Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-012 *19 January 1995*

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Russia's Gaydar Compares Chechnya to Afghan War

AU1801174295 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 17 Jan 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with former Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar by Vera Ivanovicova in Prague; date not given: "Yeltsin Has No Chance of Being Reelected"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ivanovicova] In your opinion, how can the conflict in Chechnya be resolved?

[Gaydar] It will be a difficult process. It is always problematic as far as ethnic relations are concerned. It took decades to reach a settlement in Northern Ireland. At the same time, England's prestige was not at all damaged when it began to negotiate. In Chechnya, this process, which was complicated anyhow, has now become incomparably more difficult than it was, for instance, a year ago. Despite this, I believe there is one solution—to negotiate with those who control the situation.

World history has shown that it make sense to negotiate not with convenient regimes that lack influence but, rather, with those who are able to bring an end to the war. Today, this is primarily Dudayev. We can like it or lump it; however, an agreement with him will open the way to peace. According to my colleagues, who have been in Groznyy for quite a long time and are still there today, such negotiations are possible. Admittedly, they will not bring astounding results immediately, but, undoubtedly, they will contribute more to the stability and integrity of Russia than continuing with bloody clashes.

[Ivanovicova] How would you characterize the current political situation in Russia with regard to the events in Chechnya?

[Gaydar] The commencement of military operations in Chechnya has altered it quite radically. The configuration of political alliances has changed significantly. Radical nationalists, from Zhirinovskiy to Nevzorov, are now supporting the government and the president most actively, and the liberal parties, chiefly Russia's Choice, are speaking out most resolutely against the current policy toward Groznyy.

[Ivanovicova] How will the conflict in Chechnya be reflected in the economic situation?

[Gaydar] When a country is at war, this does not, naturally, create the best backdrop for economic stabilization. Doubt is being cast on this year's budget. The original version, which we supported, obviously does not incorporate either the inflation that is to be expected in connection with the war or the new dynamics of the exchange rate and the highly probable additional military expenditure. We are now getting into a most difficult situation. After Groznyy is captured, we will have to continue to deal with the Chechens, feed them, and restore everything that has been destroyed. This will cost us dearly.

[Ivanovicova] Has Russia's international status been altered?

[Gaydar] The Chechen events have, to a considerable extent, tainted the endeavor to create a new image of our country as one that is not a national aggressor but a partner for civilized democracies. On the whole, it is possible to say that momentous and rather unpleasant changes have taken place in Russia during the past two months.

[Ivanovicova] What is their main impact?

[Gaydar] First and foremost, a sharp rise in the influence of all the power-wielding institutions and a weakening of the civic institutions. If a country is at war, then, understandably, the army's influence will always increase, regardless of whether or not the war is successful. Moreover, if it turns into a long-term partisan war, the role of services such as the former KGB, now the Federal Counterintelligence Service, and the Interior Ministry will increase as required. This essentially leads to an attack on human rights.

The question is often asked whether the president is still in control of the situation. I think he is. However, developments in accordance with the scenario so far may, of course, restrict his room for maneuver to a minimum.

[Ivanovicova] Why, in the three years since the declaration of Chechen independence, has nothing been done to find a political solution?

[Gaydar] Chechnya is, in essence, an issue integrally associated with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. When the fundamental supportive elements of the eastern empire—the KGB and the Communist Party—and the readiness to use force fell apart in the USSR, it led to East Europe's gaining its independence. Then, not 15, but de facto 16 independent states were formed out of the former USSR in a similar process. One of them was formed on the territory of the Russian Federation and currently belongs to it constitutionally—the Chechen Republic. The problem does not consist of how the Chechen issue arose, but of what it was necessary to do afterwards.

[Ivanovicova] So, what should have been done?

[Gaydar] The Chechen Republic is very distinct on account of its complicated history, the deportations of 1944, and the method of its incorporation into the Russian Empire. With a relatively ethnically compact population, it was, understandably, one of the most difficult islets of ethnic problems in the whole of Russia. When its independence became a de facto reality, the most important thing was not to permit this process to

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spread to other territories. And, indeed, when the economic reforms started to be implemented at the beginning of 1992, it did not make any progress. On the contrary, centripetal tendencies began to prevail. As early as the spring, all of the republics and oblasts signed treaties that formed the basis for the reconstruction of the Russian state on federal foundations. When the market mechanisms began to function, Russia's appeal increased sharply, and not only for the former republics of the Soviet Union.

From this point of view, it is unnecessary to dramatize the Chechen problem. Taiwan has also remained independent for 40 years, and its situation was not resolved by military force and Taipei was not bombed. Calm and a combination of political and economic pressure were necessary in Chechnya. This was, without a doubt, still possible last spring.

[Ivanovicova] Could you be a little more specific?

[Gaydar] At that time, Dudayev's regime was obviously losing popularity; the economy was in a state of collapse, the petrochemical plant was hardly working, Dudayev was losing control of the territory, and an ever wider circle of his allies was transferring to the opposition. The spokesmen from various Chechen groupings, from those close to Dudayev to those distant from him, came to Moscow with an urgent plea to reach an agreement somehow.

[Ivanovicova] So where was the mistake made?

[Gaydar] I believe that the very weakness of Dudayev's regime last spring played, to a major extent, a provocative role. Some people in Moscow, those whom we now call the warring side, came to the conclusion that, because Dudayev was so weak, there was no need to negotiate, but it was possible to use force to preserve Russia's integrity. They did not understand that Dudayev was completely different without the external Russian threat. That is, there are two Dudayevs. The first was, until last fall, one of the conflicting and not too popular Chechen politicians. The second is now, following the imposition of force, an absolutely essential leader of national resistance and, in this context, an incomparably more powerful man.

[Ivanovicova] Is it possible to compare the sending of Russian troops to Groznyy to any historical event?

[Gaydar] This does not involve any Russian return to anything. This act has no direct precedent in Russian history. It is, in my opinion, a very grave mistake that will have long-term consequences, and, from this point of view, it is possible to compare it to what happened in Afghanistan in 1979.

[Ivanovicova] You have said that the West is beginning to understand that the events in Chechnya are not purely a internal Russian affair. Notwithstanding, the Chechen Republic is still, constitutionally, part of the Russian Federation.

[Gaydar] Just because Chechnya is part of Russian territory, what is going on there does not have to be our internal affair. If, let us say, irresponsible politicians were—God forbid!—to come to power in your country and, to enforce order, started the carpet bombing of Brno, it would not be the internal affair of the Czech Republic, either. It would be a matter for the world community because it would involve war crimes and the mass violation of human rights.

[Ivanovicova] Is Russia still a democratic state?

[Gaydar] Yes, at the moment, Russia is a democratic state. At the moment, we have a free press. Elected bodies are still functioning in our country, and I believe it will be possible to maintain this situation.

[Ivanovicova] What about attempts to curb the freedom of the mass media?

[Gaydar] Undoubtedly, these have occurred and are continuing. This is a source of very grave concern. I would say that, if the press in Russia were really to lose its freedom, it would be a very perilous step toward eradicating all democratic institutions.

[Ivanovicova] What is your opinion on Russia's interests in the so-called near abroad countries?

[Gaydar] This is very closely associated with the issue of what Russia is and what will happen in it. A democratic, stable Russia, with an expanding market economy, could very well play the role in the near abroad countries that, shall we say, Germany plays in Europe—that is, it acts as the motor for its economic and political integration. I firmly hope that we will succeed in orienting developments in accordance with this scenario. An authoritarian, inscrutable Russia that bombs its cities and strives for strong-arm solutions would inevitably become a source of instability and a threat to its neighbors.

[Ivanovicova] Has Boris Yeltsin any chance of being reelected in the next elections?

[Gaydar] No. I think none at all.

Holan Outlines Important Steps Toward NATO

AU1801193995 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 13 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by "(bak)": "Vilem Holan Gives Priority to the Steps Toward NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Defense Minister Vilem Holan has described the steps toward the North Atlantic Alliance as one of the most important tasks of his term in office. He declared at yesterday's briefing that he would like to make significant progress in this sphere because the Army is capable of taking technical measures that will bring it much closer to NATO. According to the minister, information technology in particular, which is capable of being compatible with NATO's information technology, and the state's air

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defense are among them. The timetable for the technical measures, their specific sequence and preparation in this sphere, is now being formulated.

For air defense to be effective, it is, according to V. Holan, better to establish a regional system on account of our republic's small size. The minister said that such a system would also be cheaper in view of the fact that the investment issue plays a substantial role. The fact that our airspace would be covered by the Alliance would be very important for our integration into NATO. Other areas in which the minister would like to make significant progress are personnel, information technology, improving the work of the ministry, and the legislative sphere.

Ministry Warns Russian Oil Supplies 'Temporary'

AU1801143595 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 16 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by "(daf)": "The Resumption of Oil Supplies Was Temporary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Russian oil that began to flow into the Druzhba oil pipeline on 12 January after a four-day interruption has reached the Czech Republic and has been processed in the Chemopetrol Litvinov shareholding company since Saturday. The raw material from Russia has replaced the oil drawn from the state material reserves. However, according to information from the Foreign Ministry's Economic Section, the resumption of the Russian supplies is only one-off and temporary. The consignment, which should amount to just 180,000 tonnes of the raw material, will make full use of the oil pipeline's capacity for three to four days. Whether it will return to normal operation or whether the flow of oil will again be suspended depends on whether Russia and Ukraine manage to reach an agreement during this period on the size of the transit fees.

[The same daily on the same date on page 2, under the headline "The Resumption of the Oil Supplies Is Perhaps Temporary," carries a 300-word report by a "(daf)-"-attributed correspondent on the same subject. This report, however, adds the following passage: "According to unnamed sources, it is also possible to speculate that this year's problems with Russian oil supplies are a reflection of Russia's dissatisfaction with the course of the privatization of the Czech petrochemical industry, which has not tendered the Russian side any offer."]

BIS Interim Director Refutes Allegations

AU1801074595 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 16 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Dusan Sramek: "Devaty Feels Like a Punching Bag"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement released yesterday, BIS [Information and Security Service] Interim Director Stanislav Devaty denied any possibility that BIS could be involved in any illegal activity. He added that he is standing by the statement he issued to the media on 13 January in which he discounted such a possibility and described the claims made by ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance] Chairman Jan Kalvoda as "an attack not only against me personally, but also against other BIS staff."

"I feel like a punching bag at a village fair," said Devaty in reference to the issue. He added that, whenever something happens in this state, a scapegoat is always sought in counterintelligence. He said that he does not understand in the least what caused Kalvoda to make these allegations. According to him, Kalvoda has the right, for example, to request a meeting of the Council for the Coordination of the Secret Services, and, if he suspects that a crime has been committed, he has the option of submitting the matter to the bodies concerned with criminal proceedings. The whole situation reminds Devaty of the campaign surrounding the Wallis affair. In this context, he described as untrue the statements made by CSSD [Czech Social Democratic Party] Chairman Milos Zeman on the 15 January Debata television program. He claimed that Devaty had lied when he said, in connection with the Wallis affair, that BIS was not gathering material on our politicians.

According to Devaty, the "Teleskop" file, which Zeman was talking about, contained nothing like this, and Wallis's private records, which were confiscated by the police, did not stem from the activity of BIS or the Federal Security and Information Service.

Devaty also reacted to the claim about the alleged impossibility of supervising BIS. He referred to the "gentlemen's agreement" with the deputies' commission for supervising BIS. According to this agreement, open files will be made available to deputies at their request. "The deputies only have to be aware of the risk that, in such a case, the incomplete operation will be suspended," he added. Devaty also denied that the Kreditni a prumyslova banka's [Credit and Industrial Bank] receiver, Jozef Spisiak of the Czech National Bank, had been a BIS officer as claimed by NOVA Television and Czech Television on Friday.

He described as absolute nonsense the reports that BIS staff had investigated anyone because, according to the law, they do not have the authority to investigate bodies. "Only the StB [State Security] had this, and we have nothing in common with it, thank God," he added.

BIS 'Really Did' Gather Information on Parties

AU1801144295 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 16 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by "(has, il, toh)": "Apparently BIS Was Monitoring the Moravec Case"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague—The Security and Information Service [BIS] really did gather information

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on certain functionaries from the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL]. However, this allegedly did not involve the purposeful collation of information against these parties as ODA Chairman Jan Kalvoda and KDU-CSL Chairman Josef Lux have claimed. This is apparent from reliable information obtained by LIDOVE NOVINY.

According to our information, BIS evidently did not obtain data on the politicians illegally but acquired it legally during the investigation of Antonin Moravec, the owner of the failed Kreditni a prumyslova banka [Credit and Industrial Bank] who is now in custody, which has been under way since 1992. [passage omitted]

It is apparent from the statements made by politicians yesterday that two groups have emerged within the coalition. ODA and the KDU-CSL primarily want to clear up the alleged illegal steps taken by BIS. It is important for the Civic Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party to wait until the police wind up their investigation into the Moravec scandal. The ODA leader resolutely rejects the speculation that he made public the details about the, according to him, illegal activities of BIS in order to deflect attention from the investigation into the Moravec case.

Three years ago, the government set counterintelligence the task of investigating the companies and individuals that intended to enter the international competition to privatize the Ralsko military zone. One of these companies was the Svobodna zona [Free Zone] shareholding company, whose majority shareholder was Moravec. Therefore, BIS also investigated his Kreditni a prumyslova banka and came up against the political backdrop of Moravec's business activity. There was speculation at this time that this bank could be involved in the dubious financing of political parties. The KDU-CSL and ODA had obtained millions of korunas worth of credit from this financial institution.

LIDOVE NOVINY has ascertained that the BIS file on this issue was closed a few months ago. At the moment, the case is being investigated by the police. Seven persons have already been arrested within the framework of this inquiry.

Before Moravec was arrested, when the banker was in Slovakia and England, he was allegedly visited by senior officials from the KDU-CSL and ODA. According to sources from the Kreditni a prumyslova banka, they allegedly persuaded him not to return to the Republic. Kalvoda said at the 14 January meeting of the ODA Central Assembly in Trutnov that his information points to the existence of preventive surveillance of political parties by counterintelligence. He discounted the possibility that BIS would monitor the parties' activity just "as part of its regular work" within the framework of other cases. "I do not accept, even by insinuation, let alone explicitly, any involvement by any political party," he said and added that the information cited by the media is far from being the only basis for his suspicion. [passage omitted]

Major Dailies View Allegations Against BIS

AU1801143995

[FBIS Editorial Report] The Czech dailies of 16 January continue to highlight the allegations made by Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) Chairman Jan Kalvoda that the Security and Information Service (BIS) has been gathering information on the political parties.

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on page 6, under the headline "An Erroneous Bang on the Coalition Drum," carries a 550-word commentary on the issue by Jana Bendova and Petr Novacek. They write that the statement made by Kalvoda on 13 January, "that the BIS is perhaps spying on the political parties, placed in context with an alleged coalition war, apparently does not mean that ODA wants to provoke a conflict within the coalition. However, if Kalvoda's party only intended to penetrate the 'two-year coalition deafness,' it chose such an explosive topic and crude method of publicizing it that it is directly launching a coalition war." According to the authors, by turning to the public instead of the Coalition Four, Kalvoda himself "has violated the principle of loyalty enshrined within the coalition agreement to which ODA itself often refers." They argue that Kalvoda's gesture "is not surprising." He has merely brought to light the "state of chilly mistrust that has been prevailing within the coalition for some time now." The "crisis of trust" within the coalition has only been "camouflaged." ODA and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL), in particular, writes the daily, "are finding it harder to come to terms with the fact that differences of opinion are not being resolved in coalition political board meetings, but in the government, where the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) reigns supreme." In the opinion of the commentators, instead of getting at the ODS, Kalvoda has "tampered with public opinion and the state's good reputation." They write in conclusion: "If the coalition wants to remain in power until the regular elections, the Four should now lay down their weapons, heal the damage inflicted on the battlefield, and, mainly, begin to cure the coalition deafness."

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on page 1, under the headline, "ODA on Thin Ice," carries a 600-word commentary by Bohumil Pecinka and Karel Steigerwald in which they ask, "What led the ODA Political Council to make such a dramatic statement?" They continue: "Why has it embarked on a road of politicizing a standard investigation (of its debt with the Kreditni a prumyslova banka [Credit and Industrial Bank] owned by Antonin Moravec), if this road merely multiplies the ugly suspicions? Does ODA want to weaken the investigation by political means? Or is it even afraid of the possible arrest of some of its politicians entangled in suspect financial operations?" The authors argue that

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"anyone who wants to can accuse the authorities of anything based on 'evidence'; it is always possible to declare later: I am glad I made a mistake. Of course, if the evidence turns out to be proof, it will mean that the affair of 'ODA and the Moravec bank' will be joined by another and more serious one. However, Kalvoda's party, as a member of the coalition, would not avoid its share of the responsibility for it." Pecinka and Steigerwald conclude: "Whatever the outcome of the two 'affairs,' a significant political precedent is being set that will influence the further shaping of the political system in the Czech Republic. The worst thing would be a vague outcome or no outcome at all."

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on page 1, under the headline "One Has To Be Out," carries a 350-word commentary by Pavel Dostal in which he writes that "there are only two possibilities: Either Jan Kalvoda is out of his mind and does not know what he is talking about, or it is really true that Devaty's secret service is gathering materials against the political parties in the Czech Republic at variance with the law on BIS." Dostal doubts that Kalvoda "is out of his mind," but, if he has evidence that BIS is monitoring the country's political parties, "we are in the middle of the most serious crisis since November 1989."

ODS' Zieleniec Reacts Sharply to Kalvoda Claim

AU1701135995 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 16 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by "(ina)": "Kalvoda's Claim About the Secret Service Has Divided the Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Civic Democratic Party [ODS] Deputy Chairman Josef Zieleniec, speaking yesterday on the Debata [Debate] television program, accused the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] of destabilizing the state's political system.

This is the most critical reaction so far to the claim made on 13 January by ODA Chairman Jan Kalvoda that the secret service is illegally gathering information on his Alliance and the other parliamentary parties.

"This statement represents nothing other than casting doubts on the functioning of the political system in this country," said Zieleniec in reference to Kalvoda's claims.

Jan Kalvoda, however, on the same Czech Television program, rejected this accusation and declared that he is prepared to prove his claims about the Security and Information Service [BIS].

Nevertheless, Kalvoda considers the requests the he present his evidence in public to be incorrect because, as he said, it must be obvious to everyone that such evidence is subject to state secrecy.

Friday's claims by the ODA chairman and the subsequent reaction to them are generally considered to be one the most serious clashes between the parties in the current governing coalition. The chairman of another coalition party, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party leader Josef Lux, later confirmed the statements made by Kalvoda.

However, ODA Chairman Jan Kalvoda yesterday denied that his claim about BIS was intended as an attack on any of his coalition allies. "I am hoping for the opposite, that the coalition resolves this situation together," said Kalvoda in an obvious allusion to today's meeting of the Coalition Four, which is supposed to discuss only one issue—relations between the secret service and the political parties.

ODS officials especially reproach Jan Kalvoda for not discussing his suspicions about the secret service with the government and the appropriate parliamentary committee first.

The ODA chairman has said, however, that the Alliance informed its coalition partners, including the ODS, about its suspicions regarding the illegal gathering of information on the political parties before making them public on Friday. "We held several conversations with representatives from the coalition parties, including the ODS, on this subject before we aired it in public," said Kalvoda. According to him, Interior Minister Jan Ruml was among the Cabinet members with whom he discussed BIS's course of action before Friday's news conference.

Klaus on Coalition Complaints Against BIS

LD1701225195 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1715 GMT 17 Jan 95

[Weekly interview with Prime Minister Vlaclav Klaus by correspondent Konvalina; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Konvalina] Prime Minister, to start with, let us have a look at the most discussed problem of recent days—the suspicion by Kalvoda [chairman of the Civic Democratic Alliance, ODA, and deputy prime minister] that some coalition parties receive an inappropriate kind of attention from the Security Information Service [BIS]. Yesterday [16 January], after the coalition talks, you explained your view from the position of the chairman of the Civic Democratic Party. How do you view the situation in the coalition as the prime minister?

[Klaus] When we look at the coalition, we have to distinguish between the short-term and the long-term situation. I think all controversies in the coalition serve the sole purpose of making the two smaller political parties, which are notorious for feeling unhappy about their position, more visible. These parties appear to think that people, through a coincidence, cast their vote differently from the way they actually should, wanted, or intended. They want to make themselves more visible, and any step to achieve that is good enough. I do not

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think this kind of controversy will cause any damage to this coalition before 1996. After all, I can say that all four partners indicated this yesterday, at a news conference held after the coalition talks. I think I may reveal that this kind of feeling also dominated the meeting closed to the journalists.

In the long-term, naturally, to me such behavior indicates that there may be other coalition alternatives, different from what I and the majority of our people have always imagined. However, speculating about it today is, at least for me, somewhat premature and vain.

[Konvalina] Nevertheless, we expected that this year, in which there are no parliamentary elections, will be a quiet year. Everything looks rather different these days. Does this mean that this kind of situation might recur?

[Klaus] Let me be more precise about what we have expected. I think my presupposition was not wrong. I said that this year might be politically calm. It is likely to be a year of preparations for the 1996 parliamentary year. I have said: It does not mean that there will be no usual disputes within the coalition or between the coalition and the opposition.

I explicitly used the phrase "this will add some wrinkles or a few gray hairs to the politicians," but I think it will not, after all, reflect on the citizens immediately. I am still convinced about this. [passage omitted]

[Konvalina] In this context, your name cropped up several times in connection with your post as a BIS coordinator. How do you, in general terms, and not just in respect to these circumstances, value the work of BIS?

[Klaus] I do not know. This is naturally a much more difficult and complex issue. I have to say that my view is probably rather untypical. I would be very strict indeed when evaluating the benefits and costs of these security information services. I would take a rather uncomfortable guess that the benefits do not correspond with what it costs to run that service. I am always chastised for this view, and it is pointed out to me that all of the countries in the world have this kind of service and that they have to have them and that there has to be an institution that will discover any wrongdoings that might erode the essential principles of the country, and so on. [passage omitted]

[Konvalina] Polish President Lech Walesa pays a visit to our country today. He is the man known for the president-prime minister conflict that is taking place in Poland. Controversies between the head of government and head of state are also apparent in Slovakia, and your relationship with President Vaclav Havel is not perceived by the public as ideal, although, regarding the acuteness of it, I would not compare it to the situation in Slovakia or in Poland. However, I would like to ask you about the source of the conflict between the most important men in the structure of power in the postcommunist countries.

[Klaus] First of all, I would like to mention that, in a short while, there will be President Walesa sitting where you are sitting now, and I will certainly discuss this issue with him.

We always build some mutually balancing system. Within this balancing act, either one of the parties involved always tries to push the other one down. This happens in Poland, this happens in Slovakia [words indistinct]. I think that this in itself is not undesirable unless it goes over the limits and destabilizes the political system in the country. Otherwise, it is quite all right. We can only discuss whether the situation in Poland or in Slovakia has gone over the limits. I am convinced that we are far from that. [passage omitted]

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Meciar Discusses Screening Law, Media

AU1901122595 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Jan 95 p 12

[Second of two installments of transcript of interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by unidentified reporters of the Czech NOVA private television channel, broadcast on 9 January; place and date not given: "Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's Interview for Czech Television Channel NOVA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [NOVA] To what degree are you interested in the past of your collaborators, both those whom you have selected yourself and those who were nominated by the other coalition parties?

[Meciar] To the degree specified by existing legislation. And the possibilities specified by the legislation are such in Slovakia that no one, in fact, carries out screening. The biography, party position, and all that was explained by each of them publicly in front of everyone else. Everyone said about himself what should have been said. More than anything else, the moral criterion was concerned. I am interested in future performance; looking back at the past is always very relative. Take, for the example, the preceding government of the Slovak Republic. The prime minister had been chairman of the Club of the Leninist Spark, which had been controlled by Soviet Consul General Kuznetsov, and, as recently as 1990, was collecting party membership dues. The minister of defense was in 1990 deputy chairman of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee. And the first deputy chairman of the National Council was, after 1989, general secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia. And everyone accepted them, considering this normal and natural. But, when the Luptakites, who had occupied very low ranks in the party hierarchy or no ranks at all, emerged, everyone took them for Reds. Well, the past is a relative concept. What is the truth, and what is just a self-serving claim? You have to work with people as they are. We took over the country in a certain moral and political condition and cannot exchange its people. Let us try to think as follows: Because we are changing history, are changing the world and the entire arrangement of society. Let us have faith that it is possible that people, too, can change in the process and that yesterday's sworn enemy can become tomorrow's ally. Let us try to think that way.

[NOVA] You have inherited the Czechoslovak screening law, which is not being observed, however, as you yourself have admitted. Do you want to change this law, abolish it completely, or do you want to leave the situation as it is?

[Meciar] The screening law as approved in Slovakia was already different from the federal law. For known reasons, the National Council eliminated from the categories of StB [State Security Corps] collaborators all those who were active agents on the basis of a word of honor [sentence as published]. Hence, there were differences even then. From the viewpoint of carrying out screenings, there exists no legal norm that would define who has the authority to carry them out. The documentation is incomplete. A considerable part of the files that have something important to say is in the Czech Republic. I therefore believe that it is in the interest of the security of the state to abolish screenings as a form. In a situation where the government and the state are not in the possession of all the materials and lack an overview, when the evidence is on the territory of another state, it is more beneficial for the state to get rid of this possible source of psychological or political pressure on people who are registered. It is less dangerous. Hence, faced with two evils, I am in favor of the lesser evil, which is the abolition of the screening law, the halting of its application in practice. I would like to deal with the issue by means of principles of personnel policy. There is no need to deal with it by means of the screening law.

[NOVA] Mr. Prime Minister, a number of Slovak journalists to whom I have spoken, particularly radio and television journalists, fear for their independence. They are afraid of political pressure from your government, from parliament, from your movement. Do you think they have reason to fear censorship?

[Meciar] Censorship does not exist in Slovakia and will not exist as long as I am in the government. But that which some journalists started to practice will not exist, either. For example, when I was in the government, whether it was in 1992, 1993, or 1994, all political parties automatically reacted to each of my statements. No matter what I said.... As chairman of the largest opposition movement, in nine months I was twice given three minutes on the radio and no time whatsoever on television.

[NOVA] But you were given time on election day in a form that many people regarded as direct support for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS].

[Meciar] First of all, at the time this happened, the majority of the population, 75 percent, had already cast their votes. Second, it really is outrageous when the chairman of an opposition movement is barred from voting in his own country. If this information was made public, it was because foreign agencies had reported it. I took it as a prepared provocation. They expected me to explode there, given my temperament, which was simply intended to discredit me. The only thing reported was that I had not been permitted to vote and my protest against it. But this really was scandalous, and I believe that this was a case of electoral manipulation because 50 persons before me had also been barred from voting.

[NOVA] Do you wish the existence in Slovakia of a nationwide independent television channel, similar to NOVA in the Czech Republic? Is this really your wish?

[Meciar] We are considering several options. We are in favor of private television as a competitor for state television. This could take the form of expanding the

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TA3 channel to nationwide broadcasts or the form of taking over the STV 2 channel. The STV 2 channel could be transferred to satellite broadcasts. All of that is subject to negotiation. Once this conceptual issue is resolved, one television channel ought to be quickly privatized, still in the course of the first half of this year. And this private television might be better than NOVA. NOVA won viewers in Slovakia mainly because of its movies, which are entertaining. It represents a certain new element and enrichment of supply. We will try to keep up with it and to be at least as good as NOVA. But we might be even better.

[NOVA] Allow me in the end a personal question. You have lost a lot of weight. How and why?

[Meciar] (Laughing) When taking stock of what needs to be done if I am still to play some role in politics, one of the things was, naturally, that I must take care of myself. In the last four years, I exerted myself many times at the expense of my own health. One of the effects of the lack of movement and frequent stresses was overweight, which, too, had its side effects. As I was contemplating what I must do, one of the things was that I have to do something about myself. That is why I have lost 25 kilograms, but these kilos could come back if I do not watch my daily regimen. There were days when I even slept in the office. There was no proper daily regimen. All my movement was confined to the car, the staircase, and the corridor. The rest was one duty after another, permanent stress. During the election campaign, I used to say somewhat jokingly that, when Weiss with his 50 kilos was proclaimed the sexiest man, I, too, had to get closer to him. What if I were to be in for such an award?

[NOVA] Mr. Prime Minister, when I interviewed you in 1991, you told me that you had a barbell in a room adjacent to your office and that you lifted weights when you needed to relax. Do you still have that barbell?

[Meciar] Well, when I moved out of the office I had to remove all the fitness equipment as well. They are now in my bedroom, including the appropriate bodybuilding [posilnovaci] equipment. I have to meet my norm every day, and, when I do not do it, I feel the lack of it.

[NOVA] Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for the interview.

[Meciar] I, too, thank you.

Meciar's Response to EU Demarche Viewed

95CH0079A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Dec 94 p 16

[Article by Berthold Kohler: "The Hint From Brussels. How Seriously Does the Future Slovak Head of Government Meciar Take the Message?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague, 4 Dec—After the sound of the kettle drum from Brussels, there were, to begin with, flute notes to be heard in Pressburg (Bratislava). The Slovak ambassador to the European Union (EU) called the EU letter an "expression of interest" that, he said, is not extraordinary. The chairman of the parliament, Gasparovic, expressed "surprise" that the EU is concerned about Slovak politics at all. The election winner and designated prime minister Meciar said that all the excitement is nothing more than an "insignificant circus"; the note from Brussels, he said, was "rather friendly" after all. Only the chairman of the Slovak National Party (SNS), Slota, whose party will probably be represented in the next Pressburg government, spoke of an "intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state." "If we were to comment on some resolutions of the French or the German parliament, we would have to write diplomatic notes every month," Slota said.

The demarche of the EU, to be sure, had not been addressed to the Slovak nation. It was meant for the politicians and parties that after the parliamentary elections at the end of September, to be sure, assumed power in the state, but not the responsibility for it. The way in which Meciar's left—wing populist "Movement for a Democratic Slovakia" (HZDS), the national SNS, and the left-wing extremist "Workers' Association" (ZRS) had brought the parliament and the electronic media formally into line gave rise to concern even in far-away Brussels. In the note—an unprecedented act vis-a-vis one of the aspirants for accession in the East—the EU, after diplomatic introductory rhetoric, recalled that Pressburg, too, has to observe the European house rules if it intends to get close to the Union. The community, the note said, is "alarmed about some indications of the political development since the elections." It is expected and hoped, the note said, that Slovakia (associated with the EU), in taking further steps toward reforms, carefully consider its own interests. Those who failed to get the message, a few days later had their comprehension enhanced through figures. As Deputy Prime Minister Schmoegnerova reported, the European Parliament's Committee for Foreign Economic Relations for the time being has blocked a credit of $246 million, which had been decided on in the summer by the EU and 24 bankers for the strengthening of the Slovak currency reserves. This is "very unfavorable news," said Schmoegnerova, who remains in office only because Meciar still has not put together his cabinet. Instead of sending money, the EU requested the protocol of the "night of the long knives" in the Slovak parliament, in which the HZDS, the SNS, and the ZRS had removed their political opponents.

That the political recklessness of that long session was an outgrowth not of a desperate act of revenge, but of a general mental attitude was proved sufficiently by the past few weeks. In order to perhaps after all still achieve an absolute majority in parliament alone with the SNS—and without the unreliable ZRS—the HZDS continued its attempts to eliminate the "Democratic Union" (DU) of Prime Minister Moravcik, who is still in charge. In the DU congregate, above all, former HZDS members, in Meciar's view "traitors and election cheats." Were the

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15 mandates of the DU to be eliminated from the parliament, it would be much easier for Meciar to govern. This is why the HZDS asserts that the DU had not had the 10,000 signatures necessary for admission to the elections. To be sure, two election commissions, which also had included HZDS people, prior to the election had confirmed to the DU that its lists were in order. What is more, after the elections the Constitutional Court turned down a lawsuit brought by the HZDS against the DU. Thereupon a commission of the Mandate Examination Committee, in which the HZDS has the majority, unlawfully acquired the signature lists kept in the Ministry of Interior. After a "reexamination," which took place without a notary public, the commission asserted that the DU lacked the required number of signatures. After there had been every opportunity for manipulation, however, the evidential weight of the lists in the meantime is close to zero. The chairman of the Mandate Examination Committee, a ZRS man, did say in the end that the HZDS, indeed, was right in its accusation, but the DU deputies should retain their seats. It would be best, he said, to leave the affair on the "moral plane." But the HZDS was not content with this and announced further steps against the party.

With their act of violence in the parliament and with the campaign of revenge against the DU, the HZDS ruined its last chances to win a party that is presentable abroad for its own coalition. After continuous off and on, the "Christian Democratic Movement" (KDH) and the "Party of the Democratic Left" (SDL) turned down Meciar's invitations, since the HZDS was not willing to abandon either is confrontational policy with respect to the state president nor its dreams of creating a presidential system. In view of the paralysis of public life, the DU, KDH and SDL, however, urgently called upon Meciar to form at long last a government on the basis of his alliance with the SNS and the ZRS. That Meciar's adversaries almost implore him to assume the post of head of government suits the cunning tactician extremly well in his self-staged role as savior.

Meciar announced the presentation of the new cabinet for mid-December (almost three months after the elections). Beforehand he wants to put on display the government currently in office. It is to present its budget proposal for the coming year—without any chance of getting it accepted. Whether later the HZDS will find it easier to push through its own conceptions remains to be seen. With the "Workers' Association" as coalition partner, which actually wanted to remain a protest party and never to enter a government, it will be impossible to enforce budget discipline. The uneasiness revealed when dealing with this majority-creator stems from the fact that, in chumming up with the people, the ZRS still overtakes the HZDS on the far Left. For this reason, the newly founded ZRS had succeeded right off the bat in entering the parliament. But populism, KDH chairman Carnogursky recently said in resignation, "can be defeated only by letting it govern and letting oneself be unmasked." Meciar's opponents once again have no choice but to hope for the mistakes and inadequacies of a team that politically and culturally exhibits a level like that demonstrated in the end by the communist regime. Whether at least Brussels is able to bring Pressburg to its senses through "friendly" notes remains to be seen. Meciar, at any rate, said that the declaration of the EU was "a hand extended, not a threatening finger."

ZRS Says Party To Support Government Manifesto

AU1801143695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 17 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Miroslav Kocnar, deputy chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia, by Ivan Stulajter; place and date not given: "Many Ideas in the Policy Statement Have Been Initiated by the ZRS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the ZRS [Association of Workers of Slovakia] and the Party of the Workers of France (SPF) held talks on 14 January. They issued a joint statement, in which it is said, among other things, that "it is our duty to tell the governments, the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Union: This policy, which is casting the whole world into barbarianism, must be stopped." The two parties' representatives also agreed that privatization is a source of speculative economy.

[Stulajter] In its policy statement, the government endorses cooperation with international financial institutions. You are a government party. How can your positions be reconciled with declarations contained in this seminal government document?

[Kocnar] During coalition talks with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], we agreed that the party's program and the government policy statement need not be in full harmony. As a coalition party, we can support the policy statement while retaining our own views on some partial issues. The ZRS's attitudes toward the IMF and the European Union differ greatly from the HZDS's position. But, if trust in the government is to sound convincing and conflict-free, we must, in view of coalition agreements, simply forget about some things that are characteristic of the ZRS policy when discussing the government's policy statement. On the other hand, when considering entering the government coalition, we reserved the right to declare our attitude toward those institutions quite autonomously and independently of the policy statement.

[Stulajter] Is it thus possible to expect that, at the very least, during the debate on the policy statement in the National Council of the Slovak Republic plenum, the ZRS will demand that sentences in which the government declares its positive attitude toward international financial institutions be deleted or modified?

[Kocnar] Even though I might perhaps prefer their deletion, we will not demand the deletion of these points because we realize what a delicate situation arises for the

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ZRS if we are to support the policy statement as a whole. This will be, in fact, the ZRS's concession toward its coalition partners because we realize that the IMF and the European Union have a sense for the policy of the HZDS, but also for the policy of Slovakia in general.

[Stulajter] The government also declares its intention to accelerate privatization. You, on the other hand, say that privatization is a source of speculative economy ...

[Kocnar] We have now gotten into a situation in which we are reconsidering some of our views, including views of privatization. There are privatization projects regarding which the employees of the companies themselves ask us to try to facilitate their privatization in order to secure their further development.

[Stulajter] Is the statement made at the meeting with the SPF to be understood as a misunderstanding then?

[Kocnar] I would not call it a misunderstanding, but our position was not accurately specified. On the other hand, there are cases where we reject privatization out of hand. This concerns strategic industries such as arms manufacturing.

[Stulajter] What then is the ZRS's measure of compromise in the government coalition?

[Kocnar] The entire measure of compromise that the ZRS is ready to accept is incorporated in the policy statement. Many ideas appearing in this document have been initiated precisely by the ZRS.

Origin of Stolen Machine Guns Not Yet Revealed

AU1801143895 Bratislava SME in Slovak 17 Jan 95 p 2

[TA SR report: "Origin of Stolen Tank Machine Guns Still Unknown"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Trencin—The stolen weapons seized last Wednesday by a special police unit on a state road in Trencin district do not come from depots subordinated to the General Staff of the Slovak Army [ASR], Colonel General Jozef Tuchyna, the chief of the ASR General Staff, told the TASR yesterday. At the same time, he refused to reveal from which depots the 50 tank machine guns had been stolen. According to Tuchyna, the origin of the weapons is being investigated by criminal prosecution bodies, and no facts connected with this case can be made public as long as the investigations continue. Jozef Tuchyna said that two of the three detained persons in whose three passenger cars the stolen goods had been found were members of the ASR General Staff with the rank of major. "The two majors acted in the whole case rather as dealers," Jozef Tuchyna said and confirmed that, in keeping with the law, no personnel measures would be drawn against the detained ASR General Staff members before the criminal proceedings have been wound up.

[Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 17 January on page 2 carries a 600-word Roman Slusny article on the seizure of 50 stolen tank machine guns on 11 January, which states that, apparently in response to the case, "the physical check of all small arms is being performed in ASR and Slovak Defense Ministry units and facilities today and tomorrow, on the basis of extraordinary measures ordered by the Slovak minister of defense. Within the framework of this check, all registered and actual movements of weapons will be verified, with emphasis on the confirmation of their delivery to the point of destination." Slusny notes that the theft of the 50 tank machine guns, "whose value on the black market is approximately 100,000 Slovak korunas apiece," was motivated by "an effort at enrichment."]

Police Say Drug-Related Crime Doubled in 1994

AU1801134495 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Jan 95 p 4

[TASR report: "Young People Most at Risk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—During 1994, members of the Slovak Police uncovered 67 perpetrators participating in the illegal production and possession of narcotic and psychotropic substances. In addition to these cases, they clarified 14 cases related to the spreading of drug addiction. Jozef Bobula, LLD, senior investigator of the Police Corps' Office of Investigations, told the TASR yesterday. "The number of drug-related crimes has doubled in comparison with 1993," Jozef Bobula said. These crimes were committed not only by citizens of Slovakia, but also by foreign nationals. The trade in drugs is organized by international criminal organizations, which use Slovak drug dealers to spread the drugs, mainly among young people.

Year-End Unemployment Rate Reaches 14.59 Percent

AU1801144095 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Jan 95 p 2

[TASR report: "Bratislava Is the Easiest Place To Find a Job; Accelerated Growth of Unemployment Toward Year's End"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Toward the end of last year, the growth of unemployment in Slovakia accelerated again. By the end of December, labor offices registered 371,481 job seekers, which was 8,476 more than in November. The rate of unemployment rose to 14.59 percent and was 0.33 percentage points higher than in November.

According to data provided by the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and the Family yesterday, the number of unemployed rose 2.33 percent in December and was 0.92 percent higher than at the end of 1993. In the course of last year, labor offices newly registered 327,316 job seekers and removed 323,930 people from their records.

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Through job vacancies offered by them, labor offices managed to mediate jobs for 87,779 job seekers last year.

Regional differences in the rate of unemployment continue to deepen. At the end of the year, the unemployment rate exceeded 20 percent in 10 districts of Slovakia and 15 percent in 13 districts, and in only three districts was it lower than 10 percent. The highest unemployment rate is in the districts of Rimavska Sobota (28.41 percent) and Roznava (23.67 percent). The lowest unemployment rate is in Bratislava (5.01 percent) and the districts of Trencin (7.55 percent) and Bratislava-Environs (8.21 percent). The number of job vacancies reported by employers at labor offices decreased by 329 since November, to 13,046 at the end of December, which also means that the number of job applicants per each vacant job increased.

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Spent Nuclear Fuel Elements Transported to Russia

LD1801211395 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A train carrying spent fuel elements from the Paks Atomic Power Station to Russia has left Hungary's territory. The 55 tonnes of strongly radioactive material are being transported in purpose-built railway carriages. The route is being guarded by more than 1,000 personnel, to ensure that the train does not have to stop, even in case of a breakdown. [sentence as heard]

Meanwhile, preparation of a second consignment has already begun. According to plans, temporary storage for the spent fuel rods will also be built in Paks.

Defense Minister Attends Military Exercises

LD1801230495 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Army's budget for this year leaves little scope for attractive military exercises. This is why soldiers are practicing cooperation between smaller Army units. The defense minister viewed one of these maneuvers today.

Today on the great plain in the region of Tatarszentgyoergy, the Szolnok Airborne Battalion and the Bercsenyi Mechanized Artillery Brigade held military exercises combined with live artillery practice. During the course of these exercises, the rapid airborne units occupied the territory, advancing step-by-step, followed by mechanized artillery with stronger fire power. However, fog made flying impossible today; therefore, jeeps and units were not transported by helicopter, and the targets also became almost invisible.

For this reason, on the one hand, the low temperature demanded supreme physical fitness on the part of the soldiers, while on the other hand, the live firing was also dangerous and demanded close attention and much organization.

Feeling solidarity with the soldiers—this time literally—and getting acquainted with them at the end of the exercises, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti and Army Commander in Chief Janos Deak were informed that the majority of the special unit consisted not of conscripts but professional soldiers.

Despite the difficult circumstances, experts considered the exercises to have been successful.

Interior Ministry Issues Immigration Regulations

AU1801143795 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 18 Jan 95 p 5

["Correspondent's report": "The Immigration Quota for 1995 Is 2,000"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some 2,000 immigration permits can be issued this year, but this quota does not affect the ethnic Hungarians—we learned from Gabor Vilagosi, interior ministry political state secretary. He also told us that the number of immigration requests has been moving between 15,000 and 17,000 in recent years, and that in most cases, ethnic Hungarians want to settle permanently in Hungary.

Vilagosi told us that the 1993 law on the travel of foreigners into Hungary and their residence and immigration here authorizes the government to determine the immigration quota every year. The cabinet decides on the basis of the proposals submitted by the interior minister, and it drew up a quota for the first time in 1994, a quota similar to the one stipulated for this year.

The number of immigration requests has been moving between 15,000 and 17,000 in recent years, but almost 20,000 people sought to immigrate in 1991. Most of them came from Romania, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and from the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Most of these people—at least 80 percent—are ethnic Hungarians and thus not affected by the immigration quotas.

Only about 10 percent of these people were not ethnic Hungarians. Besides, it is an open goal of this quota determination to limit the number of foreigners settling here—foreigners who do not know, or know very little, the Hungarian language and customs.

At the same time, the regulations also provide concessions in this field: People who enjoy temporary refuge in Hungary, or people who were recognized as refugees before and who no longer have this status, should be treated advantageously. According to Vilagosi, some 3,000-3,500 people in this category turn to the authorities annually with immigration requests.

According to earlier data, one-fifth of the people asking to immigrate are under 18 years of age, 70 percent are between 18 and 70, and every tenth person is already of retirement age. The percentage of graduates of higher education is higher than the average among the population, but it is not true that the people who want to settle in Hungary are mostly intellectuals.

Vilagosi told us that decisions on the requests can take one to two years on occasion, and that the number of rejected requests is increasing. Thus, for example, a total of 10,000 permits were issued in 1993, and 2,000 requests rejected. In 1990, however, the request to immigrate was denied in only 88 cases.

Bank Leader Views Debts, Budget, Economy

AU1901112195 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 Jan 95 pp 1, 10

[Interview with Gyorgy Szapary, deputy chairman of the Hungarian National Bank, by Katalin Bossanyi and

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Gabor Ferencz; place and date not given: "Szapary: A Supplementary Budget Might Again Be Needed This Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Hungary enjoys the confidence of the international capital market. However, to preserve this confidence, we have to improve the foreign balance. If confidence in the country is shaken, then it does not matter who took on the loans. For our international assessment, it makes no difference whether the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] took on the loan to finance the country or an enterprise did, to expand its production—believes MNB deputy chairman Gyorgy Szapary.*

On the basis of the bank's internal regulations, Szapary has exercised the duties of chairman since Akos Peter Bod left the position. In his interview with NEPSZABADSAG, Szapary emphasized that we cannot put our minds at ease by saying that the enterprises, rather than the state or the MNB, are responsible for the indebtedness—although loans given to private enterprises are normally better utilized than state loans. Assessing the 1995 budget, Szapary said that he agrees with the finance minister in that a later adjustment that will reduce the planned level of the budget deficitmight be needed.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What does the status of executive chairman mean for you? What are you entitled to do?

[Szapary] According to the MNB's internal regulations, in the absence of the chairman, all his duties are exercised by the general deputy chairman. This is the situation now. Daily affairs are conducted normally but we are not making any decisions on certain issues that would considerably limit the chairman, for example, in organizational matters.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How far have you progressed in drawing up the 1995 monetary policy guidelines?

[Szapary] The proposal will soon be submitted to the directorate and the MNB's board.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is it possible that the guidelines will be submitted to Parliament before the new chairman is appointed?

[Szapary] If the MNB's board accepts the guidelines, then it is. It is our obligation to inform the government and parliament.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Were you given any instructions or mandate when the period of transition began in the MNB?

[Szapary] I was not; my authorization automatically follows from the bank's internal regulations.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You probably often meet foreign bankers and financial leaders. Can this transition period also be seen in changed assessments of the MNB?

[Szapary] Many people ask who will be the chairman and when, but the current situation does not cause any problems. Assessments of the MNB are good and it is believed to be a stable institution.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Contrary to the former, more optimistic prediction, the payment balance closed with a $4 billion deficit last year. What are your views on this situation?

[Szapary] By all means, the present deficit of the current payment balance has to be taken seriously. Although the deficit in itself is not necessarily something bad, its reasons and the ways it is financed also have to be known before an assessment can be made. The increase in investments played a major role in accumulating this deficit. This is a positive process; however, the increase in domestic consumption also significantly contributed to the deficit. At the same time, the deficit was only partially financed by the incoming working capital that does not create debt. Therefore, a large part of the deficit also added to the increase in foreign debt. No country is in a position to allow its foreign debt to increase to such an extent as Hungary's has increased in the past two years! This process has to be stopped. It would be ideal if consumption temporarily decreased and the savings increased because, in this case, the investments would not have to be decreased to such an extent; in fact, they could perhaps even continue to grow. Unfortunately, our tools are not refined enough for this and our measures—for example, interest rate increases—to reduce consumption and increase savings also affect investments. In 1994, the population's real income increased by about 5 percent; therefore, we should now achieve a stop on increasing wages. In a macroeconomic sense, the deficit of the current payment balance means that domestic accumulation exceeds new savings. Therefore, to reduce the deficit, savings will have to be increased and consumption decreased. However, to increase net domestic savings, in addition to increasing the savings of the population and of companies, it is also necessary to reduce the budget deficit.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Still, why does the deficit in the current payment balance exceed the former expectations to such an extent?

[Szapary] We do not yet have final data for 1994. It is not much bigger than what we said one or two months ago, which was between $3.7 and $3.8 billion.

[NEPSZABADSAG] However, the $3.7 billion was already an increased amount.

[Szapary] At the beginning of the year, $2.6 billion was mentioned and the actual deficit is much larger than this amount. However, imports increased more dynamically than expected. Although exports also increased faster than expected, the increase of imports exceeded this, due to the increase of investments and popular consumption. It is within the error margin if our former estimate of $3.8 billion turns out to be $4 billion.

[NEPSZABADSAG] According to the data, exports grew by 15 percent and imports by 20 percent. Is the difference between the two figures a sufficient explanation for

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the size of the deficit? Is there no confusion around registering the working capital? Is it not possible that the export-import statistics are incorrect due to a possible expectation of devaluation?

[Szapary] It is possible that the December data are somewhat distorted due to concealed capital repatriation speculating on devaluation.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Let us return to indebtedness. Some experts warn that it is mainly the debts of enterprises that have increased; therefore, concrete and hopefully profitable projects are increasingly behind the debt. However, the restrictive measures will also affect these prospering enterprises.

[Szapary] This also shows that Hungary enjoys the confidence of the international capital market. To preserve this, we must improve our foreign balance situation. If confidence is shaken in a country's ability to pay, then it no longer matters who took on the loans. If, all in all, a country uses more than it produces—and finances this through indebtedness—then the time might come when creditors' confidence is shaken; then it does not matter who gave the loan and for what purpose. Of course, the loans taken on by private enterprises are better, because they are usually better utilized than loans taken on by the state.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Does this mean that it does not matter at all, for our international assessment, whether the MNB takes on a loan to finance the country or, let us say, the Tungsram company does, to buy a new production line?

[Szapary] In assessing the debt burden, it makes no difference. Trade bank experts also look at the economic indicators, and they become more cautious if the debt burden is very high compared to the exports and they cannot see any chance for this to be reduced. We cannot put our minds at ease by saying that the loans leading to indebtedness were taken on by the state or the MNB rather than the enterprises.

[NEPSZABADSAG] The average interest rates of trade banks on loans are rather high, at around 30 percent. This equally punishes the good and the bad enterprises because few activities can produce enough for this rate of interest, in Hungary. Are you not afraid that the enterprises will bypass the banking system and take on cheaper loans from abroad, thus further increasing the debt stock?

[Szapary] It is a fact that the high interest rates squeeze out investments. Nevertheless, the domestic debt stock continued to increase just the same, in 1994. It is true that the dynamic increase of loans guaranteed by the state and of preferential loans played an important role in this. It is also true that foreign loans become more attractive when the real interest rates are high in a country. In fact, even foreign speculative capital starts to show an interest. This has to be faced, but only one lasting solution exists: We have to end the conditions that created these high rates on loans. If it was the budget deficit, then the deficit has to be reduced. All other methods—sticter regulations on capital imports, and making them more expensive—can be only temporary measures.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What are your views on the government's economic measures?

[Szapary] We agree with the governmental goal that the deficit of the current payments cannot exceed $2.5 billion this year....

[NEPSZABADSAG] This is already something of the past....

[Szapary] We agree with the goal. To achieve this, the MNB would have to withdraw some 150-170 billion forints' liquidity from the economy. This will be very difficult because it might involve extremely high interest rates. This is one of the reasons we are urging that the budget deficit be made smaller than the proposed amount. We have not yet succeeded in this, but the finance minister also believes that an adjustment might be needed later in the year.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Would this be done through a supplementary budget?

[Szapary] I believe so. If the payment balance does not improve, then I hope that a supplementary budget will be submitted.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What happens if the economic policy does not change and the budget deficit is not reduced? Will the interest rates go above 50 percent?

[Szapary] It is not possible to achieve the necessary improvement in the payment balance through interest rate policy alone if the budget deficit is not reduced.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What about a bigger devaluation? Many people believe that a one-time, major devaluation of the forint is needed, instead of the current exchange rate policy of small adjustments.

[Szapary] An improvement cannot be achieved by exchange rate policy methods, either, if they are not backed by an adequately strict budgetary and monetary policy. Otherwise, the balance-improving effect of the devaluations disappears.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Has the effect of the 8-percent devaluation in the summer disappeared?

[Szapary] The forint's real devalued state has not disappeared because inflation has not increased to the same extent.

[NEPSZABADSAG] According to certain views, this devaluation, which can be called drastic, was already too late; therefore, it could not have achieved its goal.

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[Szapary] We saw a one-step major devaluation possible only together with expenditure-reducing measures in the supplementary budget and restrictive monetary measures that were to support these. Devaluation is only one economic policy tool and its effects are influenced by the application of other tools. Let us assume that we devalue the forint by a high percentage. If this is immediately followed by wage increases accelerating inflation, compensations that have to be paid, and increasing deficit, then we cannot achieve the hoped-for improvement of the balance.

[NEPSZABADSAG] The country's debt-servicing burden reaches one-third of the budget's expenditure side. What are your views on this situation?

[Szapary] If the budget deficit is not reduced, then we will sooner or later get into a situation where the budget calculated without interest rate payments will have to have a surplus to be able to pay the interest. This means that an increasing proportion of the tax revenue would be spent on paying interest on the debts and a smaller proportion could be used for financing other goals—roads, schools, and so on.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How much loan does the MNB expect to take on in 1995?

[Szapary] If the current payment balance deficit does not exceed $2.5 billion and the inflow of working capital meets the expectations, then the MNB's net foreign indebtedness might even decrease. Actually, the international economic conditions are favorable to Hungary. An upswing has started in Western Europe. We should make use of the favorable situation, and it is now that we should take the necessary adjustment measures. They would not need to be as restrictive now as during a recession.

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PM Addresses Sejm on Defense; Walesa To Speak

LD1901095095 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0900 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Sejm resumed its proceedings an hour ago. National defense is the main subject of today's deliberations. President Lech Walesa, commander of the Armed Forces, is present. A government report on the basic issues related to Poland's defense was presented by Prime Minister [PM] Waldemar Pawlak. Over to our parliamentary correspondent:

[Correspondent] At the end of his speech, Waldemar Pawlak said that in Europe it is not structures to win wars that are important but structures that will make wars unprofitable. He devoted much attention in his speech to external aspects of our defense.

Jerzy Milewski, secretary of state in the Defense Ministry, took the floor after him. At the moment, he is presenting an outline of government bills that will be submitted to the Sejm for discussion today. This will be the first reading of these bills. [passage omitted]

The president of the Polish Republic will speak later.

UW Criticizes Pawlak Economic Moves

WS1901124995 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by K.O.: "Freedom Union Critical of Government's Economic Policies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *According to Waldemar Kuczynski, a member of the presidium of the Freedom Union [UW], the state of the Polish economy in 1994 was better than in 1993 (when Hanna Suchocka was prime minister). However, UW is concerned about the economic activities of Pawlak's team, in particular the slackening of the privatization process and the lack of progress in fighting inflation.*

UW believes that the economic situation and specific economic policies have to be viewed separately. The positive growth tendencies in 1994 were primarily the result of the economic policies of Solidarity governments. "The coalition governments refused to acknowledge that there was economic growth until voters cast their votes in the elections," Kuczynski said. There are positive aspects in the present economic situation, according to UW, such as: considerable growth rate of the GDP; a curbing of the unemployment growth—actually, unemployment was slightly decreased; an improvement in the balance of payments; an increase in the foreign currency reserve; and a surge in investments.

While assessing specific economic actions undertaken by Pawlak's team, UW criticized the "lack of a clear and uniform stand of the government on the ownership structure of the Polish economy." Waldemar Kuczynski believes that, as a result of this, "some investors are just standing by with guns at their feet, waiting for a better government."

UW also insists that the government put into effect the plan for keeping inflation at the projected level of 17 percent. Also criticized was the government's failure to undertake reforms of the insurance system, the health service, and the pension and educational systems, which "previous governments had not completed, chiefly because they carried out many other equally difficult reforms that had to come first."

"Waldemar Pawlak has said that his government's policy 'does not involve any shocks and leaps,'" Kuczynski warned. It is hoped that the government's policies will not lead to a situation where there will be "shocks caused by delays."

UW Group Against Assembly Meeting on 4 Feb

LD1701223195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1844 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 17 Jan—It was decided at a meeting on Tuesday that the Freedom of Union [UW] parliamentary floor group is against the summoning of the National Assembly on 4 February. According to the Presidium of the group, this would mean "turning parliamentary matters into some sort of a spectacle," the deputy chairman, Jan Maria Rokita, said.

Rokita said that, on the same day, the Sejm speaker informed the Council of Elders of the possibility of summoning the National Assembly for 4 February. The Assembly would possibly adopt regulations, including a regulation on the procedure for indicting the president.

Rokita pointed out the "striking similarity" between the proposed date for the National Assembly meeting and the fact that 2 February is the last date for the president's decision on the Budget Law, and the next day is the last of a three-month period for passing the budget, as to which there was a disagreement between the lawyers. This would be "a somewhat frivolous spectacle, which would be intended as a warning for the president," Rokita said.

Party Congress Viewed; Delegates Criticize Walesa

WS1701142195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Eliza Olczyk: "Union of Labor Wants Independent Candidate for President; Zielinski or Kuron—Talks Have Already Been Held"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Union of Labor [UP] is going to begin a campaign in favor of a civil accord which would support a nonaligned candidate for president. Ryszard Bugaj informed the participants of the Fourth UP Congress that he has already discussed this with Jacek Kuron and Professor Tadeusz Zielinski. Both

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preliminarily agreed to run for president. Ryszard Bugaj was once again elected chairman of the party. There was no opposing candidate.

One result of the two-day Saturday-Sunday session of the Fourth UP Congress was a resolution that states that Polish democracy is threatened by social tensions created by the pauperization of citizens, as well as by "aspirations of politicians caused by the coming presidential elections." Incidentally, threats to Poland in general and democracy in particular were the leading motif in all the speeches before the discussions.

Capitalism With the "Muzzle of a Wolf"

Ryszard Bugaj talked about threats arising from the activity of Lech Walesa. According to him, he "cannot find a place for himself in the democratic system." Bugaj stressed that the strength of the president increases if the governing coalition is weakened. He announced that UP will submit amendments to the Small Constitution that are to ensure that if the parliament is dissolved, it will continue to work until the new parliament is constituted.

The international situation can also be a threat to Poland. Bugaj did not rule out that the imperial designs in Russia may become increasingly stronger, while the West follows a policy of consent, just to be left alone.

There are other threats as well: the construction of a capitalism with "the muzzle of a wolf," the limiting of social protections, the lack of a structural program for combating unemployment, a steady decrease in the amount of money earmarked for education, ideological privatization, and a limiting of the rights of employees' self-government. Bugaj believes that all this will lead to the establishment of a class structure in Poland: the rich will remain rich, and the poor will have no chance to get out of their class.

Fight for Power

Zbigniew Bujak believes that threats to our democracy are to be found in the weakening and disintegration of the judicial authorities, who, in addition, cannot get protection.

"The president, who is not really threatened by anything, has the greatest protection services in the country," Bujak said. "The executive authorities can also be called names; judges and prosecutors cannot hope to get any protective services. Is this a coincidence or a logical action?"—Bujak asked.

Bujak believes that another threat is the treatment of posts in the state administration as the party's loot. This makes it impossible to establish an efficient apparatus for running the state. According to Bujak, the president and his irrepressible desire to have more power is a threat as well. Lech Walesa introduced the principle: Whoever is not in power, has no meaning; whoever loses this power, is trampled underfoot. In such a situation a fight for power is a fight for life.

"Lech, you are not governing. You are playing with power. Instead of being a guardian of the law, you are playing with the law. This is unacceptable. If you violate a democratic procedure, we will be against you," Zbigniew Bujak said.

Law Like a Playground

Democracy is threatened by the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW], subordinated to which are police, the Office of State Protection, the Personal Security Unit, Border Troops, fire brigades, and the Vistula Military Units (that is, regular Army units). Bujak believes the MSW is capable of carrying out or preventing any coup d'etat.

"Only MSW Chief Andrzej Milczanowski is the guarantor that this [such a coup] will not happen," Bujak said, adding that the question of whether or not Milczanowski will continue to be minister came up recently. [passage omitted]

The delegates supported the idea of waging a campaign supporting an independent candidate for president, and authorized UP leaders to conduct further talks with both candidates and groupings that would be prepared to back such a concept.

Alone in Left Wing

The delegates also discussed the position of UP on the political scene. Ryszard Bugaj stated that the UP is now the only leftist party. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] shifted toward the liberal center; the Freedom Union found itself to the right of SLD. The programmatic identity of the Polish Peasant Party is difficult to specify—though, as Bugaj believes, the party is dominated by pragmatism without any clear principles. In this situation the entire party configuration moved to the right. The left side of the political scene is represented only by the UP, which is the only grouping that wants, and is able, to defend social justice.

During the discussion most delegates agreed with this evaluation of the situation, even though some seemed to long for participation in the formation of a governing coalition. Certain delegates said failure in the local elections was caused by the indecision of UP leaders as to whether to enter the government or remain in the opposition. In the last analysis, however, the delegates supported the party's program and re-elected Ryszard Bugaj chairman. In a week the newly elected UP National Council will convene in order to appoint deputy chairpersons of the party.

SdRP: Coalition Should Agree on One Candidate

WS1301093695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 11 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Wojciech Zaluska: "The SdRP Makes a Suggestion to Pawlak: Take the Belweder, Give Back the Government"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] *"The Council of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] suggested that the governing coalition put forth a joint candidate for the presidential elections," we begin speaking to Janusz Piechocinski of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. "And that candidate was considered to be Waldemar Pawlak," the PSL member interrupts us.*

He then ironically adds: "We hear from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] that the SdRP concept is to put Pawlak forth in the presidential elections, thus ousting him from the government. The new prime minister would be...Aleksander Kwasniewski."

One of the SLD leaders confirmed this hypothesis. Behind the scenes at the Sejm, it is rumored that putting Pawlak up for the elections would allow Kwasniewski to take control of the government. It could also aid him in the party squabbles. If Pawlak became a coalition candidate, Jozef Oleksy could not run. The Sejm speaker is becoming Kwasniewski's chief rival in the fight for the "rule of souls" in the SLD. Running in the election campaign would strengthen his position. At the cost of Kwasniewski, of course.

The Basic Concept

Kwasniewski himself told GAZETA WYBORCZA yesterday that the "Pawlak for president, Kwasniewski for prime minister" variant is possible, but it is not the only option. He did not want to talk about "personal data." He explained the concept presented by the SdRP on Saturday.

"The coalition," says the SLD head, "must decide whether it wants to exist for another four years. If so, it should do everything it can not to allow for rivalry with the president to lead to inner conflicts and division. This is very likely when there are two contending candidates. If 'a third man' wins—for example, Lech Walesa—the government may fall."

Other SLD politicians, like Marek Borowski and Jerzy Wiatr, claim likewise. "If we do not put forth a joint candidate, the government will be jeopardized. Pawlak's ministers will work together until 1600 and start fighting afterwards," warns Wiatr. "Our concept enables them to concentrate on their work, not on the campaign," adds Borowski. Wiatr does not rule out making far-reaching concessions to the PSL politicians—for instance, to a prime minister and president who would be members of that party.

The Prime Minister Does Not Respond

The SLD activists do admit that so far the prime minister has not responded to their proposal. From what we learn from PSL members and from statements issued by the spokesman of the PSL Parliamentary Club, Janusz Dobrosz, it seems that the PSL's reply will be negative. They will definitely not agree to the "Pawlak-president, Kwasniewski-prime minister" variant. The post of the head of government is an "absolute top priority" for them. It gives them an instrument to actually influence economic policy and state administration.

The PSL is also unlikely to consent to a different joint candidate in the first round of elections. Party activists claim they want to cooperate with the SLD, but not that closely. They point out that the majority of the rural constituency is Catholic. An election platform with the postcommunists would cause a rift between the PSL and the church. "Pawlak can afford to wage various wars, but not one that would cause his political base to split," says one PSL member.

Chances of PSL, SLD Fielding Candidate Viewed

WS1301113095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 Jan 95 p 5

[Article by Ewa K. Czaczkowska: "PSL Candidate for President; Its Own or Nonaligned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] will most probably not field its own candidate in the presidential elections. Even if it decides on a joint candidate, it is not very likely that it will be a candidate of the coalition of the PSL and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. Nonaligned Professor Zielinski is a more likely candidate. If both the SLD and the PSL decided that their most important goal should be to try to prevent Lech Walesa from passing to the second round of the presidential elections, perhaps the PSL would run in the elections jointly with the left. The decision, however, will not be made very soon.

The Later the Better

The proposal made by the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] that the SLD and the PSL field a joint candidate in the presidential elections came to the peasants as a surprise. The proposal was put forward by the SdRP Chief Council, which means that all of the leaders of the party had agreed. Two months ago, when a similar proposal was submitted by Deputy Zbigniew Zaborowski at the session of all of the coalition's clubs, the reaction of the peasants was not only negative, but also disrespectful. "All this is really unrealistic," [PSL] Deputy Chairman Stefaniuk said. Now the peasants are saying: We will think about it. Not only because the proposal was submitted by the party's leadership, but also because the situation has changed, the conflict with the president has clearly escalated. The answer will most probably not be very speedy. The final decision—whether to wage the campaign together or separately—will not be made at one of the next sessions of the Chief Council. It will probably not even be made at the congress in February. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the congress will delegate its powers to the Chief Council at a later time or to the party's convention, which will be held in the spring. The sooner a decision is made, the sooner relations with the president will become more strained.

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It Is Difficult To Give Up One's Own Candidate

Within the PSL, the prevailing opinion is that the party should field its own candidate. This idea is supported by its leaders—Adam Struzik, Franciszek Stefaniuk, Janusz Dobrosz. They do it for a variety of reasons. "Both the SLD and the PSL can afford to field their own candidates"—this is the most-frequently repeated argument, based on the conviction that it would be a real disgrace for the largest party—that is, the PSL—not to run in the elections on its own. Every campaign is an opportunity to build and strengthen party structures, to impose discipline on members and the electorate. Janusz Dobrosz often submits a more important, historical argument. Fielding a joint candidate with the SLD would mean that the PSL decided to unequivocally support the left, whose roots are in the Polish People's Republic. In the presidential campaign, it would be an excellent argument for alternate candidates fielded by the post-August camp. The PSL would then lose the last remnants of credibility that Chairman Bartoszcze established a few years ago and that are respected by the right.

In such a situation, the PSL would unequivocally place itself on the left side of the political scene in the next years, as a result of which it would lose its chance to form possible alliances with rightist groupings. At a recent panel discussion, the leaders of the PSL, the Christian-National Union, the Union for Real Politics, and the National Democratic Party tried to persuade each other that they did not differ much in the sphere of values, although they did differ on economic issues.

Antipresidential Front

Aleksander Kwasniewski argues that, because the coalition is supposed to govern until the end of the parliament's term, it is difficult to fight for the presidency and then, after the elections, to pretend that nothing has happened and to continue working. [SdRP General Secretary] Jerzy Szmajdzinski fears that the fight for the presidency may cause the coalition to break apart. If the parties ran in the elections together, one party could handle the current affairs of the government, while the other might see to the election campaign. However, it is known that there is more to the whole issue than that. First, it is much easier to ward off any blows together; second, by "marking" the PSL, the left would have an ally in the future, even though it would not necessarily have to adore its partner. Finally, a joint candidate would stand a chance of winning the elections already in the first round (of course, separate support for a PSL candidate and a separate SLD candidate do not necessarily add up to the support of one joint candidate).

Only for this reason could the PSL decide to field a joint candidate with the left. Then all "party-related" reasons would become of secondary importance, and the fundamental goal would be to prevent Lech Walesa from passing to the second round of the elections. However, the SLD may be implementing its scenario for an entirely different reason: It may want to eliminate the PSL from the game.

Who might possibly be the joint candidate? The SLD says that party membership, whether the PSL or the SLD, does not matter. However, because Leszek Miller said "Our president, your speaker," it means that the candidate should be a representative of the left. It is not very likely that the SLD would agree to Waldemar Pawlak, unless a different scenario were to be implemented, nor is it likely that the PSL would agree to Aleksander Kwasniewski. The only person who would come into play would be Sejm Speaker Oleksy, who would be replaced in the Sejm by Jozef Zych.

Perhaps Zielinski?

In PSL circles, one can increasingly often hear the following question: Maybe we should back Professor Zielinski? Among the peasants, Civic Rights Spokesman Tadeusz Zielinski is enjoying considerable esteem and popularity. The most important matter, however, is that he might make a good nonaligned candidate. He has already been supported by the Union of Labor, to which the PSL was very close not long ago.

UW Decides How To Choose Presidential Candidate

WS1701145295 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Malgorzata Subotic: "Tragedy or Farce; Mazowiecki: Simultaneous Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Possible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Freedom Union [UW] has determined the manner in which it will select its candidate for president. All members of the party will participate in this procedure; however, the final decision will be made by the congress, which is scheduled for April. This does not mean the end of negotiations with other groupings. Nevertheless, "the chances to agree on a common candidate are next to none."

UW Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki believes that the deterriorating conflict between the president and the governing coalition may result in either a tragedy for the nation or a farce played out by the centers of authority in Poland. Unless both sides establish principles of coexistence that would not go against the Constitution, the presidential and parliamentary elections should be held simultaneously.

Mazowiecki said both sides are responsible for the deteriorating crisis between the president and the governing coalition. He decided that a classic example of this process is the resignation of Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski. "The coalition did everything to ensure that this resignation was actually submitted." This undermines the position of Poland in the uncertain international situation.

Two Authority Centers That Do Not Recognize Each Other

The UW leader said the situation of dyarchy, a situation in which authority centers do not recognize each other, is

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most dangerous for the country. The authority centers, which are in conflict with each other, may cross the line behind which there lies only a national tragedy or a farce played out by the representatives of the authorities. Therefore, unless the president and the coalition establish certain constitutionally legal rules of cohabitation [preceding word published in French], they should let the nation decide.

Later on, at the request of the Council, he explained what he meant: should that happen, the best solution would be presidential and parliamentary elections held simultaneously. The latter would be held after the parliament decided its term of office should be shortened.

Jacek Kuron, quoting the interview Lech Walesa gave recently to POLITYKA, said that "no one must put off any elections." He said that the mere mention of the possibility of postponing presidential elections was a "great threat to democracy in Poland." According to Kuron, it is impossible to remain silent about the fact that generals were given awards after the Drawsko dinner, which was a "scandal." He can also see the threat of dictatorship in the activities of the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party.

All the members of the Council agreed that the threat came from both sides: the coalition and the president.

The Closing of the Power Circle

Mazowiecki announced that UW would oppose both the authoritarian inclinations of the president and the threat of "the circle of power closing itself," if the fight for the presidency is won by the candidate of the governing coalition. This can be averted by fielding a candidate who stands a good chance of winning. Therefore, Mazowiecki urged that the Council not end negotiations with other groupings of post-August Poland, even though it has not been possible thus far to agree on a common candidate and the chances to achieve that are rather small.

Mazowiecki confirmed that press reports about names that appear in the mass media (Skubiszewski, Zoll, Brzezinski, Strzembosz) are true. He said that talks were also under way with the left side of the political scene. Even though he did not specifically mention the Union of Labor [UP], one can assume that this is the party he had in mind. Last Saturday UP declared that it would be prepared to support a nonaligned candidate in the presidential elections: Jacek Kuron (or Tadeusz Zielinski). However, not a single word was said about this proposal at the session of the UW Council.

Final Decision on All Fools' Day

Mazowiecki announced that he would not run in the presidential elections. "I can serve Poland differently." He asked that his name not be submitted. However, the UW leader answered a question from one of the party activists, who asked about his new jacket. "Not only Jacek Kuron can have a new jacket, I can have one as well," Mazowiecki explained.

The procedure for selecting UW's candidate for president was accepted without any major changes. Candidates can be submitted by the presidium, 100 members of the party, and regional councils. When all candidates have been submitted, UW circles will vote on the list of candidates. The presidium will compare the results and present its list in April (1 or 2 April) to the UW congress. However, the list prepared by the presidium will not be binding on the delegates. They will be able to make a different decision.

UW Deputy Chairman Donald Tusk said that an anticrisis group has been set up in UW. Its task will be to follow and analyze the situation in the country; they should also watch out for the possibility of dissolving the parliament and holding new elections. This group consists of Tusk, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Jan Rokita, Jerzy Woznicki, and Bronislaw Komorowski.

Aide: No Misunderstandings on Auschwitz Ceremonies

LD1601212895 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 16 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Andrzej Zakrzewski, secretary of state in the presidential chancellery, has said that there are no misunderstandings between Poland and Israel with regard to the commemoration ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Nazi concentration camp. He emphasized that it was obvious that the Poles, the Jews, and the rest of the world all have different attitudes toward Auschwitz. One must, however, find a common denominator so that Auschwitz can unite people instead of dividing them.

[Zakrzewski] "Poles have a different attitude toward Auschwitz than Jews. After all, it is a symbol of the holocaust and a cemetery of their loved ones. The rest of the world has still another attitude. The aim should be to find some sort of common platform so that Auschwitz, after 50 years, should not divide but unite.

"I regret that, in statements made by some representatives of the diaspora, particularly the U.S. one but also the German, I can see a strange relationship between the executioner, the victim, and the witness. The relationship between the executioner and the victim is a more sympathetic one than the relationship involving the witness. But the witnesses were often not indifferent: Thousands of Poles were killed as a result of helping Jews in the country on the vistula. In Yad Vashem, it is the Poles who have the most trees planted for those righteous among nations."

Minister Zakrzewski said that there were differences only between the honorary committee in charge of the commemoration ceremonies and Jewish organizations. He rejected the accusation voiced by Baron Maurice Goldstein, chairman of the International Auschwitz

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Committee, that the ceremonies were being polonized. Goldstein thinks that President Walesa should not speak in Auschwitz.

[Zakrzewski] "Baron Goldstein pointed out that Walesa should not speak in Auschwitz. It is an unequivocal position of the entire honorary committee that the president of the country on whose territory the camp was built, although not by Polish hands, of the country that is the host and the initiator of these ceremonies, has the right and the duty to say 10 sentences before the laying of the wreath.

"Some of the Auschwitz prisoners claim that Auschwitz was not liberated, that the Germans manning the camp had escaped, and, consequently, the Russians entered the grounds after the camp compound had already been liberated. I think this view is wrong.

"Another contentious issue was the participation and the place of participation of Edgar Bronfman, the president of the World Jewish Congress. Having consulted the issue with various circles, we came to the conclusion that the whole program of ceremonies would be opened by a special session of the Senate. All state delegations will take part in this ceremony, including several presidents. It does not mean that Mr. Bronfman has been pushed to the sidelines. It only means that the number of speakers in Birkenau itself, or in Auschwitz, has been limited. Mr. Bronfman is now saying that Polish-Jewish resentments have resurfaced during the preparations. It is the fact of dragging out such an issue as, for example, the Carmelite sisters [the presence of a Carmelite convent within the Auschwitz compound was for some years a bone of contention, until the convent was relocated], which arouses resentment. Mr. Bronfman is talking about the polonization of the ceremonies. If 30 heads of European states, who will be accompanied by 10 to 20 Auschwitz prisoners, have been invited, in what way does this constitute polonization? In fact, it means that the ceremonies have been made international and that tribute will be paid to all those who were imprisoned in Auschwitz and Birkenau."

Trade With CEFTA Countries Viewed

95EP0025B Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 141, 24 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Edward Molendowski, Andrzej Tymkowski, and Stanislaw Lautsch-Bendkowski: "How Are We Trading in CEFTA?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Text] The Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) was signed by the Visegrad Group partners—Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia—in December 1992. Supplemented by an annex accelerating liberalization in trade it is a document that forms the regulations that change, for the better, the mutual economic relations of these countries.

Has it fulfilled expectations for more commodity turnovers among the partners and for restoration of coproduction and service ties?

The answers to these questions may be found in an assessment of the results, thus far, of the implementation of the CEFTA agreement as compiled in the Offices of Commercial Counsellors of the Republic of Poland in Budapest, Prague, and Bratislava by Edward Molendowski, Andrzej Tymkowski, and Stanislaw Lautsch-Bendkowski, respectively.

Hungary: Favorable Tendencies

The coming into force of the CEFTA agreement on 1 March 1993 and its modified version accelerating the liberalization of trade on 1 July 1994 has caused, as confirmed by analyses made in the Office of Commercial Counsellor in Budapest, a growth in commodity turnovers and favorable changes in the structure of Polish-Hungarian trade exchange.

According to Polish statistics, turnovers for eight months of this year were valued at US$239.3 million, of which $107.5 million was Polish export to Hungary and $131.8 import from there. Compared with the same period last year, this represents an almost 18-percent growth in turnovers, with import growing 38.6 percent and export remaining at the same level. Compared with the previous year, according to these figures, an almost 40-percent growth in export from Hungary was achieved and, in import from Poland, a growth of 15.3 percent.

Regardless of the difference in figures, the negative balance for Poland of turnovers after eight months is readily apparent: over $20 million according to Polish figures and not quite $20 million according to Hungarian figures.

During this time, a drop in Polish deliveries to Hungary occurred in such commodity groups as mineral products and base metals. Last year, these deliveries made up over half of our export to Hungary and, compared with the eight-months period, even exceeded 60 percent.

Meanwhile, deliveries from Poland of farm-food articles, products from the chemical-, light-, and electrical-machines industries, and wood and its products grew. The fact that the growth tendencies appeared in the export of highly processed articles, especially food (which doubled), is a very good sign, but the growth of electrical machinery and wood products is also considerable—about 50 percent.

The tendencies in changes in the structure of export commodities noted in 1994 are regarded as being favorable because a gradual departure from the dominance of deliveries of raw materials and commodities that do not require much processing is occurring, although base metals continue to remain at the top of the list (minerals dropped from second to fourth place, being surpassed by electrical machinery and chemical products). In Polish

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export, furthermore, the most important were such commodities as copper, coal, electrical energy, sugar, medicines, automobiles, paper, diesel engine parts, copper wire, cast iron products, polyester fibers, salt, seed corn, potatoes, vegetables, wood, tires, dog and cat food (thanks to foreign investments in this branch from the West, located in Poland), aluminum alloys, and furniture.

The growth in Polish procurement in Hungary occurred in all commodity groups. But the greatest was in the field of mineral products (a twofold increase) and base metals and products made from them, plus raw materials and semifinished products that do not require much processing. But this does not have a large effect on the value of our import because these products constitute scarcely 6.3 percent of our total import from Hungary. However, our import of farm-food articles dropped (from 26.4 percent to 25.3 percent), as did chemical industry products. But this did not change their rank on the procurement list: Chemical products are still in first place, ahead of farm-food, electrical machinery and light-industry products. Most of our purchases were in medicines, automobile bodies, sunflower oil, pork, acrylic fibers and cable, spare parts for automobiles, nonalcoholic beverages, polyethylene, aluminum oxide, glass, corn, and cleaning agents.

From the standpoint of liberalization of trade between both countries, the goods on the "A" list in the CEFTA agreement are the most significant (industrial goods totally exempt from duty), as are those on the "O" list (goods with a zero duty rate). In our export to Hungary, they make up 54.3 percent of the total value and, in Hungarian export to Poland, 47.2 percent.

As the commercial counsellor in Budapest, Edward Molendowski, states, the data pertaining to the changes occurring in the commodity exchange in group "A" unequivocally confirm that the liberalization of trade, particularly the removal of duties, decisively contributed to the slowing down and then the reversing of the declininng tendencies in Polish-Hungarian turnovers. But it seems, he added, that benefits accruing from the liberalization process are not being distributed equally between both partners: The Hungarian exporters were better able to take advantage of the merits of CEFTA than the Poles (the negative, for us, balance of turnovers!). But accelerating the reduction of duties on industrial goods and greatly expanding the range of concessions on farm commodities in the July annex to the agreement forms a basis for further stimulation of exchange, restoration of severed coproduction ties, and greater incentives for foreign investments.

Slovakia: Further Liberalization Needed

In the group of commodites on the CEFTA "A" list, on which a zero duty rate has been in effect since 1 March 1994, the value of export from Poland to the Republic of Slovakia grew almost 17 percent—comparing the first six months ($4.02 million) to the same period last year ($3.44 million). The important items in this growth are salt for table use and chemical processing, medicines, nitrite, sodium carbonate, ladies blouses, and glass containers.

An examination based on statistical data from the Slovak Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Land Economy pertaining to the first six months of 1993 and 1994 did not cover all Polish-Slovak turnovers, but only a representative group of the 60 most important items in export and import. They constituted 62.4 percent of Polish export to Slovakia last year and 78.2 percent this year and, in Polish export to Poland, 66.4 percent and 71.6 percent, respectively. The share of coal alone sold during this period from Poland amounted to 37.5 percent in 1993 and 46.3 percent in 1994.

The sale to Slovakia of Polish farm-food commodities rose very greatly—by 278.9 percent, compared to the first six months of last year—but their percent share in Polish export continues to be low (a rise from 2.6 percent to 5.8 percent). Sales of processed and canned fish have been especially good.

On the other hand, in Slovakia's export to Poland, the value of industrial goods in the examined period of last year totaled $52.1 million, and $54.3 million this year. In the case of farm-food articles, the value of deliveries to Poland dropped from $5.5 million in the first half of 1993 to $3.5 million this year for the same period.

The commercial counsellor in Bratislava, Stanislaw Lautsch-Bendkowski, drew the following conclusions from the analysis:

—The creation, thanks to the CEFTA agreement, of preferential trade conditions, brought the Polish side perceptible results in the form of a growth of commodity turnovers in the first six months of 1994, and, to a great degree, this growth is evident in the group of farm-food commodities.

—But a much larger growth of Polish export of industrial goods is observed in the "O" group, where the zero duty rate is applied to all participants in trade exchange.

—The growth tendencies in Polish-Slovak commodity turnovers, according to Slovak data, are confirmed by the results of foreign trade covering eight months in 1994, which indicate a growth of total Polish export to Slovakia of 34.4 percent, compared to eight months in 1994, and a growth of Slovak export to Poland of 9.3 percent, which was undoubtedly influenced by the functioning of the CEFTA agreement.

—Still, irrespective of customs duties, export from Poland to Slovakia encounters burdensome nonduty obstacles: licenses, quotas, certificates, special import taxes, and equalization charges, in relation to certain farm-food commodities.

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—Further liberalization of trade within the framework of the CEFTA agreement would be advisable, inasmuch as the solutions embodied in the agreement do not give Poland any special preferences in access to the Slovak market. They compemsate only partially for the conditions created by the signing of agreements with the European Community and EFTA countries in behalf of their countries on this market.

Czech Republic: Preferences for Food

From the examination made in the Office of Commercial Counsellor in Prague, it may be concluded that, in the period of eight months of this year, the decisions made to liberalize trade between CEFTA partners had a dynamic effect on commodity exchanges between Poland and the Czech Republic. This effect, in the case of industrial products, was stronger in import to Poland than in our export. However, the export of farm-food articles from Poland developed more rapidly than import from the Czech Republic.

Expressed in figures, the value of export of industrial goods covered by CEFTA tariff licenses grew during this period by $33.3 million (24.1 percent) compared with figures from the same period of last year. The value of all of Polish industrial export during this period grew by $35.6 million (16.8 percent). The share of products covered by customs licenses in all of industrial export increased from 65.8 percent to 69.9 percent.

The value of commodity imports, which during this period benefited from CEFTA's liberalization of duties, grew by $70.2 million (36.6 percent), whereas total industrial import from the Czech Republic grew by $51.9 million (23.8 percent). The share of these commodities in total industrial import rose from 88.2 percent to 97.3 percent.

Export of those industrial products on which duties were reduced on 1 July 1994 to two-thirds of the base rate and will be removed on 1 January 1997 expanded the most. On the other hand, the drop in the export of goods on which duties were entirely removed on 1 July was surprising. But the largest increase in exports is seen in those commodities on which, according to the agreement, the duty will be reduced to 90 percent of the base rate—not until 1 January 1995, those on which the period for removing the duty is the longest. Their percentage share in export, however, is very slight.

A more than $500,000 increase in Polish export during the period discussed was recorded in a significantly large group of chemical and plastic products, and personal hygiene and cleanliness products. Included also are harvesting combines (a growth from zero to $71,700), woodworking and plastic-working machines, lathes, building materials, semifinished steel and sheetplate products, snowplows, sewing machines, digital data-processing machines, connecting devices for the telephone industry, furniture, tractors, passenger cars, and automobile spare parts.

In our import from the Czech Republic, similar increases in growth were recorded in chemicals, cosmetics and cleaning agents, construction materials, paper pulp, knitted fabrics, building ceramics, pig iron and unalloyed steel, turboprop engines, knitting machines, TV tubes, refrigerators and freezers, certain woven fabrics, steel products, and certain passenger cars and trucks.

The value of export of farm-food articles covered by CEFTA customs licenses was 119.4 percent higher than a year ago—that is, by $5 million, which constituted 72.5 percent of the growth of total food exports to the Czech Republic. The size of import in this group dropped from $3.8 million—that is, 40.3 percent. A significant growth in export after liberalization was recorded in the export of fish and fish products, animal food, onions, garlic, beets, lettuce, celery, cucumbers and pickles, confectionery products and baked goods, extracts, essences, and concentrates.

For many food articles, yearly duty preference quotas were established, but in some fields we did not take advantage of them in our export (this applies, for example, to meat, variety meats, rapeseed). But for many other products, the size of these quotas was established much below the actual possibilities of export and import. This applies particularly to orders that are subject to year-to-year fluctuation, depending on the size of production, its competitiveness and demand.

[Box, p 3]

CEFT Agreement Tariff Lists

A—Commodities totally exempt from duty beginning on 1 March 1993 and 1 July 1944.

B—Commodities designated for gradual reduction of duty rates.

C—Commodities "sensitive" to national economies, therefore duty-protected for the longest period of time—for example, steel products to the year 2001.

O—Commodities with a zero percentage rate ("orga omnes" principle).

R—Farm-food articles.

Polish-Hungarian Trade Improvements Noted

95EP0025A Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 24 Nov 94 p 5

[Article by Ferenc Szaniszlo from Budapest: "Benefits From CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Association)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The CEFTA agreement on the gradual elimination of duties in commodity exchanges in Central Europe, concluded by the Visegrad Group and in effect since 1 March 1993, is having an increasingly

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positive influence on trade between Poland and Hungary. This is confirmed by recent financial figures from the bilateral economic contacts of our countries.

From January to September of this year, the total value of these turnovers amounted to $239.3 million, which is an increase of almost 18 percent over the same period last year. The Hungarian traders who managed to sell us more than 38.6 percent of their products in the first seven or eight months of this year should be even happier. Our exporters, on the other hand, supplied the Hungarians almost as much as they did during the same period in 1993 (0.3 percent less). The Budapest statisticians are consoling us a little. According to their statements, Hungarian firms bought goods in Poland valued at $113.7 million, while our figures show $107.5 million. Thus, the negative balance for Poland differs: According to us, it is $24.3 million, and, according to the Hungarians, it is $19.6 million.

It is believed in the office of our trade counsellor in Budapest that this situation is the result, to a large degree, of not informing our businessmen about the possibilities offered to us by the amended and even more advantageous rules of CEFTA, which went into effect on 1 July 1994.

A closer examination of the structure of Polish-Hungarian trade exchange reveals the changes taking place in it. For example, in this year's export, the largest commodity group continues to be the base metals, making up 24 percent of the total amount, but a year ago it was 30 percent. On the other hand, products from the electrical-machinery industry slipped from fourth to second place, making up 19.1 percent of the value of Polish deliveries, while a year ago it was 12 percent. Chemical products held third place (17.1 percent), and mineral products fell from second to fourth place (from 30 percent to 16.9 percent). Fifth place is held by farm products and foodstuffs (from 5 percent to 10.2 percent, i.e., a 103-percent growth). Wood and wood products are in sixth place (a rise from 5.2 percent to 7.8 percent), and light industry products hold seventh place (up from 4.4 percent to 5.2 percent).

Summing up, we are gradually departing from deliveries of raw materials and materials that require little processing, which have dominated trade for decades, and are going to processing industry products and foodstuffs. Let us hope that this tendency is a lasting one. In any case, that is how it is supposed to be, given that we are doing everything we can to enter into not only the political and military structures of Central Europe, but also the economic ones. And, because the Hungarians are thinking along the same lines, the prime minister of Hungary, Gyula Horn, who is paying an official visit to Warsaw today, will have something to talk about with his Polish hosts.

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Spokesman Calls For Talks on Chechnya

AU1801125995 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] During his weekly news conference today, Mircea Geoana, the spokesman of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, announced the schedule of the official visit to be made to our country over 24-25 January by Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez at the invitation of President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu. [passage omitted]

Geoana said the Foreign Ministry is closely following the dramatic evolution of the events in Chechnya. The expansion of the military actions causing loss of life and much suffering to the civilian population, as well as substantial material damage, calls for an immediate halt to the fighting and the commencement of negotiations intended to settle the conflict peacefully, says the Romanian foreign ministry declaration. In this connection, the ministry salutes the recent appeal of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin calling for the beginning of negotiations among all parties in conflict, the signing of the principal cease-fire accord, and the agreement to that effect concluded by the government of the Russian Federation and representatives of the Chechen authorities.

The Romanian Foreign Ministry salutes the readiness of the Russian Federation to cooperate with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in view of a more ample involvement of that organization in the peaceful settlement of the aforementioned crisis.

In the conclusion of the declaration, the ministry expresses its hope that the recent initiatives, including the cease-fire accord, will have a positive effect and will trigger the process of negotiations to find political solutions corresponding to the expectations of international public opinion, put an end to the loss of human lives, and restore order and other circumstances ensuring the full observance of human rights.

As regards the 12 January UN Security Council resolution extending by 100 days the suspension of certain sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Romanian foreign ministry believes that the resolution comes as a continuation of the process of easing the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a positive reaction to the cooperative spirit manifested by the Yugoslav authorities.

According to our correspondent Doina Saiciuc, the Romanian Foreign Ministry expresses its hope that the recent resolution will support the orientation that favors the political settlement of the crisis and the fulfillment of the necessary preconditions for the full lifting, in the near future, of the sanctions imposed on the FRY.

Geoana announced that at the end of last week Romania notified Hungary about its readiness to resume, as soon as possible—perhaps even during the month of January, if possible—negotiations at the level of experts to finalize the text of the basic treaty and to further bilateral relations, in general. [passage omitted]

PD Official Says Country Turning 'Fascist'

AU1801191195 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 13 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Mihai Diac: "PD Deputy Adrian Severin Requests the Demotion of Minister Taracila"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We do not rule out the possibility that there might have been a series of debatable decisions in the course of the activities of the Credit Bank [private bank the head of which was arrested recently on charges of corruption]. However, regardless of the irregularities that might have existed, this is in no way a criminal case—and especially not one that justifies the arrest and continued detention of the culprit while the police make their investigations. What they are doing is trying to strike a blow against the banking system, which has been under systematic attack ever since 1992, when the Vacaroiu government took office" said Adrian Severin, deputy chairman of the Democratic Party [PD] yesterday. The arrest of the chairman of the Credit Bank's administrative board "is an extremely dangerous attempt to make the interior ministry pursue domestic political objectives" and "a brutal meddling on the part of the interior ministry in the self-regulating balance of political and economic power in the country and the involvement of interior ministry employees in actions that do not belong to that ministry's profile," "to again turn the ministry into an instrument of political repression, an instrument of political manipulation." "Unfortunately, the Credit Bank case is not a singular one. The strength of the banking chain is measured by the strength of the weakest link. By destroying a single loop, one can weaken the entire banking system. After the ousting of Dan Pascariu from the leadership of the BRCE [Romanian Foreign Trade Bank]—also due to the fact that he had not accepted to cooperate politically, a fact which unfortunately was easily overlooked by the mass media—now they have came up with the case of Ivan and the Credit Bank. If we do not manage to halt this, the process will doubtlessly conclude with the Mugur Isarescu [Romanian National Bank governor] case. All this serves to demonstrate the hatred the current leadership feels for the financial-banking system because the latter does not accept the game the current rulers expect it to play, nor is it prepared to fulfill the wish of the political rulers to make use of administrative instruments to promote their own political-economic interests. This is why we request the demotion of the interior minister."

According to Severin, the interior ministry is also personally motivated to discredit the head of the Credit Bank and thus his bank as well, as "the Credit Bank has managed to win a tender in the town of Calarasi, besting another group in which the interior minister has his share of interest."

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Another hot issue discussed during yesterday's news conference was the "formalizing of the so-called red quadrilateral," consisting of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party], PRM [Greater Romania Party], and PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], an older alliance which, however, is about to be consecrated for the first time by the conclusion of a written protocol. This would "turn Romania into the first Central and East European country led by a government under the banner of the extreme right, fascism, and extremism. We are the first country in Central and East Europe that is about to turn fascist." "Mr. Nastase [PDSR executive chairman] will put his signature on a document that legalizes anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and intolerance in Romania. It legalizes all this from the doctrinary point of view; and, practically speaking, it offers them access to the levers of power." "What they want is to steer the PDSR not toward the values of social democracy, which they so greatly acclaim, but toward extremism, intolerance, racism, national-communism, and fascism." "We call on the PDSR leadership to not sign this document, which risks turning the country into a fascist one and tearing it away from its natural allies—that is, the Western democracies; and we reassert our readiness to continue doing what we have been doing so far: negotiating, together with the other opposition political parties, a political formula that also allows for the rule of the PDSR without any need for the PDSR to subject itself to blackmail by the extremists."

Covasna Leaders Reject Criticism of Council

AU1801201695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Arpad Orban, president of Covasna County Council, and Balint Puskas, president of the UDMR's [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] Covasna County Organization, have issued a statement in which they say that the concerted vehement protests against the UDMR regarding the establishment of the Council of Mayors and Counselors representing the UDMR are proof of a lack of precise knowledge of the purpose and goals of the council. The statement says that the Association of Presidents of the County Councils, the Federation of the Municipalities, and the Federation of Towns in Romania were established because of the problems and difficulties facing local autonomy. Although this was not welcomed by all political forces, it did not prompt the virulence of current criticism. The statement oes on to say that the goals of the new council are comparable to those of these federations and associations: that is, the achievement of real local autonomy, a principle stipulated in both Romania's Constitution and Law No.69/1991 regarding local public administration.

The establishment of the council—which includes mayors, deputy mayors, and councillors who represent the UDMR—is perfectly normal because it gives them the opportunity to voice their opinions and cast their votes within the respective local councils on the basis of collective consultation and decisions.

The statement also points out that no mention is made of territorial autonomy, territorial separation, or the establishment of the Autonomous Hungarian Region [Regiunea Autonoma Maghiara], as has appeared in various communiques and protest notes. In support of this idea, the statement points out that the council's founding conference was attended by representatives of all those counties where there are UDMR councillors, including counties where the Hungarian population is below 20 percent. Some of these have been elected as vice presidents or secretaries to this council.

In conclusion, the statement suggests that the statute of the respective council should be read in the Romanian language.

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Party of Democratic Action Holds Session

LD1801234195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The sixth regular session of the main committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been held in Sarajevo. It was attended by members of the party's main and executive committees; SDA deputies in the assembly of the republic and federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Islamic community, and the Council of the Congress of Bosniak Muslim Intellectuals; representatives of Preporod, Merhamet, and [words indistinct]; and guests and senior party members from abroad. The session, which was held behind closed doors, was chaired by Irfan Ljubijankic, chairman of the main committee of the SDA.

SDA Chairman Alija Izetbegovic, Vice Chairman Edhem Bicakcic, and Ejup Ganic made introductory speeches about the agenda, about which the public has already been informed. More than 50 members of the main committee from Bosnia-Herzegovina and abroad, as well as Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and General Rasim Delic, commander of the supreme command headquarters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army, took part in the discussion that ensued.

President Izetbegovic listed 12 tasks facing the state bodies this year, as the SDA sees them. Edhem Bicakcic presented a document [word indistinct] on the failure to implement the Washington agreement [words indistinct] Ejup Ganic read out a brief summary of the peace process and explained the conditions for the continuation of the talks. All three reports will be made public in their entirety.

SDA, HDZ Officials View Federation Issues

AU1701101095 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 95 p 8

[Article by Sejad Luckin: "Another Test of Sincerity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The signing of the Washington Agreement and the establishment of the Federation undoubtedly represents one of the most important events for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994. During the past nine months the process has been too slow. The outcome of the Constituent Assembly session in Zenica has threatened to become a greater crisis that could, ultimately, have negative consequences on the future of the Federation.

In fact, the time has come for the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], as the leading representatives of the Bosniak and Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to draw a line below what has been done together so far, and, after the cleaning up, channel their forces toward the problems that have been chronically repeating. In a conversation with Pero Jurisin, the Split correspondent of OSLOBODJENJE, Dario Kordic, president of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said that the Croat people joined the Federation project sincerely, and that their intention is to actualize the state-forming quality and sovereignty—naturally, to the extent that the "existing situation and historical conditions" will allow. This is why Kordic firmly rejected all accusations that the HDZ obstructs the Federation, and described those who make such accusations as individuals who want "to place the Republic above the Federation."

What Is Harmful for the Croats

As one of the key arguments to prove the orientation of the HDZ toward the Federation Kordic noted the organization of the party in accordance with the "grand county [velezupna] division", which is under way. He interpreted the SDA demand that a rotation be carried out in the Federation leadership as an intention "to conceal everything that has not been done in the implementation of the transitional solutions in establishing the Federation." Kordic said that many things have not been done, and mentioned the issue of Croat cadres in the federal ministries and consulates and embassies. Moreover, he said he believed that many things were done at the expense of the Croats during the period since the signing of the Washington Agreement. "The main issue here is that of about 37,000 Croats who have left their homes in Zenica, Tuzla, Sarajevo, Konjic, Travnik, Bugojno, Kakanj, and other places. At the same time, about 10,000 Muslim Bosniaks returned to their homes in Livno, Ljubuski, Tomislavgrad, Mostar, Orasje," said Kordic.

He sees the reasons for the great number of Croats leaving the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the fact that the young Croat men are not allowed to be involved in the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] formations, that there is no right to a Croat educational program, the Croatian language, Croat media....

Edhem Bicakcic, deputy president of the SDA, on the other hand, sees all the problems for which the Constituent Assembly has been confronted with a crisis as a result of the Croat representatives obstructing it, that is, in the fact that there was no quorum in the Club of the Croat Representatives, due to which no laws proposed by the government could be adopted. The attempt to solve the problem consisted of consultations with the authorized representatives of the HDZ, headed by Ivo Lozancic, and the Republic of Croatia was also directly asked to help. Bicakcic interpreted the failure of the Croat representatives to attend the session as a lack of readiness to start implementing the Federation Constitution.

Only Agreements Remain

Bicakcic reminded that in the many negotiations between the SDA and the HDZ many political decisions

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were coordinated, but were not implemented. He stated that the SDA either actualized all the HDZ demands, or else paved the way for their implementation. However, although the HDZ signed the agreement in Kresevo, agreeing to start implementing the constitution in the municipalities, they only implemented it in a small number of municipalities, such as Neum, Posusje, Grude, and two more municipalities in Posavina. This shows that the HDZ is not prepared to leave the authority to the legal bodies, said Bicakcic.

No progress has been made in forming cantons, either, although it was agreed in Kresevo that a western Herzegovina canton be formed. Bicakcic added that in Rosulje, near Tesanj, the HDZ was asked to propose to the prime minister candidates for the positions of assistant ministers and other positions in the government, but the list never arrived. The issue of the positions in consulates and embassies was resolved with the Zagreb Agreement between Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman. However, the HDZ only proposed that Mile Akmadzic be appointed ambassador in Washington, but the government decided that filling this position be postponed for better times, because of the specific reasons.

"We clearly stated in the Zagreb Agreement that the picture of Bosnia-Herzegovina abroad is created by the consulates and embassies abroad, and the customs at the border of the Federation. The demand was that at least one customs office a road for the Federation be established that would be controlled by the federal police. The decision was that this would be the Doljani crossings, that is, the road from Metkovic to Mostar, including the railroad from Ploce. Unfortunately, this has not been completed," said Bicakcic.

(In)correct Figures

Talking about what the SDA has done, the deputy president emphasized the forming of the Tuzla-Podrinje canton. This process has almost been completed in the Zenica canton, and it has not been completed only in Zepce and Zavidovici, because of the HDZ obstruction at the local level, and in Vares, because of the specific regional conditins. The SDA does accept part of the blame. The Croat demands concerning local self-management have been accepted, and the government immediately determined the necessary criteria and presented them to the Assembly. Moreover, the conditions have been met for the HDZ to function normally on the territories controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, as well as for cultural and religious institutions.

"The Croatian language can be used in schools, the example of which is the opening of a special Catholic school in Sarajevo," said Bicakcic.

Edhem Bicakcic said that all the information on the return of the Bosniaks to "Herzeg-Bosna" was incorrect. On the contrary, he said, we have new information on some of the Bosniaks leaving Livno and going to Canada, with the help of the legal authorities, "which is another example of Bosniak brain drain."

"I would like to know where the 10,000 Bosniaks returned to. No one has returned to Kiseljak, Prozor, Stolac, or Capljina, and they are leaving western Mostar. I would appreciate it if we could discuss specific things instead of figures that cannot be checked, and if as few as 10 people return, that will be an achievement," said Bicakcic.

As far as the Croats leaving, Bicakcic did not deny the accuracy of the figure. The reason is not political pressure, but the war, the third winter in war.... This information can relate primarily to big cities in which life is really difficult, but it is the same for everyone, said Bicakcic.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO

Bicakcic mentioned that on the HVO-controlled territories the work of the SDA and other parliamentary parties was not allowed.

Explaining why the SDA demanded that a rotation be carried out in the Federation leadership, Bicakcic said that this was determined by the Vienna Agreement, which the Constituent Assembly also ratified. According to him, this was a mere formality, and, on the other hand, the fact that this detail was quietly overlooked could make it possible to avoid other parts of the Vienna Agreement, primarily those relating to constituting the cantons. Moreover, the explanation that the national interest of the Croats would be jeopardized with this rotation cannot be accepted. The president and deputy president of the Federation have the same authorizations, and it should also be borne in mind that, after the transition period of two years, the functions of the president and prime minister, according to the constitution, will be carried out by representatives of the same people. Moreover, the president of the Constituent Assembly is at the moment a Croat, and it is an important position, explained Bicakcic.

Both Bicakcic and Kordic pointed to relations between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO as a favorable element in the process of establishing the Federation so far. Particularly favorable is their military cooperation. However, there are some problems there too. The HDZ has demanded that forming of the HVO units be made possible in all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a sign of Croat equality, but Bicakcic said that HVO formations already exist in Brcko and at Tesanj. On the other hand, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has no units in "Herceg-Bosna", and Bicakcic wondered if the renewal of the Bregava Brigade in Stolac should not be allowed, for instance, or if a navy infantry unit should be formed in Neum.

There are obviously many questions the answers to which have yet to be found. However, the important thing is that both sides have shown a willingness to solve

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the problems. The SDA has announced that, before the next Constituent Assembly session, they would try to reach a joint solution in political talks, and Bicakcic believes that the present parliamentary crisis can enhance the process. On the other hand, Dario Kordic said that the present disagreements are in no way dangerous for the Federation positions, especially in the relation toward the common aggressor.

Bosnians Call For Opening of Tuzla Airport

AU1801200995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The United Nations is concerned about the situation in Tuzla, and the blockade of the UN bases and the Tuzla Airport, where the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] troops are deployed.

Yesterday UNPROFOR stated that it had received a letter from Hasan Muratovic, chairman of the state committee for cooperation with the United Nations and minister in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, in which he calls for the opening of the Tuzla Airport. UNPROFOR civilian representative Paul Risley confirmed this morning that this letter contained the demand that the UNPROFOR troops withdraw from the airport unless it is opened to humanitarian traffic by 1 February. There was no mention of this demand in talks conducted with Messers Ganic and Delic, Risley said. He did not reply directly to the question whether UNPROFOR would withdraw from the Tuzla Airport unless it was opened.

According to the same source, the talks with the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not result in any ultimatum. Theoretically, UNPROFOR could withdraw from the airport, Risley said, since the agreement on its use differs from the agreement reached on the use of the Sarajevo Airport, which is under the control of the United Nations.

Minister Calls For UN Efforts To Open Road

AU1801160095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 18 Jan 95

[Interview with Hasan Muratovic, chairman of the State Committee for Relations with the United Nations and minister in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and Federation, by an unidentified correspondent in Sarajevo on 18 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Muratovic] The Serb aggressor side [words indistinct] for bringing in materials for Eagleton's [Sarajevo administrator] project, is demanding that it name seven international organizations that would transport these goods and possibly other humanitarian aid, and that it considers it to be an open road. Obviously, we cannot accept this; we believe that the materials for Eagleton's program should be brought in without any restrictions and that the road should be open as it was according to our agreement of 17 March. This means that we are asking that humanitarian goods should be brought in irrespective of which organizations bring them in. It does not matter who brings it in or whose truck it is, but what is brought in. That is the essence. But the Serbian aggressor side wants to decide on who can and who cannot use this road and thus directly obstruct humanitarian aid.

[Correspondent] So we still have the status quo. What can the citizens of Sarajevo expect?

[Muratovic] They can expect nothing until a definite solution is reached, until the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], that is the United Nations, reaches a solution with the Serbian aggressor side on implementing the agreement as signed.

[Correspondent] UNPROFOR is making some efforts. However, so far this seems very mediocre and we have seen no results.

[Muratovic] First of all, UNPROFOR does not have enough people here. The new man who is to replace Mr. Andreyev has still not arrived and Mr. Andreyev is still pottering about. He spends a day or two here, and then a entire week he is somewhere out in the big wide world. The new man who has come to replace [word indistinct] has only just introduced himself, so the United Nations is not giving this problem the serious approach that it warrants. We can expect nothing more concrete and we have to continue to exert pressure on the United Nations to work on this, to try to bring it to a conclusive end. They are still suggesting that traffic be opened only to passenger vehicles and international organizations. International organizations cannot help us since the only one to ship goods is the UNHCR, and even that in very limited amounts. No other organization has the vehicles needed to transport the goods. We are not insisting on commercial traffic, but we do insist on humanitarian goods, regardless of who brings them in.

Danish Battalion Attacked in Srebrenica Safe Zone

AU1801155995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The members of the Danish battalion, who are stationed in the Srebrenica safe zone as part of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], were attacked yesterday from the aggressor's positions. This was stated by Colonel (?Kaur), UNPROFOR spokesman in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Danish battalion's vehicle was fired at while it was moving toward the western part of the Srebrenica safe zone. There were no casualties, and UNPROFOR did not return fire, which we believe came from the positions held by the forces of Karadzic's Serbs, Colonel (?Kaur) said.

[Word indistinct] at the regular news conference in the Sarajevo UNPROFOR Headquarters, it was confirmed

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that the Serb aggressor's forces on the western part of the front had brought several tanks and armored vehicles as reinforcements to their military units in their operation of entering a kilometer deep into the Srebrenica safe zone. Because of obstructions of their movements by Karadzic's Serbs, the members of the Danish battalion have been unable to obtain detailed information.

Aide Denies Karadzic Accepts Contact Group Plan

AU1801145195 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA [Alternative Edition] in Serbo- Croatian 14-15 Jan 95 p 3

[BETA-attributed report: "TANJUG's Wrong Interpretation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Srpska republic President Radovan Karadzic's adviser, Jovan Zametica, has said that TANJUG's interpretation of Karadzic's interview for the American news agency AP was wrong and that Karadzic had not said that "the Serbian leadership accepts the Contact Group's plan for negotiations," the SRNA reports.

TANJUG's interpretation is, to say the least, erroneous, if not even tendentious. The Srpska republic president said that he agrees that the international plan may be a basis for negotiations, but has never said that "we accept the Contact Group's plan," it is said in the public announcement signed by Zametica.

It is pointed out in the announcement that the AP management was using the formulation used in Point 2 of the document that was signed with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter:

"We agree—while the cease-fire is in force—to negotiate on a comprehensive peace agreement, with the Contact Group proposal serving as a basis for negotiations," SRNA quotes the said point of the agreement.

Correspondent Warns of New Milosevic-Tudjman Deal

AU1801210395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 18 Jan 95

[Report by Nada al-Isa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign diplomats in Zagreb are trying to figure out the meaning of Tudjman's unbridled optimism and his promise to the people that there would be no new Serbo-Croat war, as well as his promise that the problem of the UN Protected Areas would be solved in a peaceful manner once the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] leaves. They say they are suspicious about Tudjman's sudden optimism.

The ambassador of a prominent and influential country is wondering whether Dr. Tudjman is planning to reintegrate one-third of the occupied Croatian territory through peace negotiations with Belgrade and Knin. The Croatian president more than needs the reintegration of the occupied areas by any means and under any pretext. The expelled people are beginning to grumble dangerously that they have had nothing but promises about their return for the last three years. They have the support of the opposition for this.

Dr. Tudjman has now canceled UNPROFOR and announced the solution to the crisis. That is why one can hear the following on the Zagreb diplomatic scene: If UNPROFOR leaves, Zagreb and Belgrade will have free hands to solve the Bosnian problem.

In that context, what is the meaning of the recent statement by Minister Granic that Croatia cannot wait forever for a solution to the Bosnian crisis; that Croatia cannot allow, as he said, Milosevic to sort out the problem of Bosnia first, and then negotiate with Croatia from that position.

As is known, Croatia has been asking the international community, and insisting with the Contact Group, that the problems of Croatia and Bosnia be solved, as Granic said, in a package. However, Granic is now saying that Croatia does not want to be tied to Bosnia in the process of solving the crisis, since, as he is stressing, that would make Croatia the hostage to the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Granic said this after President Tudjman canceled the UN forces.

Many say that only the United Nations can prevent the partitioning of Bosnia. Is the departure of UNPROFOR supposed to serve as a basis for a new agreement between Zagreb and Belgrade? Such questions can be heard with increasing frequency on the Croatian political scene. What will the answers be?

Karadzic's Serbs Turn Off Gas Valve in Sarajevo

AU1801171695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] There is increasingly less natural gas in Sarajevo. The pressure in the city gas network is minimal, and the amount of gas entering the city is one-fiftieth of what is needed. The gas is entering the city only via the valve in Kasindolska Street.

The other valve that was opened at the end of last year under the airport agreement has been turned off by the Serbian aggressor's side. However, the regime of gas redistribution remains in force.

This afternoon all the available gas will be directed at the areas of Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo.

Army, Ministry Reorganize Civil Defense Service

AU1801210295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The joint operation by the Bosnia-Herzegovina defense ministry and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army headquarters, aimed at allocating adequate war assignments to all citizens in order to

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contribute a maximum to the defense and construction of the country, has been met with approval by the public.

Following the decision that only citizens over the age of 45 can remain in the Civil Defense, apart from specialized personnel, 12,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been removed from the civil defense register. After a revision, many have had their medical committee findings annulled, and a similar thing has happened to those who had compulsory labor duties but failed to produce adequate results.

The Defense Ministry says that this operation was planned a long time ago, but certain preparations—which included amendments to certain regulations and the reorganization of certain state and military bodies and institutions—had to be carried out first.

Sarajevo Talks Flounder Following Serb Demands

AU1801155595 Paris AFP in English 1445 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 18 (AFP)—UN authorities Wednesday [18 January] cancelled a reconnaissance flight planned with Bosnian Government and Serb officers over a disputed demilitarized zone after the Serbs demanded that areas outside the zone be inspected as well, a UN spokesman reported.

Colonel Patrick Declety said Serb officers left Sarajevo airport after being told that the helicopter inspection mission would be limited to the 100-square-kilometer (40-square-mile) DMZ on Mt. Igman south of here.

The flight had been arranged to confirm a withdrawal from the sector of troops from the mainly Moslem Bosnian Army in compliance with a cessation of hostilities agreement that took effect January 1. [passage omitted]

Report Examines Serbs' Position in Sarajevo

AU1301170895 Belgrade BORBA (Alternative Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 94 p 5

[Report by Radenko Udovcic: "A Constituent or Minority Nation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian question in Bosnia is at a complete standstill until Karadzic signs a peace agreement. The Serbs who believe in Bosnia-Herzegovina are uneasy in their minds about the future: Will the Bosnia in which they have remained continue to be their homeland?

The official authorities generally make a distinction between chetniks and Serbs, but in part of the public these two notions are regarded as the same, which is why some innocent Serbs, and even entire families, have suffered or even had to leave Sarajevo. At the same time many Serbs have proven themselves to be dedicated to the idea of peaceful cohabitation. The majority, however, have kept silent for a long time, burdened with Karadzic's propaganda denouncing them as traitors to the Serbian people or with the mistrust of neighbors about their sincerity about or at least loyalty to the Bosnian state. As soon as the war started, all of the Orthodox clergy fled Sarajevo. If there had not been a certain deacon Avakum Rosic, who just happened to be in Sarajevo when the war broke out and decided to remain there, there would not have been anybody to chant at funerals.

To stress that one is a Serb, as the local Muslims and Croats do not shun regarding their respective nationalities, has been quite a sensitive thing and sometimes even dangerous. Such people may experience various difficulties and troubles. Official policy and the media sometimes glorify precisely those who have renounced almost everything Serbian, so that other Serbs, who do not emphasize publicly enough their devotion to Bosnia, are always looked upon with suspicion. Things look like this: When, for instance, a Bosniak criticizes the authorities, then he is a communist, when a Croat does that, he is against the Federation, but when a Serb criticizes the authorities, he may be denounced as a chetnik. Or, for instance, when you ask for a piece of pork at the market, you may get an answer like this: "Those who want to eat pork should go to Pale!"

"Purification" of Staff in State-Owned Firms

In Sarajevo itself there are many more examples of peaceful cohabitation. There are few friendships or marriages that broke up because of national disagreements. The majority of people still believe that its multiethnic composition is a treasure of this state. Still, in state-owned firms there are no more Serb directors, while in some firms the second wave of "purification" among staff has just begun. In Energoinvest, a prewar industrial giant, 10 chief executives have been dismissed, of whom six are Serbs. At Radio-Television Bosnia-Herzegovina the situation is somewhat different. Among the journalists working there, there are 62 Bosniaks, 20 Serbs, 17 Croats, four Montenegrins, one Macedonian, and 40 Bosnians, who are actually those who used to declare themselves as Yugoslavs.

Some time ago the Assembly deputies of Serbian nationality from civic parties put forward an amendment to the Federation Constitution that demanded that the Serbs are declared a constituent people as well. The proposal was turned down with the explanation that Serbs cannot be a constituent people in both the Bosniak-Croatian Federation and in "their" Serbian entity. This made it clear that the Federal Assembly still thinks that Karadzic and the leadership in Pale will decide on the destiny of the Serbs. "If we cannot exert influence on the so called Srpska republic, we shall not allow the Serbs to have influence on the most important decisions in our Assembly," a Croatian deputy said. According to estimates, in the territory of the Federation there live at the moment between 130,000 and 150,000 Serbs. As for Sarajevo, estimates range between 30,000 to 40,000. However, Serbs, and not only them, are still leaving Sarajevo.

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Initiative on Forming a Party Is at a Standstill

The initiator of the amendments proposed by the "Serbian" deputies in the Federation Assembly, who are parliamentary club members of multinational parties, was the Serbian Civic Council—the only institutionalized form of Serbian activity in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the younger members of this body consider that a truly democratic Serbian party should be formed, which would be a counterbalance to Karadzic and deprive him of any right to represent all Serbs. The idea is that through such a party Serbs loyal to Bosnia would be able to state their position. Still, for the time being, this initiative is at a standstill, because in addition to problems regarding staff, any Serbian party, even if it supported contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina, might be viewed as a Trojan horse introduced by Milosevic.

The Serbs do not much feel like a national minority in the federation, because simultaneously with the federation, in legal terms, there exists the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which the Serbs are a constituent nation. The capital of both states is Sarajevo, so that the Serbs, when speaking of equality, do not feel in an unfavorable position. For instance, even though the official languages, according to the Federation Constitution, are Bosnian (Bosniak) and Croatian, most of the teachers teach those languages as they always did, while pupils may choose whether Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian is written as their mother tongue in their diplomas.

In the Federation, of course, there are no Serbs holding state office, but they do hold some in the bodies of the republican administration. Miro Lazovic is the chairman of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Mirko Pejanovic and Tatjana Ljujic-Mijatovic are members of the state Presidency.

The Serbian question in Bosnia is at a standstill until Karadzic signs a peace plan. The Serbs who believe in Bosnia-Herzegovina are troubled by uneasy thoughts: Will the Bosnia in which they have remained remain their homeland? The division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as any possible union containing an independent Serbian entity, will quite certainly divide Serbs into constituent and minority Serbs. As the process of division advances, the Serbs in the Bosniak-Croatian Federation are becoming increasingly a virtual minority. Some would say: "That would not be so bad either, if at least half of what is being promised today regarding the civil concept is implemented!"

Filipovic Claims Serb Military 'Exhausted'

AU1601195995 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 95 p 7

[Interview with Muhamed Filipovic, former Liberal Bosniak Organization leader, currently Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Switzerland, by Djuro Kozar in Ljubljana; date not given: "The War Is Almost Over"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Having analyzed all the relevant facts, I believe that in 1995 we can certainly expect a final resolution to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I hope that there will be peace in the new year, whether through an agreement or as a consequence of the total exhaustion of the aggressor's motivation and resources, and in that case the international community will be able to persist in working toward a just peace.

This is what academician Muhamed Filipovic stated at the beginning of his interview with OSLOBODJENJE. We talked to him recently in Ljubljana. He emphasized that the opinions that he was stating were his own personal views and that he was not talking as president of the LBO [Liberal Bosniak Organization] or the ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Switzerland, but rather as a Bosniak intellectual.

[Kozar] Mr. Filipovic, on what facts do you base your political forecast of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995?

[Filipovic] I base my assessment on two facts. The first is the strength of the Bosnian Army, which has increased. The Army is a considerable force and can definitely not be overlooked. Our Army has been proving that it is capable of changing the military situation and that it cannot be defeated. It is the army that consolidates the position of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state in the negotiations. Second, despite the aggression that has been going on for nearly three years, Karadzic's Serbs have not achieved any of their important aims for which they went to war: They have not destroyed the Bosnia-Herzegovina state, they have not exterminated the Bosniak Muslims, although they have significantly decreased their numbers through genocide, and they have not managed to isolate the Bosniak people from the patriotic and pro-Bosnia orientated Serbs and Croats.

[Kozar] You say that the Serbian aggressors have been significantly exhausted by the aggression that they have been carrying out against Bosnia-Herzegovina for 1,000 days now. It is obvious that the logistical support from Serbia is not as it was at the beginning. Moreover, the losses that they have suffered so far on the Bihac front are great. Do you think that all this could make Karadzic start thinking rationally and sincerely want peace?

[Filipovic] The Serbian aggressor is indeed exhausted. Milosevic's actions show this more than Karadzic's for the time being, but indications and facts about the real condition of the "Army of the Srpska republic", which the media in Pale and Banja Luka have been trying to conceal, do so even more. The war has exhausted not only the military power of their army, but also, I would say, it has also greatly exhausted the human factor. I would like to emphasize that the war has also exhausted their military and political aims, and the meaning of fighting.

They are at present faced with a situation in which they cannot achieve their main aim—the creation of "Greater

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Serbia", through integrating Bosnian territory in the project. This is why it is normal for the scales slowly but surely tipping in our favor, that is, the political position and the entire group fighting for a democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks will live equally and in full freedom and which will function as a state, which is very important.

[Kozar] You attended the recent session of the Assembly of the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zenica, at which there was a disagreement between the representatives of the Bosniak and Croatian peoples. Could the Washington Agreements fail because of the so-called presidential issue in the federation?

[Filipovic] The Bosniak-Croat Federation is a good form for resolving internal relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Naturally, as any institution created by negotiations, the federation is now the object of various ambitions, wishes, and interpretations. It should not be forgotten that the federation makes sense only insofar as it helps preserve the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the limit of the functioning of the federation, because it is in the interest of both Croats and Bosniaks, and we should not forget that this is the only solution that the international community supports. The establishment of the federation, even under these circumstances, has proved that it is capable of producing normalization. It is a fact that life has normalized to a certain extent in those areas where the federation is functioning.

It is necessary for the future of the federation that some people rid themselves of their illusions. All those who refer to the rights of the constituent peoples must realize that only those who recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state can be constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such a status stems from the existence of the Bosnian state. If someone denies the Bosnian state in any way, they are also denying their own status and reducing themselves to the level of a minority. In that context, I would like to emphasize that everyone who wants peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is very much interested in the federation functioning.

I hope that the difficulties relating to personnel issues are only temporary. The response to those forces that use every unclear situation to delay the processes leading to the implementation of the Federation Constitution should be insistence on reaching specific solutions in the areas in which there are no dilemmas. These areas are, for instance, that of traffic, the economy, and the integration of the army and the police. The return of the people to their homes and the normalization of the property-rights relations should also be insisted upon. We should insist on everything that could facilitate a new quality of life that would subsequently provide first a clear proof of the advantages that the Federation represents to all, and, second, it would be a good basis for further progress of the integration process in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of respecting the rights of each of the peoples.

[Kozar] In your opinion, what is the role of Zagreb in the functioning of the federation? Could it be said that among the forces obstructing it there are certain circles there that are close to the right?

[Filipovic] My general observation would be that this role may have been blown up out of all proportion. We must clearly understand that the issue of the position of the Croats, even though we have to acknowledge the interests of the Republic of Croatia in the situation and the status of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stems from the fact that they are Bosnia-Herzegovinan Croats. They have never been within the Croatian state, except during World War II. They are citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a constituent element of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, the functioning of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is its own internal political issue. This is why maximum room should be made for autonomous estimates, judgments, and resolutions of all open and acute issues, while the general geopolitical and geostrategic projects, such as the project to "round off Croatian national territories" should be less evident, since it is the counterpart to rounding off so-called Serbian national territories.

In my opinion, the Croatian state should in that respect check its role and its direct presence in the processes of our internal arrangements and decisions should be felt to a lesser degree. I hope that this is understood to a greater extent in Croatia now and I hope that it is also understood how great a delusion it was that the issue of the position of the Croats in relation to the Bosniaks or the Bosnia-Herzegovina state might be resolved militarily.

[Kozar] Professor Filipovic, a great number of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina will unfortunately not be in their homes and in their country in 1995. How many of our refugees are in Switzerland at present and how are they doing there?

[Filipovic] There are between 70,000 and 80,000 Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens in Switzerland at present. Over half of these are Bosniak refugees and the other half are Serbs and Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some other citizens also figure as refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina; they came to Switzerland from Serbia and other parts of former Yugoslavia and used the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to claim certain international rights to avoid the consequences of war and war zones. There about 2,000 of those, to our knowledge. About 60 percent of our overall population in this country consists of newly arrived refugees. The rest are an older generation. According to the official estimates and my own impression, the Swiss state has dealt with the issue of our refugees very well.

There are three categories of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Switzerland. The first consists of those who arrived here in an organized way, through the Red Cross or the UNHCR. Their status is the best—they have apartments, full medical insurance, work permits, approved five-year residence, and receive a monthly

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income of about 3,000 Swiss francs. The second category consists of those who arrived here in an unorganized way, but have the status of refugees. These are individuals who, having been in refugee centers, and having been treated by the social services, were provided with decent accommodation, health insurance, and financial aid sufficient for a relatively good life. The third category consists of those citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who entered Switzerland illegally and are now trying to regulate their status. They also have certain rights, so their existence is not in question.

Switzerland has much understanding for refugees and has been trying to make their lives outside the homeland easier in various ways. They have extended residence visas for the second and third categories for another year, because they decided that these people could not yet return to Bosnia-Herzegovina because of the war. They have accepted our request concerning the education of our children. The children of refugees will thus have the opportunity to be educated at all levels, just like the Swiss. They have also been helping us to organize education in accordance with the Bosnia-Herzegovina programs for the Bosnian language, history, geography, culture, and religion.

[Kozar] How are our people doing in Switzerland?

[Filipovic] A great number of our citizens are living in accordance with their position; they obey the laws of the country they are in and appreciate the hospitality of this friendly country, and in that respect there have been no complaints on the part of the authorities. A smaller number of our refugees have had a hard time adjusting. There have also been some speculators who have used their position for unlawful purposes. For instance, there is a problem that we share with the Swiss authorities, namely that some former employees of the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Bern under suspicious conditions issued passports to certain individuals who were not entitled to them. On the whole, though, I can say that these problems are not great and that the Swiss are very happy with our attitude and behavior concerning these problems. Namely, we, as representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state, strictly abide by the rule of maximum observance of the law and sovereignty of the Swiss state, and, naturally, its customs and traditions. We do not want them to feel that we are creating problems.

[Box, p 7]

I Will Answer Adil Zulfikarpasic

[Kozar] There is a book called "Bosniak Adil Zulfikarpasic" by Milovan Djilas and Nadezda Gace, in which your name is mentioned in a negative context. Have you read the book and do you have an opinion of it?

[Filipovic] I have read it and I will tell you that it is typical of him and his irresistible ambition to become part of history at any cost; since he was not to be seen in the actual historical events, he wanted to be visible in a book that he himself produced. In that sense, I have nothing to say. I will only say that I will probably write the truth about everything that he treats in the book, since he systematically misinforms and systematically conceals some very important information, his ambition being to exaggerate himself and his role out of all proportion, while minimizing the role of others.

I said a long time ago that Adil Zulfikarpasic would, unfortunately, not make it into history. Alija Izetbegovic will. Naturally, our brave people defending Bosnia-Herzegovina also will. Fikret Abdic also will, but in the negative sense. Zulfikarpasic will not make it into the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina for elementary reasons. He systematically opposed the legal and legitimate leadership of the Bosnian state and did not help Bosnia in any way, though he was financially able to do so, particularly as he is not in Bosnia-Herzegovina. You cannot play a relevant role in the life of a state and a nation from the outside and from a distance all the time.

Finally, I will say that this book is a gross forgery. For instance, Adil had photographs put in the book to make it seem that he, having been in Sarajevo for only a few days, played an important role there and made certain contacts. In fact, his visit to Sarajevo was, to my knowledge, a private one and it played no part in the liberation struggle of the Bosnia-Herzegovina people.

Croat Official Views Cease-Fire, Federation

AU1301123695 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 95 p 7

[Interview with Vladimir Soljic, official of Herceg-Bosnia, by Jozo Pavkovic; place and date not given: "We Must Give Peace a Chance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With General Sir Michael Rose as mediator, Vladimir Soljic, defense minister of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia, and Kresimir Zubak, president of the presidential council of Herceg-Bosnia, signed on behalf of the Croatian side the agreement on cease-fire. On that occasion we talked with Soljic.

"This war was forced upon Croats. I guess that now it is clear to everybody that the war started in order to make possible the creation of greater Serbia at the expense of Croatian territories. The aggressor made us suffer many losses, human and material, but it did not succeed in its intention. Despite all this, we signed the cease-fire agreement, convinced that each side can obtain more through negotiations, rather than through war. Now we are committed to finding a just solution. Any solution forced upon a weaker side would result in a new war, and this would not take much time to happen. There can no longer be any new brotherhood and unity. Rather, one has to use a formula of settled accounts and find a way of permanently protecting the interests of all three peoples. Each of those peoples should make decisions on its

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future alone, taking into consideration the justified interests of other peoples. If it turns out that there are no results and that the agreement does not lead to a just peace, it is not too late to start a new war even after four months," Soljic said.

Weapons—Guarantee of Freedom

[Pavkovic] What was the first day on the front after the signing of the agreement like?

[Soljic] As if nothing had been signed. However, there are indications that the cease-fire will still be observed. When the situation calms down completely, great caution and combat-readiness will be necessary. It is definitely clear to all of us what kind of enemy we have. Nothing ought to surprise us. The Croats in this region will have to defend freedom with arms for a long time still.

[Pavkovic] What happened at yesterday's meeting in Uskoplje, where all three warring factions met?

[Soljic] We, as always, signed the agreement with the intention to implement it. Other sides did not send appropriate representatives, so the first meeting did not produce the expected result. Nevertheless, the meeting was held even in such circumstances, and there are chances that the situation will improve and that first results will come about.

[Pavkovic] Will you, please, comment on the statement by General Rose that he will bring in some additional forces from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will ensure the implementation of the signed agreement? Are UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] troops from Croatia coming to Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Soljic] Apart from the interests of the three nations that live here, the interests of the greatest European and world powers also clash here, in such a small region. I cannot answer your question precisely, even with the best will, because we do not know what many of their plans anticipate.

[Pavkovic] Does this agreement mean the freezing of the existing state and the legalization of everything that has been taken by force in this war?

[Soljic] The Serbian side, which makes up less than one third of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, though it controls two thirds of its territory, would certainly find it suitable, but neither the Croatian nor the Muslim side can accept that. The alternative to a just solution most suitable for all three peoples is a new war, that probably would not remain within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The First Phase of HVO's Reorganization Is Completed

[Pavkovic] What does the agreement mean for the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]?

[Soljic] The Croats are people who want to achieve a better tomorrow through work, rather than through war. We have used the cease-fire with Muslims for consultations and the reorganization of our own lines. We have shown results on the front, as well as in the economy. We shall make even better use of this cease-fire, if it holds. We shall immediately prepare a special program for the civilian sphere of life.

[Pavkovic] How far have you gone with the reorganization of HVO?

[Soljic] It could be said that the first phase has been completed. The HVO is now composed of four guards' regiments and troops for special assignments, as well as members of the Home Guard [originally the Croatian Army in World War II] and the reserve. The MUP [Interior Ministry] units and military police are certainly a part of the HVO as well.

[Pavkovic] Are you personally satisfied with the results achieved?

[Soljic] I was not sure what its real state was like, until we proved it in a practical way. There is no reason not to be satisfied. Now we have a real army, and what remains to us is to continue with training and to arm ourselves with high-quality arms and equipment. We shall organize and motivate the army that will liberate all the occupied Croatian territories and defend them in the future. Freedom in these regions will depend on each nation's armed forces for quite a long time, though.

[Pavkovic] How far have you gone with the organization of the Federal Army?

[Soljic] For the time being the Federal Army is not being organized yet, but the plans on actions to be taken by the HVO and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the common enemy are being harmonized. It is planned that the joint army should retain two components—the Croatian and the Muslim one—as a guarantee of the freedom and equality of the two peoples.

[Pavkovic] Actually, what is the Joint Staff doing?

[Soljic] It has already justified its existence. Since the cessation of the Croatian-Muslim conflict there has not been any more serious incident, as a matter of fact. A satisfactory degree of mutual trust has been accomplished, for which credit is certainly due to the Muslim and the Croatian part of the Joint Staff.

[Pavkovic] When will the curfew be imposed again?

[Soljic] It has never been lifted. Actually, it was lifted only during the Christmas and New Year holidays, while now it will be imposed again because so far it has produced good effects.

Started From Nothing

[Pavkovic] You are the deputy prime minister of Herceg-Bosnia. Recently there have been rumors saying that the government will undergo reconstruction.

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[Soljic] We started from nothing, which also applies to the sphere of the highest executive organs. We have people whose qualities are unquestionable, but not all the people are capable of performing certain functions. To all of us the general interest must be a priority over individual interests, and in such responsible and difficult times we must accept jobs that are considered to suit best to our skills. We shall make certain changes in order to improve the quality of work and expertise of the government, but certainly not to the disadvantage of those who have performed those jobs until now. The reason for the government's reconstruction is the desire to make the connections with the federal government of Bosnia-Herzegovina even better.

[Pavkovic] Does the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] rule in Herceg-Bosnia?

[Soljic] There are various speculations, but nobody even considers denying the legitimacy of the HDZ's victory in the elections and its having the main say in politics. However, when speaking of the government, one is supposed to bring in experts, which means that people from other parties are also necessary.

[Pavkovic] What is the government undertaking in the field of the economy?

[Soljic] With the reorganization of the HVO we have obtained a smaller and more efficient army. Thereby we have made many people available for industrial work. We shall organize our economy so that it answers the needs of defense. This war, or rather this state of half-peace and half-war, will probably last a long time. We shall try to make life in the region even in such conditions as bearable as possible.

The War Between Two Victims

[Pavkovic] Is the war between the Croats and the Muslims definitely over?

[Soljic] In this part of the world nothing is ever known with full certainty. I consider that senseless war to be definitely over. It was, actually, a war between two victims.

[Pavkovic] Are you satisfied with the work of the institutions that are supposed to inform the public on what is going on in the field?

[Soljic] We have failed to achieve the planned results. We did not sufficiently promote the significance of the victory at Kupres. We should have done more to disseminate the truth in the world, as distinguished from the other two sides, particularly the Serbian side, which can make a truth out of a lie and send it out in the world.

Unified Defense of the Croatian People

[Pavkovic] How do you assess the further course of events?

[Soljic] The unity of the Croatian people from here and abroad is the reason for the successful defense and victory in this war. The enemy knows this quite well, so he is trying in various ways to disunite us, to cause conflicts among us and weaken us. You saw for yourself in what way he wanted to devalue our success on the Kupres- Livno front. Those who, through lack of information, falsely accused us of having arranged with the Serbs that they voluntarily surrender the territories to us that we actually seized by arms, would do well to apologize to us. I do not expect any apology from those who deliberately work against Croatia, nor would I accept any. Fortunately, the majority of our highest officials in the republic of Croatia unselfishly supported and helped us, being aware that the Croatian people is defended by unity. Today it is clear to everybody that the Croatian state is not defended only within its own borders, which the aggressor has not yet recognized. If he had not been halted in the Neretva valley, near Livno and Stolac, many Croatian towns, like Split or Makarska, would have been devastated....

[Box, page 7]

[Pavkovic] Would you, as defense minister, comment on the situation around Bihac and do you think that Croatia should get involved in that war?

[Soljic] The best answer to the question whether Croatia should intervene was given by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Defense Minister Gojko Susak. The Croatian army is certainly capable of militarily settling many issues in western Bosnia. However, Croatia has still not decided to support this military option within its internationally recognized borders as well. This is one of the reasons why there has not been any intervention yet. There is another reason, which is that no such demand has been made by the state leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, page 7]

[Pavkovic] How will the HVO behave if the agreement fails to be observed?

[Soljic] It would be naive to trust the aggressor. He has not given up his plans of conquest. Only the strength of our army can halt the enemy in his intentions, rather than any agreement. I personally have confidence only in our own forces. Nevertheless, we shall work out plans for action for both cases, that is, in the case of observance and non-observance of the cease-fire, and prepare a proper response for each of these possibilities.

Muslim Police Occupy Municipal Building

LD1801210095 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, while the public's attention was focused on the reasons why the session of the constituent assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation was not held, some 50 armed Muslim policemen

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today barbarically occupied the premises of the Ravne-Brcko municipal council. Our correspondent Mario Ivkic has the report.

[Ivkic] While the session of the assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation—at which a number of important laws were to be passed—was awaited, at 1130 on 18 January 1995 on the premises of Ravne-Brcko Croat municipality, we all remembered April 1992, when the aggression on Brcko municipality was carried out—only the aggressor was different then.

What happened was a barbaric act carried out by the police force of the Muslim Brcko municipality. Fifty heavily armed policemen occupied the building of the municipal council of Ravne-Brcko, in which there were only few municipal officials at the time. The policemen took off the plaque reading: Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ravne-Brcko Municipal Council. The plaque on the building also displayed the coat of arms of the Croatian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I would like to stress that it was agreed yesterday with the same police and the interior ministry of the Tuzla-Podrinje grand county, that we should await political talks between representatives of the Tuzla-Podrinje grand county, Ravne-Brcko municipality, and Kresimir Zubak and Jadranko Prlic, leading representatives of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They announced their visit to Ravne-Brcko municipality specifically to deal with all the problems in relations between Ravne-Brcko municipality and the Muslim side.

After this action by the Muslim leaders, it is difficult to say what will happen next in the area. The Ravne-Brcko municipal council and other institutions are active throughout the municipality and are in session continuously.

TV Station Announces New Program Schedule

AU1801210095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The signal of the Zenica independent television station (Zeta) was first launched three years ago. A news conference was held today for Zenica correspondents to mark this anniversary.

Editor in Chief Kaid Bajramovic talked about the founding and work of this information network, stressing that this was the only television station in the wider area of central Bosnia to broadcast all the information about events in the Republic from the onset of the war until April 1993

(Zeta) today broadcasts six hours of its own programs for about 150,000 citizens of Zenica, and a new, interesting program schedule dealing with current affairs was announced at today's news conference.

Srpska 'Consul' in Belgrade Interviewed

95BA0062A Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 12-15 Nov 94 pp 15-17, 87

[Interview with Momcilo Mandic, Srpska republic consul in Belgrade, by Vanja Bulic; place and date not given: "We Fell Out of the Kangaroo's Pouch"—first paragraph is DUGA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Without Serbia and Yugoslavia, we are like a wounded man for whom someone cut off the flow of oxygen, like the young of a kangaroo who fell out of its mother's pouch and who will die. Not even the Chinese Army could defend a border 1,500 kilometers long, and our tanks are standing still because we do not have fuel, and people are dying because the Muslims are attacking from the protected zones."*

What is happening in the republic of Srpska, how are the sanctions being implemented on the Drina, and how are the people who have been forced to take up their rifles again living? There are many questions, but little news, since a news blockade is one of the consequences of the break in political and economic relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and the republic of Srpska.

The same questions are certainly being asked by Serbs on the other side of the Drina, since news is slow in reaching them, and the strict border guards, supervised by UN observers, are very careful to make sure that nothing on the list of items restricted by the blockade passes through. The border guards are even too zealous, and this only intensifies the picture of absurdity as a consequence of disagreement within the Serbian people.

Momcilo Mandic is the director of the republic of Srpska bureau in Belgrade, a person who is constantly involved in relations between Pale and Belgrade. He is the consul of the Serbs on the left bank of the Drina in the capital [words missing in original] title, Nusic was once subjected to scorn, but today is a different time from the one in which Nusic froze the smile.

[Bulic] How is the republic of Srpska's bureau in Belgrade—or the Bosnian Serb Embassy, as Belgrade residents call it—operating under the conditions that arose after the sanctions by the FRY?

[Mandic] If the former and present jurisdictions, and the way in which they are implemented, are compared, the working conditions have not changed. We are working exclusively in the area of the administrative-technical and humanitarian cooperation between the FRY and the republic of Srpska. The bureau is exclusively involved in the area of disability and pension insurance, providing assistance to disabled, wounded, and homeless individuals from the republic of Srpska who now live on the territory of the FRY. Then there is cooperation between the ministries of internal affairs, television, people responsible for defense.... I would say that cooperation in connection with issues from citizens' daily lives is being continued.

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With respect to political and state contacts with officials, they have stopped, so consequently we as a bureau do not have any contacts at all with the political leadership of the FRY, the Republic of Serbia, and Montenegro. With respect to the technical services of the Commissioner for Refugees and the Red Cross, however, there is still extremely good cooperation and understanding. Disagreements arise when certain people show their loyalty to the political leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia and display animosity toward the Serbs from Bosnia.

[Bulic] Can you cite examples to back such a statement?

[Mandic] I will cite a few examples for you, and you can judge for yourself. It pains me as a person who has never made distinctions not only between the Serbian people on the two sides of the Drina, but also among people in general. In principle, I am a nostalgic and a Yugoslav, but not an unrealistic one, because I am also aware of the new situation, in which it is impossible to live the old way. I cannot understand an administration that can act this drastically: The fighter Radomir Petrovic was not able to take a headstone for his son across the Drina, because our border guards on the Drina prohibited it and stopped it....

[Bulic] When you say "our," of whom are you thinking?

[Mandic] Well, these are not just conceptual confusions! I am thinking of people from the FRY, who did not feel at the border that a father's pain for his lost son was stronger than all decrees. I am convinced that Braca Kertes does not know about this and that he would not have authorized such an action. Imagine a father whose leaves the headstone from the other side of the Drina intended for his son in a shed in Banja Koviljaca?! You should ask him what he thinks about the degree to which relations have fallen within the Serbian people and the causes that led to it. I don't know who needs that much zeal on the border, that unnecessary pedanticism that does not acknowledge someone else's pain. Another example: Certain people exploited the good will of Jovica Stanisic, the head of Serbian State Security, and stopped the production of passports for citizens of the republic of Srpska. Jovica Stanisic is a person has helped the Serbian people across the Drina a great deal, and consequently someone misused his good will. Now it is more difficult to obtain a passport in Yugoslavia if you are a Serb from the republic of Srpska than it is to get a visa for Germany! Our word at the bureau is not valid anymore; instead, the verification goes through the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs. I think that is an abuse, and that Slobodan Milosevic and the people who make the decisions in Serbia do not know about it, since if they did, they would certainly not allow preventing wounded people from going abroad for prosthetics, and going abroad for medicine, and preventing people from going to see their relatives. At the same time, from New Year's until now, the Yugoslav state treasury has given our citizens, for various forms of insurance, 11 million dinars, and full care is being taken of 1,500 people who are citizens of the republic of Srpska. That is why I think that the exaggerated administrative measures have not been blessed by the Serbian and Yugoslav leaderships.

Who Abandoned the Serbian People

[Bulic] What are the reactions of the people you meet on the street who know that you are the ambassador from the republic of Srpska?

[Mandic] At first people thought that it was a political game necessary because of the international community's attitude toward the FRY, and that relations would be straightened out very quickly. People often mention leaders on both sides and their role in everything, but now there is less and less talk about a game. I am convinced that relations will be straightened out, i.e., that there will be a reconciliation of the political positions of the two sides. In other words, I am convinced that the gap will soon be surmounted. The single people divided by a river is behaving in two ways. On one side of the Drina, they curse Slobodan Milosevic, and on the other, Radovan Karadzic. Thus, in Yugoslavia people curse Radovan Karadzic for continuing the war and refusing to sign the Contact Group plan, and in Bosnia, people curse Slobodan for allegedly abandoning his people across the Drina.

[Bulic] What is your personal opinion of those criticisms?

[Mandic] I am convinced that both positions have been forced by the media propaganda on both sides. The people on both sides do not know the full truth. Since you are asking me about my personal position, instead of it I will publicly state a request. I am asking Kostunica, Seselj, and Djindjic not to defend the Serbian people across the Drina from Slobodan Milosevic. Whenever they have defended them, things have gotten worse and worse for the Serbian people across the Drina! This is not any sort of official position; I am stating this as an individual affected by what is happening to us. Where were they with such an explicit position when Milosevic and Karadzic were together? They scored political points by attacking both of them, and now they have decided to attack everything that Slobodan Milosevic does. Our people—including Karadzic and the entire leadership, you may be convinced—are convinced that we cannot live without Serbia. That would be the same thing as if a kangaroo's young one was ejected from its mother's pouch. Let me express myself even more drastically: It is as if you cut off the supply of oxygen to someone who is seriously wounded. Thus, everything that we have had and have obtained, and we are now obtaining in various ways, we obtained from Serbia, i.e., Yugoslavia. There is no need for people who have 10 percent of the electorate behind them to defend us from a person who is backed by the majority of Serbs.

Serbs Are Better Border Guards Than Norwegians

[Bulic] A little while ago you emphasized that political positions should be reconciled. How is that possible

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when there has been a confrontation between the people who express those positions? In other words, how can one reconcile someone who is said to be a profiteer and a criminal, and the one who said that?

[Mandic] Let us not analyze ideas about politics and its everyday use. All of it has to be overcome. I personally am not justifying Lilic and the other people who, in my opinion, unjustifiably attacked Karadzic and Krajisnik. I am thinking of the attacks related to crime. With respect to political relations, i.e., Karadzic's political deceptions of Milosevic and the political leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia, I would rather not talk about that now. I only know that it was not possible to act any differently. Even if he had signed the peace plan, the Assembly would not have ratified it. Until the Assembly itself realizes, and especially until the people themselves realize, that they have to sign it the way the great powers want, Karadzic is powerless. When people realize that it is impossible to defend 70 percent of the territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, when they realize that the deaths because of unrealistic demands have to end, only then will it be possible to sign the peace plan.

[Bulic] Do the latest events on the battlefield demonstrate that realization, since it turns out that it is difficult to defend everything that has been conquered to date?

[Mandic] The situation is extremely difficult, both economically and militarily. The FRY is conducting the blockade thoroughly, as it promised the international community. It would have been better for us if Ukrainians or Norwegians were sitting at the crossings, instead of Serbs from Serbia proper, because the latter know all the ways that goods cross the border, and do their job well. In other words, we certainly cannot survive either militarily or economically if this blockade is continued.

[Bulic] This all resembles praise for an absurdity: Is something that brother does to brother declared to be good?

[Mandic] That is the Serbs' fate—a grim one. It is seriously affecting our people across the Drina. A person brings five liters of oil, and it is poured out at the border. How will you explain to people why it is being done, when they do not have correct information and when the media have been blocked?!

[Bulic] Since you have already mentioned oil, I have to remind you about the reports from meetings of your government, in which it can be seen that at one time Serbia was providing as much 1,200,000 metric tons of oil derivatives from its reserves for the republic of Srpska, and almost 200,000 liters crossed the border. The rest was sold in Serbia. How does one view the five liters of spilled oil from that standpoint?

[Mandic] When the political leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia attacked the involvement of Karadzic and Krajisnik in crime, they probably were not thinking strictly of them, but rather of their political involvement, since they chose people in the government who were involved in crime. I assure you that both of them are honest people, but Karadzic obviously conducted an incorrect personnel policy. Fortune hunters, war profiteers, criminals like Branko Ostojic, the deputy prime minister, then Lukic, the prime minister, and Vito Popovic and several others gathered around him. They abused the trust of Karadzic, Milosevic, and the official FRY authorities. Now they have disappeared. They collected the money and left the people in the lurch. They stroll around Moscow or Sweden, and Lukic is wandering around Banja Luka.

[Bulic] How much money was stolen in that way?

[Mandic] There is the money from the republic of Srpska and from Serbia, which assisted its brethren in goods, oil, grain, basic necessities.... A lot of those goods ended up in Croatia, in Muslim enclaves, or abroad, and the money ended up in private pockets. This is a question of tens and tens of millions of German marks. I hope that it will be repaid to the Serbian people someday. Believe me, now two fighters are sharing a single meat patty on the front.

The Money Went Across the Border

[Bulic] These are people in the government, who opened firms in Belgrade and abroad. Wasn't it clear that in that way they would take money out of the republic of Srpska?

[Mandic] It cannot be said that there were no people pointing out crime, but it was felt that there was more urgent work. During that time, money was irrecoverably flowing out of the republic of Srpska, and so we barely have enough money to survive.

[Bulic] Can you say more precisely where the money went?

[Mandic] The firms in Belgrade were only a front, since the money mostly went beyond the borders of the FRY and the republic of Srpska.

[Bulic] There are minutes from government meetings that prove that the present leaders of the republic of Srpska knew about the criminal actions, and so it is logical that the attacks from Serbia are aimed at them as well....

[Mandic] I sincerely think that Karadzic thought that it was not the time to debate crime, in the middle of a war, at a time when a state was being created. Imagine debates at a time when the border had to be held and every rifle was important!

[Bulic] It is well known that in the beginning, Branko Ostojic paid for an apartment at the Intercontinental for Karadzic and his family. Was that the reason why Karadzic was slow to react?

[Mandic] There were many donors who helped the party, and I consider that primarily assistance to the party,

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since its president had to live in Belgrade in circumstances that were appropriate for the head of the republic of Srpska. Many donors later abused that, however, and virtually bought positions that way. Branko Ostojic and people like him, during the election campaign for the multiparty parliament, used to give money for all the parties, and thus donated to the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. They waited to see who would win and to benefit from it. Ostojic is a classic case of a cheat who bet on all the cards. Karadzic is terribly trustful of his associates, and it is hard for him to renounce them. Some will consider that a weakness, and some will consider it a virtue. The fact remains, however, that many people exploited being close to him, quickly enriched themselves, and disappeared.

[Bulic] It is said that some prominent figures in the republic of Srpska also have considerable funds in foreign banks, since the loot has been divided up....

[Mandic] I do not have any information about that. There are various stories and speculations, but I know that everything will be found out. Just wait a bit....

[Bulic] We are talking about things that were mentioned at government meetings by Mico Stanisic, the top policeman of the republic of Srpska. He tried unsuccessfully to fight crime, and he was removed.

[Mandic] I will not repeat again everything that Mico Stanisic said, since I agree with most of his positions, except that Mirko Krajisnik is a thief. He is Momo Krajisnik's brother. That is an honest Serbian family that has given everything for the Serbian cause. Momo is a right-winger within the party, a bit headstrong, and does not listen to others, because he is going the way that he has outlined, but his honesty cannot be denied. I would rather not comment now on how it was that Mico Stanisic did not find an opportunity to lock them all up. They got away from him, but I think that it could have been done. I would have acted differently.

[Bulic] Momo Krajisnik nevertheless removed Mico Stanisic. Was that revenge?

[Mandic] I would not call it revenge. Admittedly, in the new term that position bypassed Mico Stanisic, who was the top policeman twice. Radovan Karadzic offered him another ministerial position, however. Mico was angry, and refused everything.

Who Was Blown Away by Tajfun

[Bulic] In a recent interview, Mico Stanisic said that he was present when a fax came from Pale in which Mirko Krajisnik was mentioned as a criminal, and Momcilo was in the same room. Could that facsimile be the reason for the removal of the person who started the battle against crime in the republic of Srpska?

[Mandic] The fax was signed by Branko Ratic, a person who was on the list of those who exploited Radovan Karadzic. He is the fortune hunter who formed the Tajfun [Typhoon] news center. The center "covered" people from Radovan Karadzic on. The center worked for several sides, both for the republic of Srpska, for Serbia, and for Croatia. They worked for anyone willing to pay. They blackmailed people. I remember how Ratic boasted that he had put former Deputy Prime Minister Vito Popovic in power, and how he had put in the present Minister Jovo Milosevic. He boasted that he could lock up Karadzic and everyone else whenever he wanted. I personally do not feel sorry for those thieves, and they got what they deserved, so the republic of Srpska's Ministry of Internal Affairs should have done it long ago. We found out later on that the people at Tajfun stole four vehicles, two vans and two Golfs, from the courtyard of the Bosnian villa in Belgrade.

[Bulic] Who founded Tajfun?

[Mandic] Radovan Karadzic, before the war, with the best of intentions. Tajfun was supposed to be a sort of intelligence service under the state president's staff. They abused everything. They started to arrest people, people disappeared, they stole money and vehicles.... All of that reminds me of the Vietnam veterans who started stealing after returning to the United States. These were mostly military personnel, who worked for all sides. They had their own network of associates and informers.

[Bulic] You mentioned again that Radovan Karadzic formed something that turned into a monster.

[Mandic] I know what you are aiming at.... I have already said that Karadzic made personnel mistakes, and his commitment to let people create on their own, not to smother them too much with his presence, contributed a great deal to that. As a doctor and a humanist, he probably proceeds from the position that all people, like him, want what is good for their people and their state that is being created.

[Bulic] But nevertheless that commitment is fatal to both the state and the people?

[Mandic] That will only be summed up in the end. It is too early for us to judge it now.

[Bulic] How much was Tajfun involved in the "September '93" coup against Radovan Karadzic?

[Mandic] Certain members of Tajfun played a decisive role in it. I know everything, but I do not want to talk about it yet. I will talk about it when the war is over.

[Bulic] Four people from Tajfun disappeared. What does that mean in wartime?

[Mandic] Various stories are circulating, but I am afraid that they were liquidated. I do not believe that they could have escaped.

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[Bulic] They were public figures who had important jobs, but they disappeared or died. Is the Djogo case over?

[Mandic] It was an accidental death, as the lawyers say. Risto Djogo, while drunk, fell from a cliff 50 meters high into a lake, and in doing so broke his spine. There is no dispute about that. There are two witnesses, two women, who saw what happened.

[Bulic] I do not know whether people will believe you, since it all resembles a suicide in which someone gave Djogo a lot of help.

[Mandic] There were versions according to which Serbian State Security was involved, and Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan was mentioned. It is all untrue. How could that have been done by someone who helped the Serbian people across the Drina and in the Krajina so much? Would he really do that to someone who spoke publicly about his struggle? I worked for many years on violent crimes, and I personally verified what had happened. I assure you that it was an accidental death.

Tanks Abandoned Because There Was No Fuel

[Bulic] I will ask you once again: How can everything be overcome when it has been openly stated that the people heading the republic of Srpska are criminals and war profiteers? Will it be possible to see Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic together again?

[Mandic] I do not know whether Slobodan Milosevic has ever said that Radovan Karadzic is a profiteer and a criminal. I know, however, that this cannot go on for long, since the republic of Srpska will disappear, and in a way Slobodan Milosevic created the republic of Srpska. He will thus not permit it to disappear, even if he had to meet with Radovan Karadzic tomorrow. Politicians are the kind of people who will forget and get over certain things in the interest of the future.

[Bulic] Let us go back again to the story about the profiteers whom Radovan Karadzic in a way brought into the leadership. Is it true that in the latest battles the Serbs abandoned tanks because they could not start them because of the lack of fuel?

[Mandic] It is true, unfortunately.

[Bulic] Consequently, it is Radovan Karadzic's duty to bring to trial those who at one time left the republic of Srpska without fuel reserves?

[Mandic] It is his duty, of course! If Karadzic and Krajisnik intend to create a modern state, they have to return to the front ranks the honest veterans with whom they began the struggle, and bring to trial the various donors who saw a profit in all of it, and left the people without oil and food.

[Bulic] Is it true that the Muslims outnumber the Serbs on the front?

[Mandic] Yes. The border is more than 1,500 kilometers long. The Chinese Army could not defend it. Very soon our people and the Assembly will realize that a smaller, more cohesive Republic of Serbia has to be created, which will be easier to defend, so that we will not be as fragmented as we are now. Only then will Karadzic be able to sign the Contact Group peace plan. I personally know that the percentages being offered are not a problem for Karadzic. The problem is the cohesiveness and quality of the state, since we are being left with the forests and mountains, and the Muslims with the cities. Brcko and Sarajevo are also a problem. With those small changes, everything will be settled, which means that our people will accept such a version of the Contact Group plan.

[Bulic] What can Serbia and Yugoslavia contribute to all this?

[Mandic] A peaceful policy has to be continued, but they do not have to be so thorough at the borders! The fact is that the FRY instituted a political and economic blockade, and thus also a news blockade, along with a communications blockade. If you just let people call each other on the telephone! You know, it must be acknowledged that only the Serbs in the republic of Srpska are paying with their lives for this blockade. That is all a great deal for a people that is currently absurdly divided by the circumstances in which it has become entangled thanks to the great powers' game. I am certain that the imposition of the blockade was hardest on those who had to make that decision, but it is a debt to the history that we are building now.

[Bulic] The Republic of Croatia's Bureau is also operating in Belgrade, and it is almost impossible to draw any parallels. For whom is it currently more difficult?

[Mandic] For us. They have an opportunity to initiate certain things and processes, but we have shut ourselves off from each other.

[Bulic] In conclusion, I would like to ask you why General Mladic has not appeared in public.

[Mandic] After some statements by General Ratko Mladic, the Supreme Command decided that he should no longer appear in public, and instead just perform his military duties.

[Bulic] Still, what is the reason?

[Mandic] Well, Ratko Mladic thinks that not a single inch of land that has been won on the battlefield should be given back.

Aid Denied to Ethnically 'Mixed'

95BA0073A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 5 Dec 94 pp 24-25

[Article by Mladen Paunovic: "Association of Nobody's People"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] *Caritas, Merhamet, and Dobrotvro simply do not want to hear about the children and members of mixed marriages. That was also the main reason why the first, and for the time being only, Association of Mixed Marriages has been founded here.*

"It would be better for a child to be born to you without an arm than from a mixed marriage. Perhaps I am exaggerating, but imagine what it means for a child, its physical and psychological development if it is exposed to daily pressure, from the street, the neighborhood, and school, just because it does not belong to any one nation, and thus not even to this crazy time." We were told this in Zenica, with a great deal of bitterness, by Ivana, the mother of two children, born a Croat and married to a Serb. She added then as a joke that her little son recently came back upset from school and asked her, "Mama, am I a Serb, a Croat, or a lily [Muslim symbol]?"

According to incomplete data, before the beginning of the war there were about 6,000 families in Zenica with so-called mixed marriages, most of them from the ranks of intellectuals, respected experts at the railroad and other enterprises, but also to a lesser extent from other social structures. The war turned the idyll of their peaceful family life into a drama, the institutions of humanitarian organizations were closed to them and about 10,000 of their children, and the political denunciation and anathemization of these people began. Caritas, Merhamet, and Dobrotvor simply do not want to hear about the children and members of mixed-marriage families. This was also the main reason why the first and so far still the only Association of Mixed Marriages in Bosnia was founded here, at the time of the greatest hunger in Zenica, when a kg of flour reached the price of 30 German marks.

Sonja and Antonija

It has been formed as a humanitarian organization and registered with the court as a citizens association, i.e., without a right to engage in political activity. In the beginning about 4,500 families joined it, but because 800 families have moved away in the meantime, there are now 3,700 of them. The founding of this association encountered neither the blessing nor the opposition of local political structures, probably out of consideration for the voice of the international public; they have been allowed to live and work, and they are exclusively taking care of the survival of their members. None of the domestic institutions is offering them any assistance, and of the foreign ones, the most regular and abundant assistance to them comes from the German organization Hilfe fuer Kinder, followed by France's Equilibre, and an Islamic one, which for well-known reasons wishes to remain anonymous. "All of our activities," we were told by the association's president and vice president, Sonja Kesko and Antonija Himbic, "are based on gathering and distributing humanitarian aid. We have done as much as we could to save our families from starvation under the most difficult conditions."

They are keeping silent about the pressures to which they have been subjected, and are not even trying to make the domestic or international public aware of them for purposes of information. It is difficult for them to bear the condemnations of mixed marriages that come from the reis, the Zenica imam, and some impassioned nationalist newspapers, as well as the harassment that they feel at work or in everyday life. "We are simply nobody's people, we do not belong either here or in exile, and we feel as if we have no roots or ground beneath our feet," Sonja and Antonija added.

Fear

Even as they are they obviously bother some people in Zenica, however. At who knows whose instigation, the notorious Sejto Cehovic and the even more notorious Fatima Damjanovic started a campaign to collect signatures against the association's work. There were 470 signatures collected, and then the campaign stopped; that was probably the first sign of a warning about their undesirability. Our impression of the presence of fear in the association is also confirmed by the very fact that there are almost no men in its leadership, especially prominent individuals whose voice could be heard and respected more in this area. A period of quiet or more vocal pressure against mixed marriages is obviously still present, and this current Zenica Association can mark as its sole success the fact that it exists and is occasionally distributing some flour, powdered milk, and stale crackers to its members.

Life goes on even in such harsh conditions, however. It is reassuring to hear that in Zenica, in spite of all the media and petty political and religious pressures, mixed marriages are still occurring. Admittedly, in contrast to Tuzla, where the percentage of mixed marriages before the war was 25 percent and has now been increased even further, those percentages have been considerably reduced in Zenica, just as in Sarajevo, but they are still not completely suppressed or negligible. Unfortunately, politics has thus reached the marriage bed, reached the most intimate human right and the freedom to choose one's partner for life. Those who enter into mixed marriages in spite of this are aware of their prolonged risk, but an association like the Zenica one is helpless to change anything for the better.

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Officials Debate on UNPROFOR Issue

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["TV Parliament" phone-in program with guests Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Gojko Susak, Croatian minister of defense; Drazen Budisa, chairman of the HSLS; Radomir Cacic, chairman of the NS; and Zlatko Tomcic, chairman of the HSS and hosted by unidentified announcer]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Good evening. What awaits the Republic of Croatia, its people and all its citizens after the dismissal of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR]? Will the world again play games with Croatia and force it to compromise? How long will we wait for Croatia's unity to be realized and how long will we wait for the return of refugees? I am sure that this evening the distinguished guests of Croatian Television's "TV Parliament" will give us a serious analysis of this, perhaps a polemical one.

I welcome Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister of the Croatian Government and minister of foreign affairs. Welcome to "TV Parliament." Mr. Gojko Susak is minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia and I am sure he will have something to say to the Croatian public this evening. He is responsible for how this decision on UNPROFOR will be implemented and the integrity of the Croatian state also depends a great deal on him. Good evening. On my other side this evening, and I don't know if you will be on the same side, are gentlemen from the Croatian opposition, the leaders: Chairman of the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS] Mr. Drazen Budisa, thank you for coming; Mr. Radomir Cacic is chairman of the Croatian National Party [HNS], the leader of another opposition party, thank you for coming to take part in this "TV Parliament"; and to my right, the chairman of the Croatian Peasants' Party [HSS] Mr. Zlatko Tomcic. [passage omitted]

Mr. Granic, let us begin immediately with you. Is UNPROFOR really leaving Croatia and who will decide about their departure—the world or the Croatian state?

[Granic] The decision about their departure has already been taken by the Croatian state in the letter from President Tudjman to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali. UNPROFOR is leaving the Republic of Croatia, the UNPROFOR mandate ceases at midnight on 31 March 1995, and UNPROFOR is to withdraw from the Republic of Croatia by 30 June 1995.

[Announcer] Mr. Granic, most international reactions express concern, in some cases lack of understanding, sometimes negative reactions. I would like to know, if you can disclose this to the Croatian public, was there any direct pressure on you personally, on the president of the Republic of Croatia, from certain world politicians to change your decision, and can you mention the names of these people or states.

[Granic] Initial reactions certainly showed concern about the outbreak of fresh fighting and this was, I would say, the reaction of our friends. We expected this. Second, the right of the Republic of Croatia to decide for itself about the UNPROFOR mandate was not disputed by anyone throughout this whole period, that is, during the talks between representatives of the president of the Republic of Croatia and eminent officials of the majority of friendly countries. On the other hand there were those who thought Croatia was being premature in taking this decision and there were pressures and opinions which did not agree with this decision, but these were initial reactions. At the moment the view prevails that it is necessary to work intensively with the Republic of Croatia in the search for peace.

[Announcer] Neverthless it seems to me that Mr. Butrus-Ghali in his latest report to the UN Security Council seems to be taking the attitude that neither the decision of the Croatian Assembly nor the decision of the president of the Republic of Croatia exist. He says something else in this report.

[Granic] I would not like to argue with the report of the secretary general because the decision of the Republic of Croatia has already been taken.

[Announcer] Thank you. The leaders of the Croatian opposition will be able to comment on this decision and the international reaction and what this means in practical terms, but first my question to the minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia, Gojko Susak, is a question directly relevant for your ministry: Has Croatia politically been given the permission of its allies, for example the United States, Germany, and some other countries, to use military action within its own state if there is no other way of regaining Croatian territories?

[Susak] No sovereign country asks others what to do on its own territory. We neither consulted nor sought the agreement of anyone. I would only like to mention that this action of terminating UNPROFOR was taken rationally. Anyone who knows the president of the state will know that he did not succumb either to the pressures from the refugees, which in the past three years were very great and understandable, or of many other factors to do something about the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR. I think that today Croatia is in an international position and internal position, including my ministry, where it is able to take such a stand and the president is now taking that stand. I repeat that Croatia, as a sovereign state, neither wants, regardless of the pressures on her, and we will not do anything which is not rational or in accordance with international laws, if we do take the military option, if we are forced to, we will adhere as far as possible to international law even in war [sentence as heard].

[Announcer] I asked this for another reason and I would like to mention another practical situation, which has been visible for several years for Croatia and the aggression of Serbia and Montenegro against Croatia [sentence

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as heard]. Slobodan Milosevic is clearly, deliberately keeping Croatia in suspense and does not want to recognize it. I ask you as minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia, is it time that Croatia recognizes herself?

[Susak] I think that this move that the president of the republic has made is the answer to your question. What the option will be in the end—we will see when we see what the circumstances are at the end of March and later. I would like to mention that I believe a part of the Serb population in the UN-protected zones and throughout Croatia also sees that this is not Croatia's military option, that we do not want to return these zones to the constitutional and legal [word indistinct] of Croatia by war, but at the same time if there is no progress I would only like to say that Croatia is prepared to do this.

[Announcer] Thank you. Several days have passed since the decision, passions have subsided, now the job has to be done; how do opposition leaders view this, Mr. Budisa?

[Budisa] Our party issued a statement on 8 January with a clear stance on UNPROFOR's mandate; the stance is in concordance with the decision taken by the president of the republic; we, as all other relevant political parties and forces in Croatia, have voiced our support for the decision. I believe that this was a sound decision, that Croatia has opted for a more active and decisive policy, that it has opted for its refugees. I do not subscribe to the theory that this was not done under certain pressure - especially from the public and refugees. All national forces have again rallied and united around this crucial issue, and I believe that this is exceptionally important at this moment. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Cacic, What should the Croatian state do today, tomorrow, what would you do?

[Cacic] It is certain that this decision was also a result of pressure, a series of pressures, that it was a result of a unanimous decision by the Croatian parliament—which was not an easy one and which had encountered resistance by the ruling party; it was diluted by this resistance—the opposition's proposal was much tougher. In view of the unanimous stand taken by Croatia's political forces, the Croatian people and the refugees, this decision could have been expected and is welcome.

However, it is also an illustration of the Croatian state's inability to use this international instrument to its own advantage and an illustration of the absence of a strategy to such an effect. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] What arguments can you give for the view of the president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, that Serbia will not interfere in a possible war in Croatia. This question comes from Nikica Martic from Capljina for you [Susak] and Mr. Granic.

[Granic] For economic, political, and logistical reasons. If you look at the present, the current map ...

[Announcer, interrupting] Do you think he is satisfied with what the world is offering him in Bosnia?

[Granic] Not only that. I said economic, and we know exactly what the present economic situation is in Serbia, and the political relations, and as far as the logistic reasons, it is quite clear that he can only help via the corridor, and if it were to come to such a situation, it is clear what the possibilities for assistance via the corridor are.

[Announcer] There are those who think that Slobodan Milosevic wants to resolve Bosnia-Herzegovina first and to leave Croatia to last, like the icing on the cake.

[Granic] Certainly, and Milosevic does not even hide this, that he wants to resolve Bosnia-Herzegovina first, and it is that pattern that we do not accept. For us the prime issue is the solution of the problems of the Republic of Croatia, our occupied territories, and clearly from that position, and in that case it is certainly easier to seek a final and just solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Susak] The statement of the president that Slobodan Milosevic will not interfere, that is his political assessment at the moment, that it would not be opportune for him [Milosevic], both because of international circumstances and the position in which Croatia is now.

[Announcer] Mr. Budisa, this question is for you. To what extent did the opposition influence President Tudjman in making the decision to cancel the UNPROFOR mandate, and in this context: Who is going to bear the responsibility for the potential war, will the opposition parties also share the responsibility for it?

[Budisa] Of course, that is our stand as well. We do not want to avoid taking on the responsibility for what will happen in the future although the authorities must always bear most responsiblity and in any case the decision is the president's. But his decision is not a decision on waging war. I do not think that his decision will necessarily fan the war further. On the contrary, I think that Croatia can use this opportunity to show the world and our people in the occupied territories that Croatia has not opted for intervention not because of the presence of international forces but because it favors a peace option.

[Announcer] It is part of the opposition's strategy, or of the three of you, leaders, when it comes to Croatia's attitude to the international community, to Belgrade, to Knin [as heard]. I would like you to briefly tell us about it. After all, this is an indication of what we should expect to do tomorrow.

[Budisa] As for Belgrade and Knin, I am not speaking on behalf of the opposition but of the HSLS, the further we get from Belgrade the better our relations with Knin. We think that Croatia has not benefited from establishing ties with Milosevic and his regime and from the semi-diplomatic relations—and it is a precedent in world relations that a state enters into such arrangements with

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a state that keeps under occupation one fourth of its territory. I think that Croatia bears part of the responsibility for pulling Milosevic out of international isolation.

As for the occupied areas, it is our view that the constitutional law on the rights of national minorities is a good framework for resolving the problems of status of the Serb community in Croatia providing that in the free parts of Croatia civil rights and the rights of national communities are strictly observed. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Susak, you have asked to speak. I would like both you and later Mr. Granic to explain what strategy—either the negotiating one, political, or military, if needed—will Croatia have at its disposal?

[Susak] I would like to thank the opposition for their constructive advice. Before we continue the discussion, I would like to say one thing about their role in the president's decision. In a democracy it is the people who empower the authorities with their trust. In our case it is the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] that has been entrusted with executive powers. The executive authorities pass decisions as they consider them appropriate. The opposition puts forward its views in parliament. You, gentlemen, have made your views known in parliament. The decision has been made and I see no reason why the president should be consulted about this point. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Granic, speaking of Croatia's state policy, is there a clearly defined plan on what to do with Belgrade and Knin? As far as the talks with Knin are concerned, we can see that the Croatian state delegation is conducting them on a daily or weekly basis. But what about Belgrade, which, we must not forget, is the center of the aggression against the Republic of Croatia, but is also the center for negotiations—the center that holds Knin and Beli Manastir and everything in its hands.

[Granic] It would be very naive to think that negotiations can only be conducted with the local Serbs. This was never the case in history. The local Serbs, I agree, are an internal affair and Croatia must resolve its problems with its own citizens, with the aid of the international community. However, our platform for talks with Belgrade is clear-cut and there can be no concessions here either. The recognition of Croatia is not merely the recognition of just another one of the 115 countries, because that would be irrelevant—it is a matter of sending a signal to the Serbs in the occupied regions, acknowledgment that this is Croatian territory and they must seek a solution to all their problems exclusively within the boundaries of the Republic of Croatia. This would be the essence of recognition. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified speaker] I would like to ask Mr. Susak the following question: We are guardsmen and we know that we will at some point get to Knin either by peaceful or military means, it does not matter which. But I would like to ask Mr. Susak whether we can, with the people we have at our disposal at present, those who are the commanders, whether they can achieve this with the army they have at their disposal at the moment. [passage omitted]

[Susak] Do we have confidence in the people we have? The chief of staff of the Croatian Army is Janko Bobetko who proved himself on the Dubrovnik battlefield and throughout this war has shown that his qualifications are such that he can, if it comes to the war option, lead the war. The commanders of the seven guards brigades are lads who grew up in this war, all seven of them have been involved since 1991 in the Croatian Army, like 90 percent of the members of the guards brigades. I believe that with these brigades and the support of the home guard and the reserves, Croatia can carry out its task.

[Announcer] Thank you very much. Our next viewer, good evening.

[Unidentified speaker] I would like to ask two questions of all the gentlemen present. The first question: I am interested in the views of all those present on what extent the Serbs in the occupied territories want to live in what they consider their, I stress their, state of Croatia, and the second question, are all the gentlemen present utopians or do they not, because of their political maturity, say everything that they are thinking. [passage omitted]

[Granic] We believe that the majority want this and there is sufficient evidence for this, particularly since the opening of the highway, and I think that this should be encouraged.

[Announcer] In other words you are saying that the majority of Croatian citizens in the occupied territories want to live in their own state. But it is also clear, Mr. Granic, that the terrorist leaders in the occupied areas have never once mentioned what is known as autonomy, except perhaps in secret talks.

[Granic] We have terminated the UNPROFOR mandate, noting that we do not want 30 or 40 years of negotiations and this is what Martic and Babic have said, and so on. [passage omitted]

[Susak] I believe that everybody is right to a certain point. Nobody can claim that he has enough information for an ideal solution. I can only say that the Croatian Government's position is that we are addressing the rebel Serbs in the UN protected zones with an outstretched hand, that we are guaranteeing them all the rights enjoyed by all the other citizens of Croatia, if they want to accept this. This would be acceptable in some other circumstances. In the present circumstances, if a referendum were to be held there today, most of them would vote for what their local media had brainwashed them into believing. In different circumstances, when some sort of communication is established, this will change; there is no doubt that some of them will leave Croatia as well. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified speaker] My question is for Mr. Granic. Will the decision to cancel the UNPROFOR mandate

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and the potential war option automatically mean international community sanctions against the Croat side?

[Granic] Suffice it to say that when he was asked about it in connection with the cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate, [German] Minister Kinkel sharply said, no, sanctions are out of the question. Absolutely no one has mentioned or asked for sanctions and they are out of the question at the present juncture. As you saw, the president's statement was very measured, balanced, and I would even say with many positive elements in relation to the Republic of Croatia.

[Unidentified speaker] My question is for Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Granic and Defense Minister Mr. Susak: It is clear to everyone that the government of the Republic of Croatia has opted for a peaceful solution but I would like to know if there are any estimates on how long it would take to carry out the reintegration of the occupied regions by peaceful means and how long by a military action. Articles have appeared in the world press forecasting a so- called blitzkrieg on the part of the Republic of Croatia.

[Granic] As far as the peace option is concerned, it is clear that all the phases of the economic agreement were practically implemented within two months. As for the political option, both negotiations and the models of reintegration and local autonomy, that there will be a special model for the area that will be granted local autonomy, especially western Slavonia, i.e. Baranja and eastern Slavonia, as the plan Z-4 envisages and providing the plan is acceptable to us, in this case it would be no problem for us to talk about the terms, for which, of course, strict deadlines would have to be set and clear guarantees and mechanisms of implementations formulated [sentence as heard].

[Announcer] And what about the second part of the question, Mr. Susak?

[Susak] The organization and the readiness of and the equipment owned by the Croatian Army were not an insignificant factor in the president's decision to cancel the UNPROFOR mandate. That is all I can tell you. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] A question for Mr. Susak from a viewer from Zagreb: Will you resign if we fail to liberate the occupied areas by military means, if it came to that?

[Susak] That would be the most natural thing to do.

[Announcer] Does it mean that you will not resign?

[Susak] We will see about that once we have completed all we have to do. I think this is not the issue of my resignation. The president had to make this decision.

[Announcer] My question was really more about our strength, our capacity to liberate, our organization, modern weapons in the Croatian Army.

[Susak] Here, before the Croatian public, I declare that I am being responsibile when I say that the president made the decision on the basis of my reports and since I do see myself as being responsible for both my assessment of the situation and the outcome. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Another question from our viewers. Good evening. Go ahead.

[Unidentified speaker] Good evening. I do not want to ask the opposition any questions because the opposition has no say in the decisionmaking process.

[Announcer] How do you know?

[Speaker] Well, in most cases it does not. They are alright as a support force but they have no important role to play. My question is for Minister Susak. Tell me, when UNPROFOR goes—and it will have to go—what will happen to the heavy weapons that UNPROFOR is now guarding? Who will get them? My question for Mr. Granic is: We have no sanctions against us, at least the majority of people think that there are no sanctions against us. But, I am telling you, there are sanctions against us, i.e. the [arms] embargo. Croatia is not at war, its territories are occupied but there is no war in Croatia. However, Croatia is under an arms embargo. Why is that?

[Susak] Listen, if Mr. Granic, Mr. Sarinic, and all the officials who have been negotiating both here at home and abroad fail, the weapons will go to the Croatian Army.

[Announcer] What about the embargo, Mr. Granic?

[Granic] Of course, UNPROFOR will take its weapons away but if they want to sell them, well, that is another question. As for the embargo: Well, it is clear the international community and the UN Security Council, in particular, have no intention of lifting the embargo.

[Cacic] Yes, but the initiative instituted from down below [as heard] is very interesting. If the lifting of the embargo against Bosnia is being seriously considered, where do we stand, what about our request?

[Granic] As far as that is concerned, we have been in direct contact with Mr. Dole.

[Announcer] The least we can hope is that our request will be considered together with Bosnia's.

[Granic] Of course. Dole's priority at the moment is, of course, Bosnia, but Croatia is in constant touch with Mr. Dole. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Tomcic, a viewer is asking you if, in the view of your party, President Tudjman fully complied with parliamentary procedure when he decided to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate?

[Tomcic] As I said before, the HSS takes the view that he did not observe the relevant procedure, regardless of his constitutional powers which allow him to pass such a

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decision. We expected the government to present its program of how to implement all this by 10 January and for parliament to respond by 20 January. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified speaker] I have two questions for Mr. Granic. Why has he not returned the visit by Mr. Jovanovic, as announced, and what is behind the mixed oil company signed by Mr. Sarinic, and what currency is going to be used in transaction?

[Granic] As for the first question, it s clear, and I have already made a statement, that the agenda of our meeting must include our mutual recognition. This is the main reason for not returning the visit. In other words, as soon as this happens, conditions will ripen for the next meeting.

[Announcer] What about the currency in the oil deal?

[Granic] Well, in Croatia the kuna is the only valid currency.

[Announcer] Tell us, Mr. Granic, more about this joint oil company. Where will it have its headquarters? Who will be its director general? What is the starting capital? Can the Croatian public be told more about it at this stage?

[Granic] Well, as far as I know INA [Croatian Oil Industry] had 36 gas stations in the area [under Serb control]. This means that the investment would come from INA. The company would, I think, be called INA-Knin. As for other details, they are at the moment being negotiated. In other words, I can see no problem as to why Croatia should not supply its citizens with gasoline, and in my view this is yet another step toward the reintegration of the UN protecteds zones. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] I have another question for Mr. Granic: Even if Serbia recognizes Croatia, do you think that the Serbs from Knin will accept it?

[Granic] It is quite obvious that this would send a clear message to the Serbs in Knin and that the idea of Greater Serbia in the territory of Croatia would at that moment die. And this is very important.

[Announcer] Mr. Susak, a question from a lady viewer from Dubrovnik: Who will take Prevlaka when UNPROFOR withdraws?

[Susak] Either the Croatian Army or the Croatian police. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Budisa, what is your message for the future.

[Budisa] We must continue our peace-creating policy with full respect for the rights of all citizens of Croatia and of all national communities without any restrictions and in line with the constitutional law. We must adhere to the principle of inviolate borders in relation to both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. No arrangements must be made with the Serb side in a naive belief that to comply with Serbia's aspirations in Bosnia would bring about the reintegration of the occupied areas. We must not allow developments to proceed according to the so-called pax Serbiana, in other words, that the Bosnia-Herzegovina issue is first resolved and we are made to wait to be given candies at the end. We must insist that the problem is resolved the other way round: We must cooperate with the Muslims and work on ensuring that the Serbs in Bosnia also agree on the inviolability of the Bosnia-Herzegovina borders and accept solutions as outlined in the Contact Group plan. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] And your message, Mr. Tomcic?

[Tomcic] The HSS will continue to give support to the president's decision and, by implication, to its own view on the need to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate. However, I wish to stress that the departure of UNPROFOR will not leave a vacuum, in other words, it will have to be filled by something else. We firmly believe that the UNPROFOR mandate must not be renewed in its present form but that some kind of control system must be retained. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Susak, how long will the Croatian public and, above all, the Croatian refugees, have to wait before they return to their homes. Can you guarantee—and I do not want dates and deadlines—that there will be no long delays, that in a sensible period of time, Croatia will be able on its own to protect its internationally recognized borders?

[Susak] We made the decision on the withdrawal of UNPROFOR with the final outcome, as outlined by you, in mind. I use this opportunity once again to send this message to the citizens in the UN protected zones: The decision to remove UNPROFOR is not part of the war option; that is not our desire and we plead with them not to force us to resort to it. As the minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia, I would be irresponsible if I were not prepared at any moment to consider that option as well if the president of the republic orders so.

Despite speculations by Mr. Cacic, the state of the Croatian Army, according to the views of those who fought in this and the previous wars here and in the world, is such that, if forced to do it, we will be able to recover the Croatian territory. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Mr. Granic, you will have the last word tonight. Over the next few months you will be very busy. You are, of course, aware that the patience of the Croatian public, of the Croatian people, has its limits and that the Croatian authorities and you, as deputy prime minister and foreign minister, will take note of this. What is you closing message?

[Granic] Well, our fundamental strategic goals are a strong Croatia as part of Europe and in control of its own borders, and we will do our utmost to achieve this in a

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peaceful way with help from the international community. This calls for the most intensive diplomatic efforts in all spheres, from negotiations with local Serbs, with the international community about peaceful reintegration and the mechanisms of supervising the reintegration process. This means that we are not shying away from any form of international control. On the other hand, we are open to the normalization of relations with Serbia, but definitely not before it recognizes Croatia within its borders. We will continue to give firm support to the Washington agreement and the Contact Group's plan and to the positive developments in Sarajevo today and yesterday. We will do our utmost to ensure that the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Federation begins to function and that it is firmly linked to the Republic of Croatia and that eventually a just and lasting solution is found for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Announcer] Mr. Granic, I hope that you, as minister in the government of the Republic of Croatia, could not have signed something that envisaged a period of five or 10 years of procrastrination, that what the Croatian Government has done is not a propaganda move but that it is being serious, that it is taking its people seriously and is seriously concerned for its internationally recognized borders.

[Granic] The decision by the president of the republic and his letter to Butrus-Ghali have been designed to eliminate such ideas. This means no negotiations over many years and decades—there are no reasons for that. We think that conditions are ripe for peaceful reintegration and we will do all in our power to ensure that this happens in a peaceful way; but in no way are we prepared to give up our rights as a sovereign state.

[Announcer] Gentlemen, I thank you for taking part in our program on this very important topic. Respected colleagues and viewers, thank you for you patience over the last two hours.

Council Adheres to UNPROFOR Decision

LD1801150095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In the Presidential Palace an augmented meeting was held today of the National Defense and Security Council. The topics discussed included the issues of Croatia's current internal and foreign policy. Prime Minister Nikica Valentic reported on the outcome of his visits to China and Indonesia.

In response to some proposals, including those by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, the council came to the conclusion that Croatia would adhere to its decision to terminate the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate on 31 March 1995. It was also stressed that further steps must be taken to ensure peaceful reintegration of the temporarily occupied Croatian areas.

Official Tells UN of Continued Serb Violations

LD1801180995 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna Vladimir Soljic today sent a letter to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina General Michael Rose. In his letter Minister Soljic tells Gen. Rose about the continuing Serb attacks on the Livno and Kupres areas and demands that the UNPROFOR commander should make a clear statement for the public about the observation of the cease-fire. We have the main excerpts from the letter:

You certainly have a sufficient amount of information, but we wish to tell you that the Serb side is violating the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, especially on the front lines in the Livno, Glamoc, and Kupres municipalities. The Serb side is also shelling civilian targets, including the towns of Livno and Kupres.

You have been regularly informed of this in writing by the HVO [Croat Defense Council] chief command. A number of people have been killed lately although, in accordance with the agreement, we are not conducting any military operations. We beg you to make a public statement regarding the observation of the agreements signed. If you are not capable of ensuring that the Serb side stops violating the agreement, we beg you to confirm this to us, so that we can take all the necessary countermeasures, without bearing any responsibility or consequences, Minister Soljic told Gen. Rose in his letter.

HRT Director Resigns; Parac Rumored Successor

AU1901131995 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jan 95 p 40

[Report by Aleksa Crnjakovic: "Antun Vrdoljak Resigns"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—We have learned from reliable sources that Antun Vrdoljak, director of Croatian Radio Television [HRT], has submitted his resignation to Sabor Chairman Nedjeljko Mihanovic. The resignation has been forwarded to the Election and Appointment Committee for review.

It is expected that the resignation will be debated and voted on at the next Sabor session, which has already been scheduled, and that in order to be accepted it has to receive the vote of the majority of present deputies. As the resignation has still not been disclosed to the public nor submitted to the Election and Appointment Committee members, there is no indication of the real reasons for Vrdoljak's decision. However, we have learned that the HRT director is too busy with obligations in the Croatian Olympic Committee of which he is president.

It is supposed that the new HRT director will be appointed at the same Sabor session, since according to

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the law, there is no need for a public competition. It is sufficient that the deputies, also with a majority vote, decide on the issue at the proposal of the Election and Appointment Commission. As far as is known, the names of the candidates still have not been submitted to the Committee, but the position will probably be offered to Labor and Welfare Minister Ivan Parac, which means that yet another ministerial post—along with the already existing three—will be vacant.

Serb Reaction to UNPROFOR Mandate Decision

LD1701231095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 17 Jan 95

[Commentary on Darko Herceg]

[FBIS Translated Text] In its proclamation to the Serbs in the Republic of Croatia and, as it seems, to all the citizens of the Republic of Croatia, issued in response to the decision to cancel a new mandate for the UN peace forces in Croatia, the Zagreb-based Serb National Party [SNS] appeals to the Serb people to exercise common sense but the facts it uses in the proclamation are such that it is more likely that the proclamation will be interpreted as a call to revolt. Here is a commentary by Darko Herceg:

[Herceg] How else to interpret the SNS' main claim that the decision to cancel UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] new mandate is a wrong one when in its proclamation the SNS states that 300,000 people, meaning, of course, the Serbs, have been resettled away from the areas under the control of the Croatian authorities, that thousands of dismissals have been carried out with the nationality as the single criterium, that hundreds of people have been summarily liquidated, that the Serbs have been deprived of their existing rights, that thousands of Serbs have been expelled from their apartments, that tens of thousand of residential, industrial, and religious buildings belonging to the Serbs have been burned down and destroyed. These are all arguments often used by Knin radio and Belgrade-based media since 1990 to encourage the Serbs in Croatia to revolt, and as an excuse for arming them with the weapons belonging to the then Yugoslav Army and organized to allegedly defend themselves against the genocide-perpetrating ustasha authorities and their soldiers.

How should we then interpret and understand this argument from the SNS, a parliamentary party with seats in the Croatian Parliament, where, like in the Croatian media, they are given the opportunity—which they are always keen to take advantage of—to voice their views about the problem of the Serbs in Croatia. To call the Serbs in Croatia to show commonsense while at the same time claiming that 300,000 of them have fled Croatia because they were dismissed en masse, expelled from their apartments and workplaces and their churches and homes destroyed, but omitting to mention that earlier over 300,000 Croats and non-Serb population were expelled from Knin, Baranja, Ravni Kotari, Konavli, and western Slavonia; that their houses were also burned down and destroyed and churches mined and graveyards plowed over. To deliberately avoid mentioning these facts is a sign of extreme cynicism on the part of a democratic parliamentary party which, by using a simple argument of this kind will not encourage commonsense in anyone, let alone in the Serbs in Croatia, but will rather encourage revolt, uprising, or more precisely, the continuation of the armed struggle designed to ensure that UNPROFOR stays in Croatia after 31 March after all. For both the SNS, Knin, and even Belgrade are aware that the departure of UNPROFOR will finally bring about a solution to the Serb question in Croatia in a peaceful way as advocated by the Croatian President Dr. Tudjman, or in some other way—the right granted to every sovereign state by international law. In this way the Serbs in Croatia will lose their rights obtained by force and the help of the King in the 1918-41 period and of the Communist Army and police between 1945 and 1990. Under these rights, the Serbs were in total control of the Army and the police and exercised an important influence on the economic, social, and cultural developments in Croatia. This they did for about 70 years and their main aim was not to make improvements but rather to pave the way for the creation of greater Serbia throughout the entire or almost entire area of Croatia.

In the light of the above, the proclamation by the SNS is in fact a political and factual forgery and it would be good if the Serbs of Croatia were to react to it since the proclamation is allegedly addressed to them but the facts indicate that it was in fact written for Knin radio.

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Ministry Rejects Papandreou's 'Preconditions'

AU1801193695 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 18 Jan 95 p 2

[Foreign Ministry statement about an interview with Greek Prime Minister published in Athens KATHEMERINI: "There Cannot Be an Equal Dialogue With Preconditions and Pressure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] wants to attract the world's attention to an interview with Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou published in Athens KATHEMERINI.

Now that in the Balkans and in other regions of the world it has been shown that bilateral disputes cannot be solved through conflict, pressure, preconditions, and embargoes, it is unacceptable to reject initiatives and readiness for dialogue and cooperation aimed at overcoming existing misunderstandings and conflicts. The use of dialogue to solve disputes has already produced positive results in many parts of the world, and, in addition to the support that official international documents give it, U.S. President Clinton was also very decisive in stating that the only way to solve disputes was without setting preconditions.

That is why we are surprised by the claims made by the Greek Prime Minister that the Greek side has done its best to solve the Macedonia-Greek dispute, while insisting in his statement on preconditions before direct dialogue can be established. Every well informed person will ask how there can be an equal dialogue if there are preconditions and pressures. Actually, both sides were asked to open a dialogue by international protagonists (the United Nations, the European Union [EU], and special envoys of the U.S. President and the EU), and they invested great efforts in preparing good conditions for the start of negotiations. But what stood in the way of these negotiations were preconditions and embargoes.

Motivated by the principles of good neighborly relations and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, but also firmly determined that the same principles should apply to it on the part of any other international subject, the Republic of Macedonia has not taken any action that could impede the negotiating process. Unfortunately, after the victory of PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] and Papandreou in Greece, Macedonian-Greek negotiations were disrupted and the Greek side imposed preconditions and an border embargo as a "tactical move." Nevertheless, being unable to accept such illegal actions, the EU itself put its member Greece before the European Court, thus showing its disapproval of actions of this kind.

The Macedonian side has from the very beginning emphasized that direct dialogue is indispensable, with or without mediators, because only this can bring the positions closer and create conditions for solving disputes. Every other alternative damages both sides and therefore the Republic of Macedonia reconfirms its readiness to resume an equal dialogue, principally because it firmly believes that the numerous common interests and needs are a basis for reaching an appropriate solution. Otherwise, the climate of mistrust will continue and will endanger mutual relations and also stability in the southern Balkans.

Deportation of 18 FRY Albanians 'Routine'

LD1801202195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1635 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 18 Jan (TANJUG)—The deportation of 18 ethnic Albanians—Yugoslav citizens—from Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM] to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] at the end of December was not a precedent but a routine procedure applied on a daily basis to other foreigners, Macedonian police chief Ljubomir Frckovski has told journalists.

His statement, carried by the press today, refutes the claims by ethnic Albanian leaders about a political agreement with the FYROM authorities for the visit to this state of 20 "deputies" of the illegal assembly of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, who were involved in the adoption of the "Kacanica constitution."

On Tuesday Frckovski said at a news conference in the Macedonian Government that he knew of no political agreement which approved a visit of "some officials" from another state and said that all foreigners had equal police treatment.

He also said that every day the Macedonian police deport 15 to 20 foreigners. On average, half of these are ethnic Albanians, and some are citizens of East European countries. [passage omitted]

Abdurahman Aliti, one of the vice presidents of the Macedonian Assembly and president of the relatively moderate Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity, which has four ministers in the government, said that due to a change in the political course of the authorities in Skopje he does not rule out the possibility of withdrawing Albanian representatives from the administration and from the assembly.

In Skopje, the deportation of 18 Albanians to the FRY and one to Albania at the end of December is frequently being cited in connection with the illegal opening of the ethnic Albanian "university" (17 December 1994) in Tetovo, in the northwest of the FYROM.

Kosovar MP's Challenge Ministry Over Expulsions

AU1901081595 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 18 Jan 95 p 4

[Report by Panta Djambazoski: "The Albanian Leaders Assert—the Ministry of the Interior Denies"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] A few days after 17 December, when a group of intellectuals and professors secretly proclaimed the Albanian "university" in Tetovo, a major Interior Ministry operation took place in which 20 (Albanian) individuals from Kosovo were deported. The whole matter might not have aroused any interest, particularly not that of the Albanian media in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM], Kosovo, and Albania itself, had they not been members of the former Kosovar assembly or, as they themselves call it, the "Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo," as it proclaimed itself after the "Kacanik Constitution" was adopted.

These media wrote of incorrect behavior on the part of the police, who detained the individuals for questioning, it was claimed, for 60 hours, after which 18 to 20 people were deported to Serbia. They were handed over to the authorities there, while one of them, Iljaz Ramajli, chairman of the Kosovar parliament, was allowed to leave for Albania. Other reasons for the harsh media comments were the police interrogations of two journalists on Pristina's RILINDJA (printed and distributed abroad) accredited in Skopje, one of whom was declared persona non grata in Macedonia for five years, just like the Kosovo members of parliament. They also wrote that those deported did not have enough time to leave and that the whole matter took only a few hours.

Coincidence or Coordination

The most intriguing part of the story related to the claims of some Albanian leaders from Macedonia and Kosovo that the stay of the Kosovar members of parliament had been authorized by a political agreement reached in May 1992 between the (Albanian) Kosovar leadership and that of the Republic of Macedonia. They claim that this was closely linked to the attempts to open a university in Tetovo and, they repeated several times, this was all coordinated with the authorities of the Republic of Serbia, which had confiscated a certain quantity of university material in Kosovo at the same time. Unofficial commentaries claimed the following: The deportations were actually a signal from Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov to Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova that (in connection with the "university") all interference from Kosovo should cease.

Just before the new year, when the police operation was also being covered by the Macedonian language media, Dime Gjurev, deputy secretary of public security at the Interior Ministry, rejected any link with the preventing of the campaign to open the Albanian "university." Gjuner [FYROM Government spokesman] stated that some people active in this initiative might be involved, but they were not legally resident in our country and it was thus purely coincidental. Actually, the Interior Ministry made it explicit that hospitality had been denied to individuals who were not registered in our country, but, according to Gjurev's statement, it could not be ruled out that some of the Kosovar members of parliament had not been involved in university activities. In assessing the whole business, the police noted that the denial of hospitality to foreigners is nothing new or unusual and that in the previous six months the same had been applied to 2,278 foreigners. The largest number had been Albanians, but there were also Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, and so on.

Nevertheless, the case of the Kosovar members of parliament has remained topical into the new year. Ibrahim Rugova recently made a statement to REUTER in which he claimed that their stay had been authorized by an agreement between the Kosovar and Macedonian leaderships. A few days before that, PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] President Abdurahman Aliti claimed something similar in a statement for our newspaper. He concluded that the overall relationship of the Macedonian state toward the Albanians has changed (he meant for the worse) and emphasized that in the case of the Kosovar members of parliament it was unprecedented behavior on the part of the authorities toward legal residence that, he said, had been authorized with their knowledge and approval. He added that some agreements with Albanian politicians had simply been disregarded.

"The Worse—the Better"

Claims about this alleged political agreement were also supported by the RILINDIJA correspondent in Skopje, Ramus Tahiri, in a letter to NOVA MAKEDONIJA (addressed to Minister Ljubomir Frckovski). Tahiri wrote that the agreement had been reached in May 1992 and he confirmed the story about the 19 deported members of parliament, and also said that he himself had been held for 60 hours of questioning, before which his apartment had been searched, as well as his offices. He claims that he was taken in for questioning about the activities of the so-called "Government of the Republic of Kosovo" (Tahiri was the deputy prime minister). There is one interesting part of the letter: Tahiri claims that the agreement permitting the members of parliament to stay stated that "if the Macedonian authorities deem it appropriate, the Kosovar members of parliament must leave Macedonia."

At yesterday's news conference we asked Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski to comment on the "deportations" and the claims that there had been such a political agreement. He said that this question should be asked of the author of the letter and Rugova because they are the ones who are claiming this and he said "I do not know of any political agreement on the stay of officials from another state or organization." They are treated as foreigners, Frckovski added, and, referring to the Kosovar members of parliament, said that they could at certain times be granted an authorized stay and at other times not, and he emphasized that it all depended on the host country. The minister illustrated that 15 to 20 people are deported from Macedonia every day, and on average, half of these are Albanians, while the rest are

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citizens of East European countries. In stating this, the minister avoided dealing with the whole case in political terms and sidesrepped the insinuations that there was any agreement between the Macedonian and the Kosovo leaderships, underlining that the fact that these deportations occurred just after the opening of the so-called "university" was coincidental.

Nevertheless, Frckovski commented on the architects of the opening of the "university," saying that they were operating from antiMacedonian and antinational positions that could hinder the process of integration into a unitary educational system, which is in the national interest. In his opinion, these people are narrow-mindedly operating on the basis of "the worse, the better," with the intention of provoking a conflict with the authorities. The idea behind classes at the Academy of Pedagogy, measures that the government is trying to implement there to solve the educational problems of school teachers in the Albanian language, Frckovski said, was not being helped by the Albanians themselves.

This last comment may provide the best picture of the current policy of Albanian politicians toward reducing the "university" tensions and achieving a better and more lasting solution to the problems in education.

Minister: 5,500 Citizenship Cases 'Doubtful'

AU1801201995 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 18 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by S. Colakvoski: "5,550 Persons With Unsolved Citizenship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recent open letter to our newspaper from Sonja Kolisevska, the wife of Lazar Kolisevski [former state president of Yugoslavia], addressed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and Minister Ljubomir Frckovski personally, has caused various reactions among the public at large. This is first of all because it touches on the problems of several thousand citizens in our country who have not yet had their citizenship status sorted out, although they do fulfill some of the legal conditions for citizenship. One of these is Mrs. Kolisevska.

This public message was received vociferously by the public particularly because there has been some protracted speculation that there is a large number of citizens of the Republic of Macedonia who fulfill some of the basic criteria for obtaining Macedonian citizenship—such as 15 years of uninterrupted residence in the country or that they or their parents were born here—and yet they cannot obtain the right to citizenship.

Usually, so-called "doubtful" cases are people from former Yugoslav republics who are resident and employed in our country, or where one member of a couple is not a Macedonian citizen (we have a large number of people who used to be officers in the former Yugoslav Army)... and they are mostly the ones who have been refused citizenship by the Interior Ministry or their applications have not yet been processed.

At a news conference yesterday, Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski stated the following about these problems and Mrs. Kolisevska's case in particular:

"One might regard it as rigid and inflexible, but the Interior Ministry is acting in strict accordance with the law in this field! It is true that we have received complaints from all quarters—ethnic Albanians, Serbian military officers, and so on, and in these cases it has been the ministry's duty to re-examine the evidence and determine if there were appeals that might have been lost and thus missed the deadline. After that, the process is repeated and the person's status determined. We should note that all people—citizens of the former Yugoslav republics who applied for Macedonian citizenship before 10 November 1993—were able to do so under much easier conditions and criteria. Following this deadline, there is now a charge of $500 for Macedonian citizenship".

As for speculation that there are an enormous number of people in our country who have not had their citizenship determined, that is that their rights were intentionally violated, Frckovski said this:

"First of all, it is up to the individual to apply for citizenship. If there are no charges, then it is simply up to the will of the citizen. In the case of Mrs. Kolisevska, we were actually able to confirm the following: She has never submitted any document to the Interior Ministry and until 1977 she lived in another former Yugoslav republic. We have a very small number of so-called "doubtful" cases, just 5,500, compared with 1,500,000 people who have regular Macedonian citizenship. Once the complaints have been examined, this number will probably fall to around 1,000.

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Italian Senator on Resumption of Bilateral Talks

AU1801193795 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] (Giangiacomo Migone), chairman of the Italian Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, is visiting Slovenia. The senator has had several working meetings in Ljubljana today, among which with the representatives of the parliamentary parties, State Secretary [at the Foreign Ministry] Ignac Golob, and State Chamber Speaker Jozef Skoljc. He was also received by President Milan Kucan. After the talks, presidents of both parliamentary commissions, (Migone) and Thaler, spoke at a news conference about the development of relations between the two states. Nadja Pengov reports:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] First Zoran Thaler: The visit was very important because it signals the possibility of a new beginning, which was our joint view. The direction that the two countries have so far pursued has not led to better relations. It should be different from now on, because, we both believe, bilateral questions should not be linked to international ones. But they must both be addressed.

Thaler said that it was not realistic to expect the talks in themselves to yield solutions. Their aim was to renew the dialogue and for this reason it was agreed to form friendship groups in both parliaments. They did not discuss concrete topics, he said, with the exception of an in-depth debate about minorities.

Senator (Migone) assessed the talks with President Kucan as very fruitful and warm. The fact that their talks were quite long is proof that problems truly exist, but also of an indication that there is a desire to overcome the current difficult phase in relations between the countries. Senator (Migone) finds it very important that there is an agreement that this situation should not drag on for too long and that talks should continue. As he said, relations in the European Community must be given priority. and Slovenia's drawing closer to the European Union is its right and for this reason the process must be unfettered. Both states must be ready for this and the senator appreciated Slovenia's readiness to face all the problems and in this light also the recent statements by Prime Minister Drnovsek.

When asked whether he has sensed any softening of the Slovene position in Ljubljana, he replied:

[(Migone), in Italian with superimposed Slovene translation] An Italian proverb says that a word can be a rock and for this reason I will say, not exactly a softening, but there is readiness, and I have became convinced that the property issue is not a taboo in Slovenia and, in short, that there is readiness to overcome the current situation and to improve living conditions on both sides, which is in the interest of both countries.

[Pengov] Asked by an Italian reporter whether Slovenia continues to insist on the Osimo Agreement as the basis for further talks, Thaler replied that Osimo remains the basis of our relations. Sen. (Migone) said that the Osimo and Rome treaties were signed under extraordinary circumstances; however, they should not become a subject for disputes or a cause of bad relations. The Berlin Wall has fallen, many things have changed, and if the minorities' issue does not create problems, then the property issue can be resolved, too. [end recording]

Discussions With Croats About Economic Relations

AU1801093595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Chamber Economic Commission and the Economic Commission of the Croatian Sabor met in Ljubljana this morning. Delegations led by Feri Horvat and Slavko Degoricija discussed economic relations between the two countries and hinted at possible solutions to open issues. Sonja Znidarsic reports:

[Begin recording] Economic contacts between the neighboring countries have been in steady decline for several years. If in 1990 trade between the countries amounted to $6 billion, the fact that it has declined to a mere $1.2 billion merits additional consideration. This cooling of mutual relations, which is to the detriment of both sides, has both objective and subjective reasons.

The war, according to Slavko Degoricija, cost Croatia over $1 billion, which is, of course, reflected in a slowdown in the economy. Both sides agreed that the low level of the institutionalization of relations, that is, the lack of agreements and treaties to define the economic relations anew following the independence of the two countries, is the main reason for the decline in economic contacts. Because economic issues became politicized, no progress has been made in resolving these issues for a while.

The two sides agreed that the main open issues between the countries are issues regarding property, foreign currency savings of Croatian savers in the Zagreb branch of the Ljubljanska Banka, the property status of Krsko nuclear power plant, and, of course, the question of borders, which lies more in the domain of politics, governments, and foreign policy committees.

The two sides agree that there should be no more taboos, that all questions should be discussed frankly, and solutions sought.

The Slovene side, which was well prepared for the talks, put forward to the guests possible solutions for open issues. Regarding the nuclear power plant, Feri Horvat said that the platform for talks with the Croatian partners is almost ready. An agreement on transportation of oil and its derivatives via Croatia is also in preparation. Regarding foreign currency deposits with Ljubljanska

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Banka in Zagreb, our Finance Ministry is drafting proposals for the talks. It is imperative that an agreement regulating property and legal relations on both sides be signed as soon as possible.

The Slovene side also suggested to Croatia that it think about a free trade agreement, which would spur trade in both directions. The delegations emphasized that the preparation of agreements on the protection of investments, border zone cooperation, and on avoidance of double taxation must be speeded up.

The delegations will report to their governments on the talks and urge them to speed up resolution of the key issues. Our side also expressed an interest that Prime Ministers Drnovsek and Nikica Valentic would meet next month. [end recording]

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Federal

Reopening of TANJUG Office in Beijing

LD1801194995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1907 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 18 Jan (TANJUG)—On the occasion of the reopening of a TANJUG correspondent's office in Beijing, TANJUG director Slobodan Jovanovic had talks with the PRC Ambassador Zhu Ankang at the International Press Centre in Belgrade today.

The talks concentrated on bilateral relations, the promotion of cooperation between Yugoslavia and China, the two countries' views on certain international events, and the general world situation.

The talks were attended by Ms Wu Liyuan, press attache of the PRC Embassy; TANJUG Chief Editor Dusan Zupan; Vesna Prlja, director of the International Press Center; and Predrag Tolpa, TANJUG's new Beijing correspondent. Ambassador Zhu Ankang said that TANJUG has remained an important press agency of international proportions.

All participants in the talks expressed satisfaction about the further consolidation of media contacts between Yugoslavia and China.

'Diplomatic War' Over SFRY Division of Assets

95BA0081A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 19 Dec 94 pp 10-13

[Article by Zoran Jelicic: "Belgrade-Zagreb: Long Drawn-Out Computation"—first paragraph is VREME introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] *There is no end in sight for the diplomatic war over succession of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. The subject matter of this property vacuum, mainly among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, are the Yugoslav foreign exchange reserves, redistribution of debts, and about $550 million worth of property of federal institutions, primarily the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. Expectations that the republics, which "divorced" by war, could themselves agree how to divide up the property of the "marital community" called the SFRY proved to be illusory. New excitement was aroused by the proposal of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] that 8,000 economic and noneconomic projects built with the money of the joint state from 1945 to 1990 be included in the estate. The members of the Yugoslav delegation explained the opposition of Croatia and Slovenia by saying that they would not fare as well, because less investment was made in Serbia. Bozo Marendic, who heads the Croatian delegation, is an optimist: "Just imagine what they will have to do to get the first loan. And time is on our side. The weaker the Serbs, the stronger we are." Miran Mejak, who heads the Slovene delegation, believes that the Serbs are delaying an agreement with their new proposal and "deriving a perverse enjoyment from submitting the bill for Vojvodina grain which we Slovenes have eaten."*

Although it is clear that negotiations on division of the assets of the former SFRY among its members will last an indefinitely long time, the first meeting of the negotiators nevertheless evoked a new wave of excitement. This time the reactions were aroused by the FRY delegation following the most recent meeting of the Conference on Yugoslavia in Geneva, held the last day of November and the first day of December. In short, the first to make a public statement was Kosta Mihajlovic, member of the academy, who heads the FRY delegation, reporting that after prolonged rejection, discussion of the platform offered by the FRY had finally been accepted. That platform is supposed to be on the negotiating table of the next meeting in Geneva, which still has not been scheduled. Perhaps that factor had something to do with the calming of the original satisfaction and a possible change of direction, although it is clear from the last public statements of other members of the FRY delegation that no one expects rapid results from the debate over division of the assets of the former SFRY. To illustrate, in an interview by Gordana Susi (BORBA, 12 December 1994), Dr. Vladan Kutlesic said at one point: "If this conference ever reaches the phase of discussing the key points of the division...."

The fact that consideration of the FRY platform is no longer rejected in Geneva, that is, that there are prospects that that would be the case beginning with the next meeting, means in practice that the estate could be defined differently than up to now. That is, up to now the estate for division that has been on the table was formulated by certain specialized world firms called upon by the organizer of the conference to do that. Most of the estate so defined consisted of the property of the former Federation and its financial obligations and claims. The FRY proposal signifies an essential enlargement of the estate, because its point of departure is that everything financed with the capital of the former state from the end of World War II to the last days of 1990 belong to that state. It is clear even to a superficially informed observer of the ruling system of the former state, that is, of the domination of state capital, especially in the first two decades, that very few economic projects, and indeed even noneconomic projects, will be left off that list of property subject to division. An inventory has been compiled with over 8,000 such properties, VREME was told by Dr. Slobodan Krcevinac, professor in the School of Organizational Sciences of Belgrade University; he heads the team in the Economics Institute which at request of the state selected the methodology and used it to draw up the list of everything that should be distributed among the members of the former SFRY. But there will be more to say about that a bit later.

Judging by the interview with Bozo Marendic, who heads the Croatian delegation in the Geneva negotiations concerning succession, done by Jasmina Popovic

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(the Zagreb weekly PECAT, 13 December 1994), in Geneva the FRY delegation (placed in quotes in that periodical) has on this occasion continued once again its practice of drawing things out and setting up new obstacles to agreements on division: "They have been repeating that they were discriminated against, that they do not recognize the conclusions of the Badinter Commission, that they are entitled to continuity, that we are all secessionists." Marendic goes on to say that the Serbs are taking a very strange approach, because "their demands are not founded on any legal documents or experience," and he adds that it is not true at all that the Yugoslav platform was accepted at the recent meeting in Geneva.

The argument repeated several times that Belgrade is constantly delaying resolution of the division of assets was relativized at the end of this interview by Marendic himself: "We see how important it is to the 'FR Yugoslavia' to join the international community; just remember what we had to do to be accepted; take, for example, just the International Monetary Fund. Just imagine what they will have to do—from general human rights to minority rights—just to get the first loan. And time is on our side. The weaker the Serbs, the stronger we are, and all the problems between us and them will be solved more easily, the weaker they are." To be sure, when there is less rhetoric from day-to-day politics, Marendic is usually realistic and moderate—whether he is saying that the fact that there are no foreign pressures on Croatia to give in to the FRY's proposals now does not mean that there will not be any tomorrow, or when he explains that their attempt to obtain the real estate of the SFRY abroad met with a snag in Washington's position: "Yes, you are right, but if we meet your demands for a portion of the real estate in the United States, they will block the property of the United States in Belgrade, and at the moment this does not suit us."

That kind of realism, aside from the passage mentioned in the interview with Vladan Kutlesic, can also be seen at the end of an interview with Dr. Dragana Gnjatovic, also a member of the Yugoslav delegation, done by Branislav Radivojsa (POLITIKA, 11 December 1994): "As far as our documents go, their destiny depends on the political development of events and the way the Yugoslav crisis as a whole is resolved." At the same time, Dragana Gnjatovic points to the specific nature of the socioeconomic system of the SFRY, that is, to the much greater joint financing than is customary in states with clearly separate public and private property, and she conveyed the assessment of the Yugoslav delegation that a way was found out of the Geneva blind alley with the "consent of the conference that the Yugoslav side make its case for its definition of state property by preparing its own inventory."

The original inventory of the estate, VREME was told by Slobodan Krcevinac, was drawn up quite arbitrarily and with large material mistakes, even in accounting. For instance, accounting mistakes of about $28 billion were made in adding up military property. The estimate of military property was increased by that amount, but there has been no clear correction of the original estimates, which are obviously mistaken.

The essence of the present inventory now being advocated in Geneva by the Yugoslav delegation comes down to the proposition that the property of the former federation included not only what nominally belonged to it (buildings, automobiles, and so forth), but everything in the past decades of socialism that was built with joint money. Everything in which the former SFRY invested is state property, Krcevinac says, and for a long time the state was by far the largest investor in economic and noneconomic projects. All those investments have been revalued, beginning with the date of the first secession from the SFRY, including even a moderate rate of interest of about 3 percent per annum. For example, if Litostroj in Ljubljana was built with state capital, that is, joint capital, sometime in the 1950's, then every investor should now be credited with an aliquot part of that value, increased by the annual rate of interest mentioned in the meantime. Krcevinac says that the inventory was not drawn up arbitrarily, but on the basis of official documents, usually decisions of the government and other competent agencies of the state. Interest was not applied to those investment projects of the state that were not for production purposes.

The entire inventory consists of three parts: real estate, movable property whose location is known, and financial elements. The first step is to estimate the value of each of these groups, and, of course, the individual parts of the groups, as of the date when the estate's formation began. The FRY position is that that is the date of secession of each of the four former Yugoslav republics which are not now part of the FRY. Stated specifically, as of the moment when Slovenia declared secession from the SFRY, all other members became entitled to claims against it. Those claims include the consequences of secession insofar as they can be expressed in material terms.

However, Krcevinac says, at the very first step we encounter obstruction by those to whom we are talking, because they do not accept our definition of the property of the state. It is obvious that they would not fare as well in this case, because the investments were larger in some of them than in Serbia, especially Serbia proper and Vojvodina. Asked whether that platform of the FRY signifies a review of the entire policy of the SFRY, and indeed even the Serbian leaderships in that period, Krcevinac replies that it is not a question of that, but only of recording official facts and of the calculable consequences. In Krcevinac's assessment, the time has now really come for accounts to be settled, according to the demand in the period of the mass movement in Croatia, and also later from other centers, so that it is better to calculate what belongs to whom than to fail to make any calculation because it cannot be done altogether precisely. The Yugoslav platform, like any other,

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contains a lengthy number of elements that would deserve public attention if negotiations about the division of assets were on the horizon. However, whether of because the fear already referred to or the conviction of several sides to the dispute that resolution of the dispute will be political, at this moment there remain two possible assessments of the future development of negotiations. One is that all the Yugoslav negotiators will be so economically exhausted that they will be forced to concessions that facilitate the financial divorce. The other way out of the blind alley is surrealist, but also realistic when the place, time, and participants in the event are taken into account. Put specifically, the first version means that the thirst for foreign capital of all or most of the participants in the division of assets outweighs distribution of property whose value is not as evident as it seems to each of the participants. In that scenario, effective entry into the IMF, the World Bank, and access to the treasuries of other potential creditors of the broken-down postsocialist economies is decisive. If that world "money whip" does not work, there remains "salvation from heaven." It can be imagined in the full spirit of one of Rabelais' main characters, precisely in that part of *Gargantua and Pantagruel* in which the latter renders judgment in such a lengthy court suit that even the opponents have forgotten why the trial began, and their representatives sought out the quack lawyer Pantagruel to use his "knowledge" to save face in the law suit and the legal profession. Rable's hero sentences the litigants—Kissbreech and Suckfist—to live in harmony in the future.

Problematic Issue of SFRY Division of Assets

95BA0081B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 19 Dec 94 p 13

[Article by Svetlana Vasovic Mekina: "Slovenia: Perverse Calculation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although in the shadow of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the diplomatic battle over succession of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], unappealing to the media, but exceedingly important to all the states that belonged to the former Yugoslavia, is still taking place in Geneva. The subject matter for negotiation consists of the remaining Yugoslav foreign exchange reserves, redistribution of debts, and about $500 million worth of property of federal institutions, above all of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslavia, property scattered over more than 80 states.

Only a few ambassadors of the former SFRY have managed to transfer the property that they managed to the newly created states. A well-known example is that of the SFRY ambassador in Vienna, who suddenly became ambassador of the Republic of Croatia and at the same time brought with him the embassy in dowry, by simply declaring it to be Croatian. He thus made it possible for his new homeland to take possession of almost $3 million worth of Yugoslav real estate. As far as Slovenia is concerned, "successful control of federal property" (or—robbery—it all depends, of course, on the point of view) has been managed only (of the 11 ambassadors who were Slovenes and who properly handed over the keys) by Istok Simoniti, adviser to the Slovene ambassador in Rome, who in spite of protests of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs has remained in an apartment that is still formally the property of the SFRY.

The Slovene delegation has emphasized the criterion of the contribution to the federal budget, whereby Slovenia would automatically be entitled to more than 20 percent of Yugoslav property. However, that model was quickly rejected following the criticism of European experts. The next criterion offered was that of division of the debts to the International Monetary Fund; Slovenia would then be entitled to 16.39 percent, the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] 36.52 percent, Croatia 28.49 percent, Bosnia-Herzegovina 13.2 percent, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 5.4 percent of all Yugoslav property. Following the protest of the Macedonian delegation that that criterion does not allow for normal conduct of business, the remaining four delegations (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) provisionally consented to a different division whereby Slovenia would get 16 percent, the FRY 35.3 percent, Croatia 27.2 percent, Bosnia-Herzegovina 13 percent, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 8.5 percent of Yugoslav property. However, the agreement fell through because Macedonia, members of the Slovene delegation have been explaining, did not consent to that kind of division as some kind of charity, but was insisting on the criterion of the size of the population, which was rejected by Slovenia. To make everything still more interesting, according to the testimony of members of the Slovene delegation, additional complications were caused by the Serbian-Montenegrin delegation, which walked out of the negotiations temporarily.

In response, all the delegations (except the FRY, of course) proposed that the property be divided even against the will of the FRY. They gave as grounds the urgent need of the newly created states and the illegality of the FRY's management of the joint property. But because no international body has the prerogative to make such a decision, it went no further than resounding words. Much the same is true of the FRY's threats that the dispute would be decided by the court in The Hague. In the opinion of Dr. Mirjam Skrk, expert from the Ljubljana Law School, "that would not be possible, because in the court all parties to the dispute must first reach agreement and define precisely what they actually want."

It is also evident that an overall agreement is still very far off from the words of Dr. Miran Mejak, who warned after his return from Geneva that the representatives of the Serbian-Montenegrin delegation had returned once again to hard positions and were repeating "outright

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stupidities" in order to drag out the process of reaching agreement. "For example, representatives of the FRY have been attempting to calculate who had the greatest benefit from the cheap Vojvodina grain that was purchased and also the cheap raw materials that were resold to the West on the basis of 'price disparities' since 1965 or indeed even earlier. Academician Kosta Mihajlovic, who has been dealing with this for quite a long time now, derives real enjoyment from these schemes, a perverse enjoyment when he calculates how cheap the Vojvodina grain was that we Slovenians ate. And in the end he, of course, came to the conclusion that not only should we not get anything from Yugoslav property, but we ought to make additional payments to them!"

Miran Mejak points to the fact that the properties, which the FRY is maintaining badly, are running down rapidly and that in the end nothing will be left that could be divided; at the same time, he warns of theft. "An experienced diplomat of one state told me some time ago that he has concluded on the basis of serious information that the robbery of those properties has been organized. Certain articles have simply disappeared from Yugoslav embassies, the embassy reports the theft, but actually those articles were 'appropriated' by the personnel themselves. And the total property designated for distribution is thereby being diminished."

In any case, the atmosphere around the negotiations is morbid somehow. Because the Slovene and Macedonian languages have still not been made official languages of the London conference, the Slovene negotiators, just like the Macedonian negotiators, are talking to representatives of the other delegations only in English by way of protest. The Serbian and Montenegrin representatives, by contrast, are using the "official" language, Serbian, while the Croatian and Bosnian negotiators are sticking to Croatian and "Bosnian," respectively. Only the translators for Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian, we have learned from participants in the conference, are still the same.

Serbia

Newsprint Shortage Affects Newspaper Production

AU1801193895 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "No Newsprint, Huge Damage Ensues"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite all the announcements that the newsprint situation will improve, promises that newspaper houses will receive as much newsprint as they need, and assurances that the state has guaranteed the Matroz Paper Mill all conditions for normal and maximum production, insufficient, irregular, and untimely newsprint deliveries are still exhausting the newspaper houses. It was for this reason that yesterday not all the newspapers appeared on the newsstands and that the Belgrade issue of POLITIKA arrived late and was published in only a limited number of copies.

Matroz has obviously learned nothing from the government's criticism or from the experience with the holiday issue of POLITIKA; it only repeated something we have already seen. And this has been going on for the last two months, long enough to exhaust even the most powerful publishers.

Let us recall, according to the Serbian Government's decision, the newspaper, that is, the Politika Newspaper Enterprise, was granted delivery of 40 metric tons of newsprint a day, or 1,200 metric tons per month. Despite the government's decision, in December Politika received only 841,736 kg of newsprint, or 32,374 kg a day, as has been carefully documented.

Kosovo

'Platform' Needed To Halt Serb Colonization

AU1801144395 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 17 Jan 95

[Mehmet Haziri telephone report from Kosova]

[FBIS Translated Text] After launching furious antiAlbanian propaganda and undertaking actions to populate Kosova with new and old Serbs, Belgrade officials and mass media under their control have started to institutionalize these actions.

Several days ago, the so-called Federal Government of Belgrade issued a decree that aims at bringing 100,000 Serbian colonists into Kosova, calling them returning cadres and evicted citizens. This year Belgrade has distributed over 4 million dinars solely for the construction of flats for new colonists.

A report by the Information Center confirms that with the latest decree, the Federal Government of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia offers very favorable conditions for Serbs who would like to live in Kosova. To construct houses or buy flats, Serbs are offered credits to be paid back over a period of 40 years, while the ground is free of charge. In order to realize this form of colonization in Kosova, Serbs are offered facilities for the procedure of preparing the necessary documentation—they just have to present a written demand and the relevant document on the number of family members to the commune where they are to be established.

Thus, Belgrade's century-old dream to make Kosova a Serb land still continues even at the end of this century when hegemonies are falling and the integration processes within the entire Albanian area have embarked on an uninterrupted road.

Apart from the possibility or impossibility of these colonist aims of Serbia's to be realized, the steps undertaken by the current Serbian regime cannot be completely ignored. The construction of whole districts for

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Serbs arriving in Stanos in Vushtrri and Junik in Decan, the conversion of agricultural properties of the current social sector into ground and real estates for Serbs and Montenegrins, and the distribution of the Albanians' houses to Serbian and Montenegrin refugees are sufficient elements for our political bodies to show greater concern toward this problem, which causes frequent and recurrent suffering to the Albanians of Kosova.

At a meeting with representatives of the UNHCR, President Rugova drew attention to the fact that the construction of several colonist villages in Kosova and the threat of starting other similar constructions adds to the political tensions in Kosova.

We think that our political parties, other bodies, and all forces that act in the framework of the national movement for the independence of Kosova should set up a concrete and constant platform to counteract, by more organized means, Serbia's colonization projects.

30,000 Albanians Leave Country in 3 Months

AU1801131195 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During the past three months, over 30,000 Albanians from Kosova have left for various countries of the world through the reopened Tivar-Bari line between Montenegro and Italy. Thus, Tivar has become a great port for the evacuation of Albanians fleeing the Serbian violence in Kosova, in search of existence and a bite of bread throughout the world.

There are reports that due to the great number of passengers, the port of Bari in Italy has started to turn back Albanian passengers.

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